permanent orders hearing in Colorado

2024See People v. Martinez , 70 P.3d 474, 480 (Colo. 2003) ; see also Tooker , ¶ 27. ¶ 41 At the initial permanent orders hearing on May 23 , 2022, husband told the district court that Landmark had recently end ed 19 his employment.

2024See People v. Martinez , 70 P.3d 474, 480 (Colo. 2003) ; see also Tooker , ¶ 27. ¶ 41 At the initial permanent orders hearing on May 23 , 2022, husband told the district court that Landmark had recently end ed 19 his employment.

2025See Medeiros, ¶ 28; see also In re Marriage of Eisenhuth, 976 P.2d 896, 901 (Colo. App. 1999) (the district court considers the evidence presented to it; it does not act as a surrogate attorney for the parties). ¶ 19 While wife insists that the district court should have continued the permanent orders hearing to allow her to complete the business evaluation given husband’s admitted failure to timely provide an allegedly essential document, we decline to address this undeveloped argument.

2024See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning N.J.C. , 2019 COA 153M , ¶ 49 (recognizing that the parties must present the relevant evidence to the district court and their f ailure 6 to do so does not provide grounds for reversal); In re Marria ge of Eisenhuth , 976 P.2d 896, 901 (Colo. App. 1999) (noting that the court considers the evidence presented to it).

2025Additional Property Division Contentions ¶ 27 Since on remand the district court cannot revalue the marital assets and debts (as it determined in its permanent orders) or recharacterize its classification of the marital property, see Wells, 850 P.2d at 697 n.6; § 14-10-113(5), we consider husband’s contentions that the court erred by (1) determining the total value of the marital estate was $2,275,000; (2) omitting a purported $437,365 loan that he executed with his father; (3) declining to set aside $66,490 from his businesses as his separate property; and (4) finding that he refinanced and t

2024Maintenance ¶ 27 Husband also contends that, in determining the amount of maintenance to award, the district court erred when it (1) averaged wife’s annual salary for the two years immediately preceding the permanent orders hearing and (2) imputed income to him. ¶ 28 Because we have reversed the property and debt division and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider that issue, the court must also reconsider maintenance “in light of the updated property division,” In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 26 , 16 taking into account the revised property division and the parties’ c

2024Maintenance ¶ 27 Husband also contends that, in determining the amount of maintenance to award, the district court erred when it (1) averaged wife’s annual salary for the two years immediately preceding the permanent orders hearing and (2) imputed income to him. ¶ 28 Because we have reversed the property and debt division and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider that issue, the court must also reconsider maintenance “in light of the updated property division,” In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 26 , 16 taking into account the revised property division and the parties’ c

2024See In re Marriage of de Koning , 2016 CO 2 , ¶ 3 3. 17 IV.

2026See id.; see also In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 75 (defining dissipation as “when one spouse depletes the marital estate for an improper or illegitimate purpose in contemplation of the dissolution”).

2026See Lockwood, 971 P.2d at 267 ; see also In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 75 (defining “dissipation” as “when one spouse depletes the marital estate for an improper or illegitimate purpose 4 in contemplation of the dissolution”).

2026See § 14-10-113(5); In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. App. 1996).

2024See § 14-10-113(5); In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. App. 1996).

2026But the court also recounted the history of the case, including that the permanent orders hearing had been held “some time ago.” And it concluded that, notwithstanding wife’s unintentional nondisclosure, it would be inappropriate to allow additional time for a new hearing on attorney fees.2 2 The court also expressed concern that it should not have permitted a later hearing on the amount of attorney fees under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025, citing C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-22 comment 2, and In re Marriage of Connerton, 260 P.3d 62, 67 (Colo. App. 2010).

2026But both the comment and Connerton contemplate that a court can “order that the issue of attorney fees w[ill] be heard after the hearing.” Connerton, 260 P.3d at 67 ; C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-22(2) cmt. 2 (noting that a court can “otherwise order[]” that attorney fees be heard at a different time).

2025See In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (“The district court must make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of its order.”). ¶ 15 Lastly, the district court restricted father’s parenting time by requiring that it be supervised and by requiring father to submit test results demonstrating ninety days of sobriety before moving to unsupervised time.

2025See In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 .

2024See In re Marriage of Ma rtin , 2021 COA 101, ¶ 13 (recognizing that all that is required to preserve an issue for appeal is that the issue be brought to the court ’ s attention, so it has an opportunity to rule on the matter).

2024See In re Marriage of Ma rtin , 2021 COA 101, ¶ 13 (recognizing that all that is required to preserve an issue for appeal is that the issue be brought to the court ’ s attention, so it has an opportunity to rule on the matter).

2024See People v. Martinez , 70 P.3d 474, 480 (Colo. 2003) ; see also Tooker , ¶ 27. ¶ 41 At the initial permanent orders hearing on May 23 , 2022, husband told the district court that Landmark had recently end ed 19 his employment.

2024See People v. Martinez , 70 P.3d 474, 480 (Colo. 2003) ; see also Tooker , ¶ 27. ¶ 41 At the initial permanent orders hearing on May 23 , 2022, husband told the district court that Landmark had recently end ed 19 his employment.

2025Valuation of Investment Accounts ¶ 13 We next consider and reject husband’s contention that the district court erroneously failed to address changes in the value of the investment accounts between the hearing and the issuance of the permanent orders several months later. ¶ 14 Per its obligation to assign an approximate value to the marital estate as of the date of the marital property hearing, see In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 4 ; § 14-10-113(5), C.R.S. 2024, the district court valued the investment accounts using figures wife provided at the permanent orders hearing.

2024In re Marriage of Wright , 2020 COA 11 , ¶ 4 ; see also § 14 - 10 -113(5), C.R.S. 2023 (directing the court to value property as of the date of the permanent orders hearing when the hearing occurs before the entry of the dissolution de cree) .

2026See Powell, 220 P.3d at 959 .

2026While the court did not need to make findings on every statutory factor under section 14-10-113(1), see Powell, 220 P.3d at 959 , given that wife’s separate property was worth approximately twice the value of the marital estate, we conclude that the court’s failure to consider that 10 separate property was nevertheless an abuse of discretion.

2021See § 14-10-113(1)(c) ; see also In re Marriage of Wells , 850 P.2d 694, 699 (Colo. 1993) ("In determining the circumstances of the parties for purposes of making an equitable award of the couple's marital property, a trial court may properly consider the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time of the permanent orders hearing."); In re Marriage of Morton , 2016 COA 1, ¶ 14 , 369 P.3d 800 ("Because we are reversing the trial court's division of marital property and debts, on remand the court must consider the parties’ economic circumstances at the time of the remand."). ¶ 54 It thus f

2021See § 14-10-113(1)(c) ; see also In re Marriage of Wells , 850 P.2d 694, 699 (Colo. 1993) ("In determining the circumstances of the parties for purposes of making an equitable award of the couple's marital property, a trial court may properly consider the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time of the permanent orders hearing."); In re Marriage of Morton , 2016 COA 1, ¶ 14 , 369 P.3d 800 ("Because we are reversing the trial court's division of marital property and debts, on remand the court must consider the parties’ economic circumstances at the time of the remand."). ¶ 54 It thus f

2026Krejci, ¶ 23; cf. In re Marriage of Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 2003) (“[A] party who fails to present sufficient evidence at trial should not be allowed on appeal to challenge the inadequacy of the evidence.”). ¶ 14 At the permanent orders hearing, the joint expert acknowledged that she had seen the businesses’ financial statements for the first half of 2024.

2026See Beatty, ¶ 15, 279 P.3d at 1229 . ¶ 41 Moreover, father insists that the district court failed to consider evidence that mother used her business accounts to pay personal expenses.

2026Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 172 (Colo. 1991); see People v. Distel, 759 P.2d 654, 660 (Colo. 1988); People in Interest of P.N., 663 P.2d 253, 256 (Colo. 1983); Kennedy v. Bailey, 453 P.2d 808, 810 (Colo. 1969). ¶ 33 With regard to the purchase of new vehicles, as we understand it, the court concluded that wife had not met the third part of the test: the result of the permanent orders hearing would not have been different given the information wife had provided.

2026See § 14-10-113(5); see also In re Marriage of Price, 727 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Colo. 1986) (upholding stipulated property valuation that the parties had agreed to several months before the date of dissolution). ¶ 19 But it is undisputed that long before that date, husband sold the Brighton home, gave ex-wife her 50% of the net proceeds, and allegedly used the remaining sale proceeds to pay off marital debts.

2026See Turner, ¶¶ 15-25 (holding that the district court properly excluded wife’s bonuses from the marital property division where “no evidence demonstrated that she had an enforceable right to them at 24 the time of the permanent orders hearing,” which predated the decree); Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35 . ¶ 56 Wife suggests that we must apply In re Marriage of Huston, 967 P.2d 181, 186 (Colo. App. 1998), disagreed with by Balanson, 25 P.3d at 39 , for the proposition that a bonus “which is deferred until after the dissolution, but fully earned during the marriage, is marital property.” But we agree wi

2026Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 172 (Colo. 1991); see People v. Distel, 759 P.2d 654, 660 (Colo. 1988); People in Interest of P.N., 663 P.2d 253, 256 (Colo. 1983); Kennedy v. Bailey, 453 P.2d 808, 810 (Colo. 1969). ¶ 33 With regard to the purchase of new vehicles, as we understand it, the court concluded that wife had not met the third part of the test: the result of the permanent orders hearing would not have been different given the information wife had provided.

2026See C.A.R. 10(d)(3) (“The appellant must include in the record transcripts of all proceedings necessary for considering and deciding the issues on appeal.”); In re Marriage of Tagen, 62 P.3d 1092, 1096 (Colo. App. 2002).

2026See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530 , 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an appellate argument presented without supporting facts, specific argument, or specific supporting authorities). 11 source. § 14-10-115(5)(a)(I); In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 534 (Colo. App. 2011). ¶ 28 Father testified at the permanent orders hearing that he was a flooring installer and that he owned his own company.

2026See Collins, ¶ 8. ¶ 15 Father additionally contends that the district court erred by unreasonably relying on the CFI’s findings instead of the PRE’s “because the CFI’s investigation was less extensive and in depth, did not consider [f]ather’s work with the parenting coach, and was concluded more than a year before the permanent orders hearing.” But “the probative effect and weight to be given to the evidence are matters within the province of the [district] court.” In re Marriage of Blake, 807 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Colo. App. 1990).

2026Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 172 (Colo. 1991); see People v. Distel, 759 P.2d 654, 660 (Colo. 1988); People in Interest of P.N., 663 P.2d 253, 256 (Colo. 1983); Kennedy v. Bailey, 453 P.2d 808, 810 (Colo. 1969). ¶ 33 With regard to the purchase of new vehicles, as we understand it, the court concluded that wife had not met the third part of the test: the result of the permanent orders hearing would not have been different given the information wife had provided.

2026See In re Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 815 (Colo. App. 2007) (the parties are responsible for presenting the court with the data needed to value marital property). ¶ 20 Husband’s sole mention of goodwill is in a single sentence in the parties’ joint trial management certificate: “[Wife] has a very significant amount of reviews, which contribute toward marketability and goodwill value.” Husband did not offer any evidence of the Company’s goodwill at the permanent orders hearing.

2026See In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 38 , 562 P.3d 106 , 115-16 (holding that to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be presented in such a way that the district court has an opportunity to rule on it); see also In re Marriage of Fabos, 2019 COA 80 , ¶ 31 n.4, 451 P.3d 1218 , 1225 n.4 (appellate court will not address an argument raised for the first time on appeal).