9 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crowell v. Bilandicgreen2 sentences2015DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 76 (2006) (citing Crowell v. Bilandic, 81 Ill. 2d 422, 428 (1980)). “[A] fiduciary who is silent, and thus fails to fulfill his duty to disclose material facts concerning the existence of a cause of action, has fraudulently concealed that action, even without affirmative acts or representations.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 77. 2006See also Crowell v. Bilandic, 81 Ill. 2d 422, 428 (1980) (“It is well established that fraudulent concealment sufficient to toll a statute of limitations requires affirmative acts or representations designed to prevent discovery of the cause of action”; however, there is “a widely recognized exception to this general rule in those instances when the existence of a fiduciary relationship is clearly established”). | 5 | 5 |
DeLuna v. Burciagagreen2 sentences2015DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 76 (2006) (citing Crowell v. Bilandic, 81 Ill. 2d 422, 428 (1980)). “[A] fiduciary who is silent, and thus fails to fulfill his duty to disclose material facts concerning the existence of a cause of action, has fraudulently concealed that action, even without affirmative acts or representations.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 77. 2015DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 76 (2006) (citing Crowell v. Bilandic, 81 Ill. 2d 422, 428 (1980)). “[A] fiduciary who is silent, and thus fails to fulfill his duty to disclose material facts concerning the existence of a cause of action, has fraudulently concealed that action, even without affirmative acts or representations.” - 10 - (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 77. | 2 | 4 |
cluster 676508green1 sentence2018See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co. , 32 F.3d 851 , 863 (3d Cir. 1994). ¶ 54 Both Pappas and Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. , involved the widely recognized principle that a party who sues a former attorney for malpractice implicitly waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to that attorney's representation. | 1 | 1 |
Vigus v. O'Bannongreen1 sentence1980(Annot., 173 A.L.R. 576 , 588 (1948); see Vigus v. O’Bannon (1886), 118 Ill. 334, 346 ; County of Cook v. Barrett (1975), 36 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hagney v. Lopeman
green
1 sentence2006Although this court, in Hagney, went on to insist upon strict pleading requirements as a prerequisite to reliance upon fraudulent concealment provisions — stating that plaintiffs must allege “the trust which was reposed in the fiduciary prevented the discovery of the cause of action” within the limitations period (Hagney, 147 Ill. 2d at 465 ) — the court did not repudiate the principles espoused in Kenroy. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
County of Cook v. Barrett
green
1 sentence1980(Annot., 173 A.L.R. 576 , 588 (1948); see Vigus v. O’Bannon (1886), 118 Ill. 334, 346 ; County of Cook v. Barrett (1975), 36 Ill. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences1977In People v. Williams (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 455 , 288 N.E.2d 406 , however, that court ruled that in alleging attempted aggravated kidnapping the charge need not set forth all of the elements of the substantive offense attempted. 1977In People v. Williams (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 455 , 288 N.E.2d 406 , however, that court ruled that in alleging attempted aggravated kidnapping the charge need not set forth all of the elements of the substantive offense attempted. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Continental Insurance
green
2 sentences1975Co. (1971), 49 Ill.2d 1 , 273 N.E.2d 353 ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. (1972), 9 Ill.App.3d 287, 289 , 292 N.E.2d 75 .) In Sears, the court summarized the more widely recognized factors which have been considered relevant to a determination of whether the doctrine should be applied in a particular case: "Numerous factors have been cited as relevant to determining whether to exercise the doctrine. 1975Co. (1971), 49 Ill.2d 1 , 273 N.E.2d 353 ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. (1972), 9 Ill.App.3d 287, 289 , 292 N.E.2d 75 .) In Sears, the court summarized the more widely recognized factors which have been considered relevant to a determination of whether the doctrine should be applied in a particular case: "Numerous factors have been cited as relevant to determining whether to exercise the doctrine. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Fender v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1975Co. (1971), 49 Ill.2d 1 , 273 N.E.2d 353 ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. (1972), 9 Ill.App.3d 287, 289 , 292 N.E.2d 75 .) In Sears, the court summarized the more widely recognized factors which have been considered relevant to a determination of whether the doctrine should be applied in a particular case: "Numerous factors have been cited as relevant to determining whether to exercise the doctrine. 1975Co. (1971), 49 Ill.2d 1 , 273 N.E.2d 353 ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. (1972), 9 Ill.App.3d 287, 289 , 292 N.E.2d 75 .) In Sears, the court summarized the more widely recognized factors which have been considered relevant to a determination of whether the doctrine should be applied in a particular case: "Numerous factors have been cited as relevant to determining whether to exercise the doctrine. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.