continuing wrong doctrine in Indiana

2026See Anonymous Dr. A v. Foreman, 127 N.E.3d 1273, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“The continuing wrong doctrine ‘applies where an entire course of conduct combines to produce an injury[,]’” and in such cases “the statutory limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the course of conduct[.]” (quoting Gradus-Pizlo v. Acton, 964 N.E.2d 865, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)).

2019The continuing wrong doctrine "applies where an entire course of conduct combines to produce an injury." Gradus-Pizlo v. Acton , 964 N.E.2d 865 , 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

2020Id. at 1143-46 .

2017“The doctrine of continuing wrong applies where an entire course of conduct combines to produce an injury.” Garneau v. Bush, 838 N.E.2d 1134, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied (2006).

2026Fox v. Rice, 936 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting C & E Corp. v. Ramco Indus., Inc., 717 N.E.2d 642, 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)), clarified on reh’g, trans. denied.

2015See, e.g., C & E Corp. v. Ramco Indus., Inc., 717 N.E.2d 642, 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“[W]hen an entire course of conduct combines to produce an injury, the conduct may constitute a continuing wrong so as to delay the running of the statute of limitations.

2026Fox v. Rice, 936 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting C & E Corp. v. Ramco Indus., Inc., 717 N.E.2d 642, 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)), clarified on reh’g, trans. denied.

2018“However, ‘the doctrine of continuing wrong will not prevent the statute of limitations from beginning to run when the plaintiff learns of facts which should lead to the discovery of his cause of action even if his relationship with the tortfeasor continues beyond that point.’” Id. (quoting Fox v. Rice, 936 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied). [13] Here, the Halls allege in their complaint that the District’s breach was “continuous,” but they do not allege facts sufficient to show that the District’s injury-producing conduct was of a continuous nature for purposes of the conti

2003LeBrun v. Conner, 702 N.E.2d 754, 758 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).

2000LeBrun v. Conner, 702 N.E.2d 754, 758 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (citations omitted); see also Boggs, 780 N.E.2d at 699.

2010The continuing wrong doctrine "applies where an entire course of conduct combines to produce an injury." Crowe, Chizek, & Co., L.L.P. v. Oil Tech., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 1203, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied.

2010The continuing wrong doctrine "applies where an entire course of conduct combines to produce an injury." Crowe, Chizek, & Co., L.L.P. v. Oil Tech., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 1203, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied.

2018Manley v. Sherer , 960 N.E.2d 815 , 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), vacated by Manley v. Sherer , 992 N.E.2d 670 , 674 (Ind. 2013).

2017See 992 N.E.2d 670 (Ind. 2013) (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)).

2026See Anonymous Dr. A v. Foreman, 127 N.E.3d 1273, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“The continuing wrong doctrine ‘applies where an entire course of conduct combines to produce an injury[,]’” and in such cases “the statutory limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the course of conduct[.]” (quoting Gradus-Pizlo v. Acton, 964 N.E.2d 865, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)).

2018See Babcock v. Lafayette Home Hosp., Woman’s Clinic, 587 N.E.2d 1320, 1323 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding the doctrine inapplicable where the alleged injury was the retention of a surgical sponge inside the patient, determining that leaving the sponge behind and, later, misreading a chest x-ray were “isolated” events). [17] Finally, Musselman asserts that a defense based upon the statute of limitations should not be available to the Health Care Providers because of the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment.

2018Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Grays’ motion to amend their counterclaim. 2 See MAPCO Coal, Inc., 786 N.E.2d at 777 (noting that futility of an amendment is a factor in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to amend a pleading). 2 Based on this conclusion, we need not address the merits of the Grays’ dual tracking argument.

2018This doctrine “is not an equitable doctrine; rather, it defines when an act, omission, or neglect took place.” Boggs v. Tri- State Radiology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 692, 699 (Ind. 2000).

2018Id. [17] On appeal, Zalcberg argued that his abuse of process claim was not untimely because the continuing wrong doctrine applied.

2018We declined to find a continuing injury for that act Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1612-MF-2885| April 27, 2018 Page 8 of 12 “[d]espite the fact that Yoost’s general maintenance of his lawsuit may arguably continue to impact Zalcberg.” Id. [18] In the instant case, the Grays have not directed us to any cases since Yoost in which a court has applied the continuing wrong doctrine to an abuse of process claim.

2015Indeed, the amended complaint did not allege any relevant new facts, Manley did not announce any new law (and was subsequently vacated by our supreme court), and it is well settled that “the doctrine of continuing wrong will not prevent the statute of limitations from beginning to run when the plaintiff learns 7 But see Hendrickson v. Alcoa Fuels, Inc., 735 N.E.2d 804, 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“The Hendricksons moved to amend their complaint for a third time almost four years after filing their original complaint and three months after Peabody and Alcoa filed summary judgment motions with res

2015The trial court was not persuaded by Gumwood’s argument regarding undue delay, and neither are we. [23] Gumwood also cites Selvia v. Reitmeyer, which states that “[d]elay alone is insufficient reason to deny leave to amend, prejudice must be shown.” 156 Ind. App. 203, 207 , 295 N.E.2d 869, 872 (1973)).7 But here, the trial court also denied Gumwood’s motion because its reliance on Manley was misplaced and because the continuing wrong doctrine, even if applicable, could not salvage its tortious interference claim; in other words, Gumwood’s amendment was futile.

2015The trial court was not persuaded by Gumwood’s argument regarding undue delay, and neither are we. [23] Gumwood also cites Selvia v. Reitmeyer, which states that “[d]elay alone is insufficient reason to deny leave to amend, prejudice must be shown.” 156 Ind. App. 203, 207 , 295 N.E.2d 869, 872 (1973)).7 But here, the trial court also denied Gumwood’s motion because its reliance on Manley was misplaced and because the continuing wrong doctrine, even if applicable, could not salvage its tortious interference claim; in other words, Gumwood’s amendment was futile.

2014This was the last opportunity Physician had to diagnose Rogers. 7 See Hopster v. Burgeson, 750 N.E.2d 841, 858-59 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (holding the date that the doctor last had an opportunity to diagnose patient was the date of patient’s last appointment, and therefore, that is the' day the statute of limitations began to run).

2014This was the last opportunity Physician had to diagnose Rogers.7 See Hopster v. Burgeson, 750 N.E.2d 841, 858-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding the date that the doctor last had an opportunity to diagnose 6 Rogers alleges that he was still under Physician’s care until July 2009 and that he continued to experience injuries related to his Cidex OPA exposure well into 2010.

2014See David, 9 N.E.3d at 153 .

2014See David, 9 N.E.3d at 153 .

2012See Livingston v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 398 N.E.2d 1302, 1303-04 (Ind.Ct.App.1979) (holding that tort claim notice was untimely as to claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery, but timely as to claim of malicious prosecution).

2011Next, the parties dispute whether summary judgment is appropriate *822 on the merits of Mary Manley’s medical malpractice claim. 2 To prevail on a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the physician owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the physician breached that duty; and (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. 3 Cutter v. Herbst, 945 N.E.2d 240, 247 (Ind.Ct.App.2011).

2011We have noted, however, that “[t]he cases applying the continuing wrong doctrine demonstrate that the alleged injury producing conduct must be of a continuing nature.” Cyrus, 546 N.E.2d at 331 .

2011See id. (concluding that continuing wrong doctrine did not apply where only treatment at issue was sterilization procedure).

2010See Coffer v. Arndt, 732 N.E.2d 815, 821 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.

2005Follett v. Davis, 636 N.E.2d 1282, 1284 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).

2005See Peck v. City of Michigan City, 149 Ind. 670 , 49 N.E. 800 (Ind.1898) (holding that public nuisance claim based on sewage drainage affords a continuing right of action); Dolph v. Mangus 400 N.E.2d 189 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (holding that damage to plaintiff's land from drainage system had become permanent more than six years before commencement of action and thus claim was barred).

2005See Peck v. City of Michigan City, 149 Ind. 670 , 49 N.E. 800 (Ind.1898) (holding that public nuisance claim based on sewage drainage affords a continuing right of action); Dolph v. Mangus 400 N.E.2d 189 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (holding that damage to plaintiff's land from drainage system had become permanent more than six years before commencement of action and thus claim was barred).

2002See Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E.2d 246 .