widely recognized rule in South Carolina

2005State v. Doster, 276 S.C. 647, 651 , 284 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1981) (internal citations omitted).

2005State v. Doster, 276 S.C. 647, 651 , 284 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1981) (internal citations omitted).

2000Quoting the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court stated, “ ‘[ejxpert witness testimony is a widely-recognized exception to the rule against hearsay testimony.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.1971) (en banc) (1972)).

1997As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, “Expert witness testimony is a widely-recognized exception to the rule against hearsay testimony.” Williams, 447 F.2d at 1290 .

2024The trial judge's decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion."(citation omitted)); Sloan v. Friends of Hunley, Inc., 369 S.C. 20, 25 , 630 S.E.2d 474, 477 (2006) ("A justiciable controversy exists when there is a real and substantial controversy which is appropriate for judicial determination, as distinguished from a dispute that is contingent, hypothetical, or abstract."); Wallace v. City of York, 276 S.C. 693, 694 , 281 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1981) ("The function of appellate courts is not to give opinions on merely abstract or theoretical matters, but only to decide actual cont

2024The trial judge's decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion."(citation omitted)); Sloan v. Friends of Hunley, Inc., 369 S.C. 20, 25 , 630 S.E.2d 474, 477 (2006) ("A justiciable controversy exists when there is a real and substantial controversy which is appropriate for judicial determination, as distinguished from a dispute that is contingent, hypothetical, or abstract."); Wallace v. City of York, 276 S.C. 693, 694 , 281 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1981) ("The function of appellate courts is not to give opinions on merely abstract or theoretical matters, but only to decide actual cont

2024This is exemplified by the widely recognized rule that the privilege does not extend to communications in furtherance of criminal, tortious [,] or fraudulent conduct." (citations omitted)); Tobaccoville USA, Inc. v. McMaster, 387 S.C. 287, 292 , 692 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2010) ("[W]hether or not a communication [between attorney and client] is privileged and confidential is a matter for the trial judge to decide after a preliminary inquiry into all the facts and circumstances.

2024This is exemplified by the widely recognized rule that the privilege does not extend to communications in furtherance of criminal, tortious [,] or fraudulent conduct." (citations omitted)); Tobaccoville USA, Inc. v. McMaster, 387 S.C. 287, 292 , 692 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2010) ("[W]hether or not a communication [between attorney and client] is privileged and confidential is a matter for the trial judge to decide after a preliminary inquiry into all the facts and circumstances.

2024The trial judge's decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion."(citation omitted)); Sloan v. Friends of Hunley, Inc., 369 S.C. 20, 25 , 630 S.E.2d 474, 477 (2006) ("A justiciable controversy exists when there is a real and substantial controversy which is appropriate for judicial determination, as distinguished from a dispute that is contingent, hypothetical, or abstract."); Wallace v. City of York, 276 S.C. 693, 694 , 281 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1981) ("The function of appellate courts is not to give opinions on merely abstract or theoretical matters, but only to decide actual cont

2024The trial judge's decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion."(citation omitted)); Sloan v. Friends of Hunley, Inc., 369 S.C. 20, 25 , 630 S.E.2d 474, 477 (2006) ("A justiciable controversy exists when there is a real and substantial controversy which is appropriate for judicial determination, as distinguished from a dispute that is contingent, hypothetical, or abstract."); Wallace v. City of York, 276 S.C. 693, 694 , 281 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1981) ("The function of appellate courts is not to give opinions on merely abstract or theoretical matters, but only to decide actual cont

2006In State v. Pelham, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted “the widely recognized principle that removal of life support, as a matter of law, may not constitute an independent intervening cause for purposes of lessening a criminal defendant’s liability.” Pelham, 824 A.2d at 1092 ; see also State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 455-56 (Utah 1986) (“[R]emoval of the respirator was not the cause of death .... the neurological surgeon who performed the surgery on [the victim] after the assault, testified that blunt-instrument injuries were the cause of death.”); State v. Yates, 64 Wash.App. 345 , 824 P.2d 5

2006In State v. Pelham, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted “the widely recognized principle that removal of life support, as a matter of law, may not constitute an independent intervening cause for purposes of lessening a criminal defendant’s liability.” Pelham, 824 A.2d at 1092 ; see also State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 455-56 (Utah 1986) (“[R]emoval of the respirator was not the cause of death .... the neurological surgeon who performed the surgery on [the victim] after the assault, testified that blunt-instrument injuries were the cause of death.”); State v. Yates, 64 Wash.App. 345 , 824 P.2d 5

2006In State v. Pelham, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted “the widely recognized principle that removal of life support, as a matter of law, may not constitute an independent intervening cause for purposes of lessening a criminal defendant’s liability.” Pelham, 824 A.2d at 1092 ; see also State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 455-56 (Utah 1986) (“[R]emoval of the respirator was not the cause of death .... the neurological surgeon who performed the surgery on [the victim] after the assault, testified that blunt-instrument injuries were the cause of death.”); State v. Yates, 64 Wash.App. 345 , 824 P.2d 5