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9 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hortongreen2 sentences1999Rule 411 provides that criminal discovery rules “shall become applicable following indictment or information and shall not be operative prior to or in the course of any preliminary hearing.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 411; see People v. Horton, 65 Ill. 2d 413, 417 (1976). 1999Rule 411 provides that criminal discovery rules "shall become applicable following indictment or information and shall not be operative prior to or in the course of any preliminary hearing." 134 Ill. 2d R. 411; see People v. Horton , 65 Ill. 2d 413, 417 (1976). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Norrisgreen2 sentences2013People v. Norris, 214 Ill. 2d 92, 97 , 824 N.E.2d 205, 209 (2005). 2013People v. Norris, 214 Ill. 2d 92, 97 , 824 N.E.2d 205, 209 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2013Gildorf maintains that Rule 411 clearly provides that Rule 415(c) does not become “operative prior to or in the course of any preliminary hearing.” ¶ 34 The State responds that under the particular circumstances of this case, reading Rules 411 and 415(c) together creates an ambiguity because, although Rule 411 would indicate that the discovery rules were not applicable at the time Gilsdorf received the video in discovery from the State, Rule 415(c) nonetheless contains strong language about “a mandatory requirement in every case that the materials which an attorney receives shall remain in his 2013Gildorf maintains that Rule 411 clearly provides that Rule 415(c) does not become “operative prior to or in the course of any preliminary hearing.” ¶ 34 The State responds that under the particular circumstances of this case, reading Rules 411 and 415(c) together creates an ambiguity because, although Rule 411 would indicate that the discovery rules were not applicable at the time Gilsdorf received the video in discovery from the State, Rule 415(c) nonetheless contains strong language about “a mandatory requirement in every case that the materials which an attorney receives shall remain in his | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Tennant
green
2 sentences1977In the absence of discovery procedures and in view of the limited nature of the evidence which may be introduced at a preliminary hearing, the question whether adequate opportunity to cross-examine had existed at the preliminary hearing (see People v. Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d 401 ) may not depend in its entirety on what transpired at that hearing. 1976In the absence of discovery procedures and in view of the limited nature of the evidence which may be introduced at a preliminary hearing, the question whether adequate opportunity to cross-examine had existed at the preliminary hearing (see People v. Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d 401 ) may not depend in its entirety on what transpired at that hearing. | 2 | 1976–1977 |
People v. Rinehart
green
1 sentence2013Gildorf maintains that Rule 411 clearly provides that Rule 415(c) does not become “operative prior to or in the course of any preliminary hearing.” ¶ 34 The State responds that under the particular circumstances of this case, reading Rules 411 and 415(c) together creates an ambiguity because, although Rule 411 would indicate that the discovery rules were not applicable at the time Gilsdorf received the video in discovery from the State, Rule 415(c) nonetheless contains strong language about “a mandatory requirement in every case that the materials which an attorney receives shall remain in his | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In re: Shelby R.
green
2 sentences2013Gildorf maintains that Rule 411 clearly provides that Rule 415(c) does not become “operative prior to or in the course of any preliminary hearing.” ¶ 34 The State responds that under the particular circumstances of this case, reading Rules 411 and 415(c) together creates an ambiguity because, although Rule 411 would indicate that the discovery rules were not applicable at the time Gilsdorf received the video in discovery from the State, Rule 415(c) nonetheless contains strong language about “a mandatory requirement in every case that the materials which an attorney receives shall remain in his 2013Gildorf maintains that Rule 411 clearly provides that Rule 415(c) does not become “operative prior to or in the course of any preliminary hearing.” ¶ 34 The State responds that under the particular circumstances of this case, reading Rules 411 and 415(c) together creates an ambiguity because, although Rule 411 would indicate that the discovery rules were not applicable at the time Gilsdorf received the video in discovery from the State, Rule 415(c) nonetheless contains strong language about “a mandatory requirement in every case that the materials which an attorney receives shall remain in his | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Rinehart
green
1 sentence2013Gildorf maintains that Rule 411 clearly provides that Rule 415(c) does not become “operative prior to or in the course of any preliminary hearing.” ¶ 34 The State responds that under the particular circumstances of this case, reading Rules 411 and 415(c) together creates an ambiguity because, although Rule 411 would indicate that the discovery rules were not applicable at the time Gilsdorf received the video in discovery from the State, Rule 415(c) nonetheless contains strong language about “a mandatory requirement in every case that the materials which an attorney receives shall remain in his | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Elbus
green
1 sentence1986(People v. Horton (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 413, 417 , 358 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 .) Furthermore, any authority “a trial court may have had to order pretrial discovery, absent specific rules, is not relevant after adoption of the supreme court rules.” (People v. Elbus (1983), 116 Ill. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Schmidt
green
1 sentence1981This contention is based on the concluding paragraph in People v. Schmidt (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 572 , 575: “The State is required to furnish defendants in misdemeanor cases with a list of witnesses (Ill. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Howell
green
1 sentence1979If the acts which violated the probation also constitute a criminal offense, the State may, of course, prosecute the probationer for that offense (People v. Howell (1977), 46 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1972If any such order of suppression of evidence or dismissal of the charge is aHowed and issued in the course of any preliminary hearing or examination, such order of suppression or of dismissal shaH be non-final, the State may not appeal therefrom, and such order of suppression or of dismissal shaH not in any manner bar, affect or be determinative in any subsequent proceedings.” Defendant, citing People v. Taylor, 124 Ill.App.2d 268 , 260 N.E.2d 347 , asserts that the State pursuant to the above mentioned provisions is allowed to relitigate a motion to suppress evidence which has been aHowed at 1972If any such order of suppression of evidence or dismissal of the charge is aHowed and issued in the course of any preliminary hearing or examination, such order of suppression or of dismissal shaH be non-final, the State may not appeal therefrom, and such order of suppression or of dismissal shaH not in any manner bar, affect or be determinative in any subsequent proceedings.” Defendant, citing People v. Taylor, 124 Ill.App.2d 268 , 260 N.E.2d 347 , asserts that the State pursuant to the above mentioned provisions is allowed to relitigate a motion to suppress evidence which has been aHowed at | 1 | 1972–1972 |