McNabb rule in Illinois

1965Although it is our opinion the evidence here does not show such unnecessary and unreasonable delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule, (cf. People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ,) it is enough to say that the rule is one of Federal procedure which' this court has consistently refused to adopt, (People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615 ; People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ; People v. Stacey, 25 Ill.2d 258 ; People v. Melquist, 26 Ill.2d 22 ; People v. Reader, 26 Ill.2d 210 ,) and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94, has been expressly held no

1965Although it is our opinion the evidence here does not show such unnecessary and unreasonable delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule, (cf. People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ,) it is enough to say that the rule is one of Federal procedure which' this court has consistently refused to adopt, (People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615 ; People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ; People v. Stacey, 25 Ill.2d 258 ; People v. Melquist, 26 Ill.2d 22 ; People v. Reader, 26 Ill.2d 210 ,) and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94, has been expressly held no

1966In Kees, the court had declared (page 302) that the McNabb rule was one of Federal procedure only which it had consistently refused to adopt for Illinois, and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 US 55, 63-64 , had been held not to extend to State prosecutions as a requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1966In Kees, the court had declared (page 302) that the McNabb rule was one of Federal procedure only which it had consistently refused to adopt for Illinois, and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 US 55, 63-64 , had been held not to extend to State prosecutions as a requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1965Although it is our opinion the evidence here does not show such unnecessary and unreasonable delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule, (cf. People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ,) it is enough to say that the rule is one of Federal procedure which' this court has consistently refused to adopt, (People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615 ; People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ; People v. Stacey, 25 Ill.2d 258 ; People v. Melquist, 26 Ill.2d 22 ; People v. Reader, 26 Ill.2d 210 ,) and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94, has been expressly held no

1965Although it is our opinion the evidence here does not show such unnecessary and unreasonable delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule, (cf. People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ,) it is enough to say that the rule is one of Federal procedure which' this court has consistently refused to adopt, (People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615 ; People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ; People v. Stacey, 25 Ill.2d 258 ; People v. Melquist, 26 Ill.2d 22 ; People v. Reader, 26 Ill.2d 210 ,) and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94, has been expressly held no

1965Although it is our opinion the evidence here does not show such unnecessary and unreasonable delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule, (cf. People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ,) it is enough to say that the rule is one of Federal procedure which' this court has consistently refused to adopt, (People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615 ; People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ; People v. Stacey, 25 Ill.2d 258 ; People v. Melquist, 26 Ill.2d 22 ; People v. Reader, 26 Ill.2d 210 ,) and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94, has been expressly held no

1965Although it is our opinion the evidence here does not show such unnecessary and unreasonable delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule, (cf. People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ,) it is enough to say that the rule is one of Federal procedure which' this court has consistently refused to adopt, (People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615 ; People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ; People v. Stacey, 25 Ill.2d 258 ; People v. Melquist, 26 Ill.2d 22 ; People v. Reader, 26 Ill.2d 210 ,) and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94, has been expressly held no

1965Although it is our opinion the evidence here does not show such unnecessary and unreasonable delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule, (cf. People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ,) it is enough to say that the rule is one of Federal procedure which' this court has consistently refused to adopt, (People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615 ; People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ; People v. Stacey, 25 Ill.2d 258 ; People v. Melquist, 26 Ill.2d 22 ; People v. Reader, 26 Ill.2d 210 ,) and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94, has been expressly held no

1965Although it is our opinion the evidence here does not show such unnecessary and unreasonable delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule, (cf. People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ,) it is enough to say that the rule is one of Federal procedure which' this court has consistently refused to adopt, (People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615 ; People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ; People v. Stacey, 25 Ill.2d 258 ; People v. Melquist, 26 Ill.2d 22 ; People v. Reader, 26 Ill.2d 210 ,) and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94, has been expressly held no

1965Although it is our opinion the evidence here does not show such unnecessary and unreasonable delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule, (cf. People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ,) it is enough to say that the rule is one of Federal procedure which' this court has consistently refused to adopt, (People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615 ; People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ; People v. Stacey, 25 Ill.2d 258 ; People v. Melquist, 26 Ill.2d 22 ; People v. Reader, 26 Ill.2d 210 ,) and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94, has been expressly held no

1965Although it is our opinion the evidence here does not show such unnecessary and unreasonable delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule, (cf. People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ,) it is enough to say that the rule is one of Federal procedure which' this court has consistently refused to adopt, (People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615 ; People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274 ; People v. Stacey, 25 Ill.2d 258 ; People v. Melquist, 26 Ill.2d 22 ; People v. Reader, 26 Ill.2d 210 ,) and which, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94, has been expressly held no

1965Rather, it is first urged upon the basis of the McNabb rule, (see: McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 , 87 L. ed. 819; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 1 L. ed. 2d 1479,) that the confession was inadmissible in evidence because it was obtained while defendant was being illegally detained.

1965Rather, it is first urged upon the basis of the McNabb rule, (see: McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 , 87 L. ed. 819; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 1 L. ed. 2d 1479,) that the confession was inadmissible in evidence because it was obtained while defendant was being illegally detained.

1965Rather, it is first urged upon the basis of the McNabb rule, (see: McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 , 87 L. ed. 819; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 1 L. ed. 2d 1479,) that the confession was inadmissible in evidence because it was obtained while defendant was being illegally detained.

1965Rather, it is first urged upon the basis of the McNabb rule, (see: McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 , 87 L. ed. 819; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 1 L. ed. 2d 1479,) that the confession was inadmissible in evidence because it was obtained while defendant was being illegally detained.

1977People v. Triplett (1973), 12 Ill.

1977People v. Triplett (1973), 12 Ill.

1977It then went on to state: “In any event, the record here does not show any lack of fair play nor such unreasonable or unnecessary delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule.” This basic test of reasonableness was also invoked in People v. Johnson (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 463, 469 , 256 N.E.2d 343 , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 , where the court stated: “* # * unreasonable delay in presenting a defendant before a magistrate is a circumstance to be taken into consideration in determining whether or not his confession was voluntary.” Reasonableness has also been the standa

1977It then went on to state: “In any event, the record here does not show any lack of fair play nor such unreasonable or unnecessary delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule.” This basic test of reasonableness was also invoked in People v. Johnson (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 463, 469 , 256 N.E.2d 343 , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 , where the court stated: “* # * unreasonable delay in presenting a defendant before a magistrate is a circumstance to be taken into consideration in determining whether or not his confession was voluntary.” Reasonableness has also been the standa

1977It then went on to state: “In any event, the record here does not show any lack of fair play nor such unreasonable or unnecessary delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule.” This basic test of reasonableness was also invoked in People v. Johnson (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 463, 469 , 256 N.E.2d 343 , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 , where the court stated: “* # * unreasonable delay in presenting a defendant before a magistrate is a circumstance to be taken into consideration in determining whether or not his confession was voluntary.” Reasonableness has also been the standa

1977It then went on to state: “In any event, the record here does not show any lack of fair play nor such unreasonable or unnecessary delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule.” This basic test of reasonableness was also invoked in People v. Johnson (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 463, 469 , 256 N.E.2d 343 , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 , where the court stated: “* # * unreasonable delay in presenting a defendant before a magistrate is a circumstance to be taken into consideration in determining whether or not his confession was voluntary.” Reasonableness has also been the standa

1970(People v. Kees, 32 Ill.2d 299 .) In any event, the record here does not show any lack of fair play nor such unreasonable or unnecessary delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule.

1970(People v. Kees, 32 Ill.2d 299 .) In any event, the record here does not show any lack of fair play nor such unreasonable or unnecessary delay as to have made defendant’s detention illegal within the McNabb rule.

1961Even under the McNabb rule, however, delay after a confession has been voluntarily given will not relate back so as to render the confession inadmissible, (United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 , 88 L. ed. 1140,) thus defendant’s contention could be sustained only if the delay of approximately five hours between his identification and the signing of his confession could be deemed to be unreasonable delay.

1961Even under the McNabb rule, however, delay after a confession has been voluntarily given will not relate back so as to render the confession inadmissible, (United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 , 88 L. ed. 1140,) thus defendant’s contention could be sustained only if the delay of approximately five hours between his identification and the signing of his confession could be deemed to be unreasonable delay.

1961Other than to point out that the McNabb rule is but a rule of evidence for criminal trials in the Federal courts, and that it does not arise from constitutional sources so as to extend to State prosecutions as a requirement of the fourteenth amendment, (Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 187-188 , 97 L. ed. 1522, 1544; Annotation, 1 L. ed.2d 1735, 1738,) we see no useful purpose in further exploring into the rationale, elements and scope of the rule.

1961Other than to point out that the McNabb rule is but a rule of evidence for criminal trials in the Federal courts, and that it does not arise from constitutional sources so as to extend to State prosecutions as a requirement of the fourteenth amendment, (Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 , 96 L. ed. 86, 93-94; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 187-188 , 97 L. ed. 1522, 1544; Annotation, 1 L. ed.2d 1735, 1738,) we see no useful purpose in further exploring into the rationale, elements and scope of the rule.

1953Malinski v. People of State of New York, 324 U.S. 401 , 65 S. Ct. 781 .

1953Malinski v. People of State of New York, 324 U.S. 401 , 65 S. Ct. 781 .