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9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2010–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ruffin v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Consequently, the reason for the delay is pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors.” (Citation omitted.) Ruffin, supra, 284 Ga. at 59 (2) (b) (ii). 2016As our Supreme Court has noted, “the reason for the delay is pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors.” Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 59 (2) (b) (ii) ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008). | 5 | 5 |
Henderson v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See Henderson, 310 Ga. at 236 (2) (b) (“Whether the defendant or the State bears the primary responsibility for delay in reaching trial is pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy[-]trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 2022See Henderson, 310 Ga. at 236 (2) (b) (“Whether the defendant or the State bears the primary responsibility for delay in reaching trial is pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy[-]trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors.” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Redding v. Stategreen1 sentence2022Additionally, the trial court failed to address the amount of time involved in each delay, i.e., whether Appellant or the State or both requested a one- day delay or a two-month delay to “research issues.” Similarly, in the portion of the order addressing the length-of- 5 In Redding I, we noted that “[t]he trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion for November 30, 2017, but, as the State concedes, there is no record that a hearing was held that day.” 309 Ga. at 128 (2). 6 Although the trial court said only that a hearing took place in October 2018, the record shows that the hearing occurre | 1 | 1 |
Phan v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The second Barker-Doggett factor is “pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Phan v. State, 290 Ga. 588, 593 (1) (b) ( 723 SE2d 876 ) (2012). 2015The second Barker-Doggett factor is “pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Phan v. State, 290 Ga. 588, 593 (1) (b) ( 723 SE2d 876 ) (2012). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Since “some amount of pretrial delay is unavoidable, the reason for the delay is pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Johnson, supra, 313 Ga. App. at 900 (2) (b). 2012Since “some amount of pretrial delay is unavoidable, the reason for the delay is pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Johnson, supra, 313 Ga. App. at 900 (2) (b). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Loud Hawkgreen1 sentence2011Thus, as the United States Supreme Court put it, “(t)he flag all litigants seek to capture is the second factor, the reason for the delay.” [United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U. S. 302, 315 (106 SC 648, 88 LE2d 640) (1986).] As noted above, the delay here was attributable to several factors, although a large portion of the delay was caused by the State in failing to indict Carder for over three years. | 1 | 1 |
Ditman v. Stategreen2 sentences2010The second factor in the Barker analysis asks the court to consider “both the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the state.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ditman v. State, 301 Ga. App. 187, 190-191 (2) (b) ( 687 SE2d 155 ) (2009). “[T]he reason for the delay is *359 pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors. ... [A]s the United States Supreme Court put it, ‘the flag all litigants seek to capture is the second factor, the reason for the delay.’ ” (Citations, punct 2010The second factor in the Barker analysis asks the court to consider “both the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the state.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ditman v. State, 301 Ga. App. 187, 190-191 (2) (b) ( 687 SE2d 155 ) (2009). “[T]he reason for the delay is *359 pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors. ... [A]s the United States Supreme Court put it, ‘the flag all litigants seek to capture is the second factor, the reason for the delay.’ ” (Citations, punct | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ruffin v. State
green
2 sentences2016As our Supreme Court has noted, “the reason for the delay is pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors.” Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 59 (2) (b) (ii) ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008). 2010The second factor in the Barker analysis asks the court to consider “both the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the state.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ditman v. State, 301 Ga. App. 187, 190-191 (2) (b) ( 687 SE2d 155 ) (2009). “[T]he reason for the delay is *359 pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors. ... [A]s the United States Supreme Court put it, ‘the flag all litigants seek to capture is the second factor, the reason for the delay.’ ” (Citations, punct | 2 | 2010–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.