widely recognized exception in Florida

2009Mr. Santana's claim that the DOC has no lawful authority to hold him is analogous to a "challenge to agency jurisdiction," which, when made "on persuasive grounds," constitutes "a widely recognized exception to the exhaustion doctrine." Falls Chase, 424 So.2d at 794 (footnote omitted).

2009Mr. Santana’s claim that the DOC has no lawful authority to hold him is analogous to a “challenge to agency jurisdiction,” which, when made “on persuasive grounds,” constitutes “a widely recognized exception to the exhaustion doctrine.” Falls Chase, 424 So.2d at 794 (footnote omitted).

2014Falls Chase, 424 So.2d at 794 n. 16 (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, 475 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir.1973)); see also Wingfield, 581 So.2d at 196 (holding that agency statement that “imposes requirements ... not specifically required by statute ... constitute[s] an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority”).

1983In such a case the courts have jurisdiction of suits to enjoin the enforcement of an order, even if the plaintiff has not attempted to secure redress in a proceeding before the commission. [citations omitted] The District Court properly assumed jurisdiction of this suit. (emphasis supplied) Coca-Cola Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 475 F.2d 299, 303 (C.A. 5th 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 877 , 94 S.Ct. 121 , 38 L.Ed.2d 122 (1973): The most widely recognized exception to the general rule against judicial consideration of interlocutory agency rulings is the class of cases where an agency has e

2015This judicially-created exception provides that it is permissible to pursue declaratory relief in a circuit court — without first pursuing and exhausting administrative remedies — if “an agency acts without colorable statutory authority that is clearly in excess of its delegated powers.” Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 792 So.2d 539, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); e.g., Curry, 722 So.2d at 878 (outlining the basis for the exception, providing that when “an agency acts without the benefit of any rule, and in a manner clearly in excess of its statutory authorization, the ac

2015This judicially-created exception provides that it is permissible to pursue declaratory relief in a circuit court — without first pursuing and exhausting administrative remedies — if “an agency acts without colorable statutory authority that is clearly in excess of its delegated powers.” Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 792 So.2d 539, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); e.g., Curry, 722 So.2d at 878 (outlining the basis for the exception, providing that when “an agency acts without the benefit of any rule, and in a manner clearly in excess of its statutory authorization, the ac

2015A challenge to agency jurisdiction on persuasive grounds is a widely recognized exception. to the exhaustion doctrine.”) (citation and footnote omitted); Dep’t of Health v. Curry, 722 So.2d 874, 878 (Fla., 1st DCA, 1998) (“The doctrine which requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies is based upon considerations of policy, rather than of jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted).

2014Falls Chase, 424 So.2d at 794 n. 16 (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, 475 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir.1973)); see also Wingfield, 581 So.2d at 196 (holding that agency statement that “imposes requirements ... not specifically required by statute ... constitute[s] an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority”).

2010See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir.1974) (noting “the widely recognized principle- that no cause of action lies against a defendant whose negligence prevents the plaintiff from obtaining a prospective pecuniary advantage”).

1983Mobil Oil Corporation v. Department of Energy, 469 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (D.C.N.Y. 1979). [17] See also Adams Packing Association, Inc. v. Florida Department of Citrus, 352 So.2d 569, 570-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); School Board of Leon County v. Mitchell, 346 So.2d 562, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979): A distinction between a proceeding essentially seeking a review of agency action, and one essentially seeking a determination of rights has also been used as a litmus in determining jurisdiction.

1983Mobil Oil Corporation v. Department of Energy, 469 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (D.C.N.Y. 1979). [17] See also Adams Packing Association, Inc. v. Florida Department of Citrus, 352 So.2d 569, 570-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); School Board of Leon County v. Mitchell, 346 So.2d 562, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979): A distinction between a proceeding essentially seeking a review of agency action, and one essentially seeking a determination of rights has also been used as a litmus in determining jurisdiction.

1983Mobil Oil Corporation v. Department of Energy, 469 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (D.C.N.Y. 1979). [17] See also Adams Packing Association, Inc. v. Florida Department of Citrus, 352 So.2d 569, 570-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); School Board of Leon County v. Mitchell, 346 So.2d 562, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979): A distinction between a proceeding essentially seeking a review of agency action, and one essentially seeking a determination of rights has also been used as a litmus in determining jurisdiction.

1983Mobil Oil Corporation v. Department of Energy, 469 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (D.C.N.Y. 1979). [17] See also Adams Packing Association, Inc. v. Florida Department of Citrus, 352 So.2d 569, 570-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); School Board of Leon County v. Mitchell, 346 So.2d 562, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979): A distinction between a proceeding essentially seeking a review of agency action, and one essentially seeking a determination of rights has also been used as a litmus in determining jurisdiction.