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9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2012–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Frazier v. the Stategreen2 sentences2016Because [Peak] had raised the defense of accident at the time of trial, the credibility of the only two eye-witnesses was crucial.” The trial court concluded that “because the credibility of [Peak] was so important to determine if this was an accidental or intentional shooting, the probative value of admitting the prior felony convictions substantially outweighed the potential prejudicial effect.” See Johnson, 328 Ga. App. at 709 (3) (b) (no abuse of discretion where the trial court considered the Clay factors and held that given the nature of the charges in the case and the fact that the cred 2016Because [Peak] had raised the defense of accident at the time of trial, the credibility of the only two eye-witnesses was crucial.” The trial court concluded that “because the credibility of [Peak] was so important to determine if this was an accidental or intentional shooting, the probative value of admitting the prior felony convictions substantially outweighed the potential prejudicial effect.” See Johnson, 328 Ga. App. at 709 (3) (b) (no abuse of discretion where the trial court considered the Clay factors and held that given the nature of the charges in the case and the fact that the cred | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. the Stategreen2 sentences2016Because [Peak] had raised the defense of accident at the time of trial, the credibility of the only two eye-witnesses was crucial.” The trial court concluded that “because the credibility of [Peak] was so important to determine if this was an accidental or intentional shooting, the probative value of admitting the prior felony convictions substantially outweighed the potential prejudicial effect.” See Johnson, 328 Ga. App. at 709 (3) (b) (no abuse of discretion where the trial court considered the Clay factors and held that given the nature of the charges in the case and the fact that the cred 2016Because [Peak] had raised the defense of accident at the time of trial, the credibility of the only two eye-witnesses was crucial.” The trial court concluded that “because the credibility of [Peak] was so important to determine if this was an accidental or intentional shooting, the probative value of admitting the prior felony convictions substantially outweighed the potential prejudicial effect.” See Johnson, 328 Ga. App. at 709 (3) (b) (no abuse of discretion where the trial court considered the Clay factors and held that given the nature of the charges in the case and the fact that the cred | 2 | 2 |
State v. Brawnergreen1 sentence2022Accordingly, Clay has not shown that the State acted in bad faith, and his contention 4 See generally Brawner, 297 Ga. App. at 820-821 (reversing dismissal of indictment and finding that the acts of obtaining and losing a videotape, alone, “are insufficient to support a finding of bad faith. | 1 | 1 |
Clay v. Stategreen1 sentence2022See Clay, 290 Ga. at 841-843 (5) (B)-(C) (upholding denial of motion and finding no due process violation in the State’s destruction of evidence where, “[a]lthough the trial court’s written order denied Clay’s motion without making factual findings or legal conclusions, at the conclusion of the hearing on Clay’s motion, the court orally found nothing ‘wilfully wrong’ in the GBI’s destruction of the blood samples, a finding that is supported by the evidence in the record. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See id. | 1 | 1 |
Diversified Holdings, LLP v. City of Suwaneegreen1 sentence2020See Diversified Holdings, 302 Ga. at 606-608 (III); Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette & Amusement Services, 267 Ga. 173, 174 ( 476 SE2d 581 ) (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette & Amusement Services, Inc.green2 sentences2020See Diversified Holdings, 302 Ga. at 606-608 (III); Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette & Amusement Services, 267 Ga. 173, 174 ( 476 SE2d 581 ) (1996). 2020See Diversified Holdings, 302 Ga. at 606-608 (III); Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette & Amusement Services, 267 Ga. 173, 174 ( 476 SE2d 581 ) (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Hites v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Thus, Frazier waived this enumeration of error on appeal by failing to object to what he now claims were inadequate findings. “[I]n order to raise on appeal an impropriety regarding the admissibility of evidence, the specific ground of objection must be made at the time the evidence is offered, and the failure to do so amounts to a waiver of that specific ground.” (Citation omitted.) Hites, 296 Ga. at 530, n. 4 (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court did not perform or articulate the required balancing test pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-84.1 where that specific objection was not made at 2016Thus, Frazier waived this enumeration of error on appeal by failing to object to what he now claims were inadequate findings. “[I]n order to raise on appeal an impropriety regarding the admissibility of evidence, the specific ground of objection must be made at the time the evidence is offered, and the failure to do so amounts to a waiver of that specific ground.” (Citation omitted.) Hites, 296 Ga. at 530, n. 4 (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court did not perform or articulate the required balancing test pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-84.1 where that specific objection was not made at | 1 | 1 |
Childs v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Childs v. State, 287 Ga. 488, 493 (5) ( 696 SE2d 670 ) (2010). 2012See Childs v. State, 287 Ga. 488, 493 (5) ( 696 SE2d 670 ) (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Tate v. Stategreen2 sentences2012(Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1) ( 440 SE2d 646 ) (1994). 2012(Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1) ( 440 SE2d 646 ) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2020Specifically, Clay asserts: that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 ( 83 SCt 1194 , 10 LE2d 215) (1963), when it failed to produce a gunshot residue test;2 that his indictment was void because it was not returned in open court, because it contained numerous substantive and non-amendable defects, and because he is “actually innocent” of the charges;3 that there were issues concerning the composition of his jury pool and the qualification of a member of the petit jury; that granted Clay’s motion and allowed appellate counsel to withdraw from the case. 2020Specifically, Clay asserts: that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 ( 83 SCt 1194 , 10 LE2d 215) (1963), when it failed to produce a gunshot residue test;2 that his indictment was void because it was not returned in open court, because it contained numerous substantive and non-amendable defects, and because he is “actually innocent” of the charges;3 that there were issues concerning the composition of his jury pool and the qualification of a member of the petit jury; that granted Clay’s motion and allowed appellate counsel to withdraw from the case. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2016Nonetheless, the trial court determined that there is "nothing in the totality of circumstances, and taking into consideration that a suspect could feel concerned about refusing because of the possibility of losing a limited permit, among other reasons, to suggest that the defendant did anything more than acquiesce to the blood draw." The trial court further found that "there was no apparent additional conversation or interaction with regard to the test to indicate that actual consent was sought or given," such that Clay's consent was insufficient pursuant to Williams v. State , 296 Ga. 817 , 2016Nonetheless, the trial court determined that there is "nothing in the totality of circumstances, and taking into consideration that a suspect could feel concerned about refusing because of the possibility of losing a limited permit, among other reasons, to suggest that the defendant did anything more than acquiesce to the blood draw." The trial court further found that "there was no apparent additional conversation or interaction with regard to the test to indicate that actual consent was sought or given," such that Clay's consent was insufficient pursuant to Williams v. State , 296 Ga. 817 , | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.