conviction under the appropriate standard in Georgia

1988See Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371 (1) ( 219 SE2d 743 ) (1975); Hearn v. State, 145 Ga. App. 469 (1) ( 243 SE2d 728 ) (1978). "[T]he fact that the evidence at the close of the state's case may have been insufficient to convict is not controlling so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard." Walls v. State, 161 Ga. App. 625, 627 ( 288 SE2d 769 ) (1982), citing Hearn v. State, supra. Conversely, the state's evidence, standing alone, may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case yet be insufficient to support a conviction in the context of subsequent evid

1988See Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371 (1) ( 219 SE2d 743 ) (1975); Hearn v. State, 145 Ga. App. 469 (1) ( 243 SE2d 728 ) (1978). "[T]he fact that the evidence at the close of the state's case may have been insufficient to convict is not controlling so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard." Walls v. State, 161 Ga. App. 625, 627 ( 288 SE2d 769 ) (1982), citing Hearn v. State, supra. Conversely, the state's evidence, standing alone, may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case yet be insufficient to support a conviction in the context of subsequent evid

2017However, our review of the trial court’s denial of Pittman’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is not confined to the evidence presented up until the close of the State’s case; instead, “[t]he entire evidence is to be examined, and so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard, no error is shown by the denial of the motion for directed verdict.” Murray v. State, 295 Ga. 289, 290-291 ( 759 SE2d 525 ) (2014) (citing Black v. State, 261 Ga. 791, 796 (10) ( 410 SE2d 740 ) (1991)).

2017However, our review of the trial court’s denial of Pittman’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is not confined to the evidence presented up until the close of the State’s case; instead, “[t]he entire evidence is to be examined, and so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard, no error is shown by the denial of the motion for directed verdict.” Murray v. State, 295 Ga. 289, 290-291 ( 759 SE2d 525 ) (2014) (citing Black v. State, 261 Ga. 791, 796 (10) ( 410 SE2d 740 ) (1991)).

2017However, our review of the trial court’s denial of Pittman’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is not confined to the evidence presented up until the close of the State’s case; instead, “[t]he entire evidence is to be examined, and so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard, no error is shown by the denial of the motion for directed verdict.” Murray v. State, 295 Ga. 289, 290-291 ( 759 SE2d 525 ) (2014) (citing Black v. State, 261 Ga. 791, 796 (10) ( 410 SE2d 740 ) (1991)).

2017However, our review of the trial court’s denial of Pittman’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is not confined to the evidence presented up until the close of the State’s case; instead, “[t]he entire evidence is to be examined, and so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard, no error is shown by the denial of the motion for directed verdict.” Murray v. State, 295 Ga. 289, 290-291 ( 759 SE2d 525 ) (2014) (citing Black v. State, 261 Ga. 791, 796 (10) ( 410 SE2d 740 ) (1991)).

2017See also Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 374-375 ( 219 SE2d 743 ) (1975) (overruled on other grounds Humphrey v. State, 252 Ga. 525 (1) ( 314 SE2d 436 ) (1984)) (“We therefore hold that on appeal of the overruling of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal made at the close of the state’s case in chief, the reviewing court can consider all the evidence in the case in determining whether the trial court erred in overruling the motion.”).

2017See also Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 374-375 ( 219 SE2d 743 ) (1975) (overruled on other grounds Humphrey v. State, 252 Ga. 525 (1) ( 314 SE2d 436 ) (1984)) (“We therefore hold that on appeal of the overruling of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal made at the close of the state’s case in chief, the reviewing court can consider all the evidence in the case in determining whether the trial court erred in overruling the motion.”).

1988See Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371 (1) ( 219 SE2d 743 ) (1975); Hearn v. State, 145 Ga. App. 469 (1) ( 243 SE2d 728 ) (1978). "[T]he fact that the evidence at the close of the state's case may have been insufficient to convict is not controlling so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard." Walls v. State, 161 Ga. App. 625, 627 ( 288 SE2d 769 ) (1982), citing Hearn v. State, supra. Conversely, the state's evidence, standing alone, may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case yet be insufficient to support a conviction in the context of subsequent evid

1988See Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371 (1) ( 219 SE2d 743 ) (1975); Hearn v. State, 145 Ga. App. 469 (1) ( 243 SE2d 728 ) (1978). "[T]he fact that the evidence at the close of the state's case may have been insufficient to convict is not controlling so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard." Walls v. State, 161 Ga. App. 625, 627 ( 288 SE2d 769 ) (1982), citing Hearn v. State, supra. Conversely, the state's evidence, standing alone, may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case yet be insufficient to support a conviction in the context of subsequent evid

1988See Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371 (1) ( 219 SE2d 743 ) (1975); Hearn v. State, 145 Ga. App. 469 (1) ( 243 SE2d 728 ) (1978). "[T]he fact that the evidence at the close of the state's case may have been insufficient to convict is not controlling so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard." Walls v. State, 161 Ga. App. 625, 627 ( 288 SE2d 769 ) (1982), citing Hearn v. State, supra. Conversely, the state's evidence, standing alone, may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case yet be insufficient to support a conviction in the context of subsequent evid

1988See Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371 (1) ( 219 SE2d 743 ) (1975); Hearn v. State, 145 Ga. App. 469 (1) ( 243 SE2d 728 ) (1978). "[T]he fact that the evidence at the close of the state's case may have been insufficient to convict is not controlling so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard." Walls v. State, 161 Ga. App. 625, 627 ( 288 SE2d 769 ) (1982), citing Hearn v. State, supra. Conversely, the state's evidence, standing alone, may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case yet be insufficient to support a conviction in the context of subsequent evid

2025When we consider the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, we consider the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict,” and we “evaluate whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 388 (1) (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (citation omitted).

2025When we consider the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, we consider the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict,” and we “evaluate whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 388 (1) (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (citation omitted).

2025However, on appeal, our review of the trial court’s denial of Douglas’s motion for directed verdict “is not confined to the evidence presented up until the close of the State’s case”; rather, we consider “the entire evidence,” and “so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard, no error is shown by the denial of the motion for directed verdict.” Pittman v. State, 300 Ga. 894, 897 (1) (799 SE2d 215) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted). 16 (a) To the extent that Douglas challenges his convictions because the evidence was constitutionally insufficient,

2025However, on appeal, our review of the trial court’s denial of Douglas’s motion for directed verdict “is not confined to the evidence presented up until the close of the State’s case”; rather, we consider “the entire evidence,” and “so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard, no error is shown by the denial of the motion for directed verdict.” Pittman v. State, 300 Ga. 894, 897 (1) (799 SE2d 215) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted). 16 (a) To the extent that Douglas challenges his convictions because the evidence was constitutionally insufficient,

1988See, e.g., Butler v. State, 252 Ga. 135 ( 311 SE2d 473 ) (1984) (murder conviction reversed on basis of uncontroverted evidence establishing insanity defense); Hughes v. State, 152 Ga. App. 80 ( 262 SE2d 245 ) (1979) (drug conviction reversed on basis of uncontradicted entrapment defense); Wright v. State, 121 Ga. App. 21 ( 172 SE2d 457 ) (1970) (larceny conviction reversed on basis of defendant's testimony satisfactorily explaining his possession of stolen property in manner consistent with state's evidence); Gilbert v. State, 94 Ga. App. 217 ( 94 SE2d 109 ) (1956) (homicide conviction revers

1988See, e.g., Butler v. State, 252 Ga. 135 ( 311 SE2d 473 ) (1984) (murder conviction reversed on basis of uncontroverted evidence establishing insanity defense); Hughes v. State, 152 Ga. App. 80 ( 262 SE2d 245 ) (1979) (drug conviction reversed on basis of uncontradicted entrapment defense); Wright v. State, 121 Ga. App. 21 ( 172 SE2d 457 ) (1970) (larceny conviction reversed on basis of defendant's testimony satisfactorily explaining his possession of stolen property in manner consistent with state's evidence); Gilbert v. State, 94 Ga. App. 217 ( 94 SE2d 109 ) (1956) (homicide conviction revers