sufficiently definite warning in Kansas

2020Due process requires criminal statutes to "convey[] a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418 , 662 P.2d 1286 (1983). "[T]he determinative question" when statutes are challenged as void for vagueness is "'whether a person of ordinary intelligence understands what conduct is prohibited by' the statutory language at issue." Richardson, 289 Kan. at 125 (quoting State v. Adams, 254 Kan. 436, 445 , 866 P.2d 1017 [1994]).

2020Due process requires criminal statutes to "convey[] a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418 , 662 P.2d 1286 (1983). "[T]he determinative question" when statutes are challenged as void for vagueness is "'whether a person of ordinary intelligence understands what conduct is prohibited by' the statutory language at issue." Richardson, 289 Kan. at 125 (quoting State v. Adams, 254 Kan. 436, 445 , 866 P.2d 1017 [1994]).

2020We employ a two-pronged inquiry, asking: "(1) whether the statute gives fair warning to those potentially subject to it; and (2) whether it adequately guards against arbitrary and unreasonable enforcement." State v. Gonzalez, 307 Kan. 575, 580 , 412 P.3d 968 (2018). "[S]tatutes are not 'automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.'" Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 244 Kan. 638, 641 , 772 P.2d 758 (1989) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 , 94 S. Ct. 2547 , 41 L.

2020We employ a two-pronged inquiry, asking: "(1) whether the statute gives fair warning to those potentially subject to it; and (2) whether it adequately guards against arbitrary and unreasonable enforcement." State v. Gonzalez, 307 Kan. 575, 580 , 412 P.3d 968 (2018). "[S]tatutes are not 'automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.'" Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 244 Kan. 638, 641 , 772 P.2d 758 (1989) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 , 94 S. Ct. 2547 , 41 L.

1995In Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm’n, 251 Kan. 240 , Syl. ¶ 2, 834 P.2d 368 (1992), we stated: “The standard for determining whether a criminal statute is vague is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

1995In Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm’n, 251 Kan. 240 , Syl. ¶ 2, 834 P.2d 368 (1992), we stated: “The standard for determining whether a criminal statute is vague is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

1984In State v. Huffman, 228 Kan. 186 , 612 P.2d 630 (1980), the test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite is set forth in Syl. ¶ 5 as follows; “The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

1984In State v. Huffman, 228 Kan. 186 , 612 P.2d 630 (1980), the test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite is set forth in Syl. ¶ 5 as follows; “The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

1993Murray v. Palmgren, 231 Kan. 524, 532 , 646 P.2d 1091 (1982), reh. denied 459 U.S. 1229 (1983), sets forth the rules regarding vagueness: ‘ “The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally void by reason of being vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

1993Murray v. Palmgren, 231 Kan. 524, 532 , 646 P.2d 1091 (1982), reh. denied 459 U.S. 1229 (1983), sets forth the rules regarding vagueness: ‘ “The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally void by reason of being vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

2020Due process requires criminal statutes to "convey[] a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418 , 662 P.2d 1286 (1983). "[T]he determinative question" when statutes are challenged as void for vagueness is "'whether a person of ordinary intelligence understands what conduct is prohibited by' the statutory language at issue." Richardson, 289 Kan. at 125 (quoting State v. Adams, 254 Kan. 436, 445 , 866 P.2d 1017 [1994]).

2013To guarantee constitutional due process of law, a criminal statute must “ ‘conveyf ] a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice/ ” State v. Richardson, 289 Kan. 118, 124 , 209 P.3d 696 (2009) (quoting State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418 , 662 P.2d 1286 [1983]).The need for clarity and prevention of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in criminal statutes is heightened because criminal violations result in the loss of personal liberty.

2020Due process requires criminal statutes to "convey[] a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418 , 662 P.2d 1286 (1983). "[T]he determinative question" when statutes are challenged as void for vagueness is "'whether a person of ordinary intelligence understands what conduct is prohibited by' the statutory language at issue." Richardson, 289 Kan. at 125 (quoting State v. Adams, 254 Kan. 436, 445 , 866 P.2d 1017 [1994]).

2020Due process requires criminal statutes to "convey[] a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418 , 662 P.2d 1286 (1983). "[T]he determinative question" when statutes are challenged as void for vagueness is "'whether a person of ordinary intelligence understands what conduct is prohibited by' the statutory language at issue." Richardson, 289 Kan. at 125 (quoting State v. Adams, 254 Kan. 436, 445 , 866 P.2d 1017 [1994]).

2013We conclude that K.S.A. 21-3608(1)(&) is clear and understandable; that ordinary persons can determine what conduct is proscribed by a common-sense reading of the statute; that the statute conveys a sufficiently definite warning when measured by common understanding; and that it is not void for vagueness.” (Emphasis added.) 230 Kan. at 199-200 .

2000The court concluded the statute conveys a sufficiently definite warning when measured by common understanding, and it was not void for vagueness. 230 Kan. at 200 .

1996Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm’n, 251 Kan. 240, 243 , 834 P.2d 368 (1992) (citing Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 244 Kan. 638, 642 , 772 P.2d 758 , cert. denied 493 U.S. 976 [1989]).

1996Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm’n, 251 Kan. 240, 243 , 834 P.2d 368 (1992) (citing Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 244 Kan. 638, 642 , 772 P.2d 758 , cert. denied 493 U.S. 976 [1989]).

1979The test to determine whether a criminal statute or ordinance is vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys “a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.” City of Altamont v. Finkle, 224 Kan. 221, 223 , 579 P.2d 712 (1979); State v. Kirby, 222 Kan. 1 , Syl. ¶ 1, 563 P.2d 408 (1977).

1979The test to determine whether a criminal statute or ordinance is vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys “a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.” City of Altamont v. Finkle, 224 Kan. 221, 223 , 579 P.2d 712 (1979); State v. Kirby, 222 Kan. 1 , Syl. ¶ 1, 563 P.2d 408 (1977).

1989“The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.” State v. Cantrell, 234 Kan. 426 , Syl. ¶ 11, 673 P.2d 1147 (1983), cert. denied 469 U.S. 817 (1984).

1989“The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.” State v. Cantrell, 234 Kan. 426 , Syl. ¶ 11, 673 P.2d 1147 (1983), cert. denied 469 U.S. 817 (1984).

2011Rupnick, 280 Kan. at 737 .

2011Rupnick, 280 Kan. at 737 .

2005First, we consider whether the statute `conveys a sufficiently definite warning' of the proscribed conduct `when measured by common understanding and practice.' [Citation omitted.] Next, we consider `whether the [statute] adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' [Citations omitted.] The second part of the test embodies the `requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' [Citation omitted.] "As the United States Supreme Court explained in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 33 L.

2005First, we consider whether the statute `conveys a sufficiently definite warning' of the proscribed conduct `when measured by common understanding and practice.' [Citation omitted.] Next, we consider `whether the [statute] adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' [Citations omitted.] The second part of the test embodies the `requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' [Citation omitted.] "As the United States Supreme Court explained in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 33 L.

2000More recently, in Wilson , the Kansas Supreme Court upheld its earlier ruling in Fisher , declaring once again that K.S.A. 21-3608(a) is not void for vagueness. 267 Kan. at 556 .

2000The test remains the same: Does the “ ‘language [convey] a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice[?]’ ” Wilson, 267 Kan. at 555 (quoting Kirby, 222 Kan. 1 , Syl. ¶ 1).

1996A statute should not be stricken down unless the infringement of the superior law is clear beyond substantial doubt.” ’ (Quoting Moodij v. Board of Shawnee County Comm’rs, 237 Kan. 67, 74 , 697 P.2d 1310 [1985].) “In relation to'the specific complaint of vagueness, this court stated: ‘[T]he void-for-vagueness'analysis is based upon a due process requirement that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite unless its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning of the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

1996A statute should not be stricken down unless the infringement of the superior law is clear beyond substantial doubt.” ’ (Quoting Moodij v. Board of Shawnee County Comm’rs, 237 Kan. 67, 74 , 697 P.2d 1310 [1985].) “In relation to'the specific complaint of vagueness, this court stated: ‘[T]he void-for-vagueness'analysis is based upon a due process requirement that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite unless its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning of the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

1993Murray v. Palmgren, 231 Kan. 524, 532 , 646 P.2d 1091 (1982), reh. denied 459 U.S. 1229 (1983), sets forth the rules regarding vagueness: ‘ “The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally void by reason of being vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

1992Murray v. Palmgren, 231 Kan. 524, 532 , 646 P.2d 1091 (1982), reh. denied 459 U.S. 1229 (1983), sets forth the rules regarding vagueness: “ ‘The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally void by reason of being vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

1992A statute which either requires or forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application is violative of due process.” State v. Meinert, 225 Kan. 816 , Syl. ¶ 2, 594 P.2d 232 (1979).

1992A statute which either requires or forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application is violative of due process.” State v. Meinert, 225 Kan. 816 , Syl. ¶ 2, 594 P.2d 232 (1979).

1975The test for determining whether a statute is constitutionally void for this reason was recently stated in State v. Conley, 216 Kan. 66 , 531 P. 2d 36 , as follows: “The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally void by reason of being vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

1975The test for determining whether a statute is constitutionally void for this reason was recently stated in State v. Conley, 216 Kan. 66 , 531 P. 2d 36 , as follows: “The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally void by reason of being vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice.

2020We employ a two-pronged inquiry, asking: "(1) whether the statute gives fair warning to those potentially subject to it; and (2) whether it adequately guards against arbitrary and unreasonable enforcement." State v. Gonzalez, 307 Kan. 575, 580 , 412 P.3d 968 (2018). "[S]tatutes are not 'automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.'" Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 244 Kan. 638, 641 , 772 P.2d 758 (1989) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 , 94 S. Ct. 2547 , 41 L.

2020We employ a two-pronged inquiry, asking: "(1) whether the statute gives fair warning to those potentially subject to it; and (2) whether it adequately guards against arbitrary and unreasonable enforcement." State v. Gonzalez, 307 Kan. 575, 580 , 412 P.3d 968 (2018). "[S]tatutes are not 'automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.'" Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 244 Kan. 638, 641 , 772 P.2d 758 (1989) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 , 94 S. Ct. 2547 , 41 L.

2020We employ a two-pronged inquiry, asking: "(1) whether the statute gives fair warning to those potentially subject to it; and (2) whether it adequately guards against arbitrary and unreasonable enforcement." State v. Gonzalez, 307 Kan. 575, 580 , 412 P.3d 968 (2018). "[S]tatutes are not 'automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.'" Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 244 Kan. 638, 641 , 772 P.2d 758 (1989) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 , 94 S. Ct. 2547 , 41 L.

2020We employ a two-pronged inquiry, asking: "(1) whether the statute gives fair warning to those potentially subject to it; and (2) whether it adequately guards against arbitrary and unreasonable enforcement." State v. Gonzalez, 307 Kan. 575, 580 , 412 P.3d 968 (2018). "[S]tatutes are not 'automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.'" Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 244 Kan. 638, 641 , 772 P.2d 758 (1989) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 , 94 S. Ct. 2547 , 41 L.

2017First, courts determine whether the statute conveys a sufficiently definite warning and fair notice of the prohibited conduct in light of common understanding and practice. 298 Kan. at 545 .

2017Second, courts determine whether the statute's terms are precise enough to guard against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 298 Kan. at 545 .

2011A statute which either requires or forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application is violative of due process. [Citation omitted.] In determining whether a statute is void for vagueness, two inquiries are appropriate: (1) whether the statute gives fair warning to those persons potentially subject to it and (2) whether the statute adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Citation omitted.]” Neighbors, 21 Kan.

2008In re Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 199 , 159 P.3d 1011 (2007) (vagueness challenge to Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct).

2008In re Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 199 , 159 P.3d 1011 (2007) (vagueness challenge to Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct).