sufficiently definite warning in Massachusetts

2018See Commonwealth v. Gallant , 373 Mass. 577 , 581, 369 N.E.2d 707 (1977) ("A sufficiently definite warning may be achieved by judicial construction"). 1 Although he failed to file a notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial, the defendant further asserts that the motion should have been allowed on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adduce evidence to properly challenge whether the defendant was operating a "motor vehicle." For the reasons we have explained, any such challenge would have been unavailing, and counsel's failure to raise the issue a

2018See Commonwealth v. Gallant , 373 Mass. 577 , 581, 369 N.E.2d 707 (1977) ("A sufficiently definite warning may be achieved by judicial construction"). 1 Although he failed to file a notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial, the defendant further asserts that the motion should have been allowed on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adduce evidence to properly challenge whether the defendant was operating a "motor vehicle." For the reasons we have explained, any such challenge would have been unavailing, and counsel's failure to raise the issue a

1977Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 553 (1971).

1974See Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 553 (1971), and cases cited.

2014A statute is not vague “if it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard so that men of common intelligence will know its meaning.” Commonwealth v. Orlando, supra. A sufficiently definite warning about what conduct has been made criminal “may be achieved by the common law meaning or statutory history of particular terms.” Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 300 (1974).

1988Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. at 300 , citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

2018See Commonwealth v. Saferian , 366 Mass. 89 , 96, 315 N.E.2d 878 (1974).

2018See Commonwealth v. Saferian , 366 Mass. 89 , 96, 315 N.E.2d 878 (1974).

2014See Commonwealth v. Reyes, supra. As the motion judge correctly determined, G.

1978Even if Regulation 13 were to be considered a criminal statute, and thus held to a higher standard of certainty than a civil sanction ( Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 [1948]), it furnishes a sufficiently definite warning so that people of common intelligence would know that the activities of the appellants' entertainers. constituted mingling with and circulating among patrons.

1978Even if Regulation 13 were to be considered a criminal statute, and thus held to a higher standard of certainty than a civil sanction (Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 [1948]), it furnishes a sufficiently definite warning so that people of common intelligence would know that the activities of the appellants’ entertainers constituted mingling with and circulating among patrons.

1976Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-492 (1957), cited with approval in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 111 (1974).

1976Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-492 (1957), cited with approval in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 111 (1974).

1976Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-492 (1957), cited with approval in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 111 (1974).

1976Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-492 (1957), cited with approval in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 111 (1974).

1947See Norcross v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 255 Mass. 177, 186 .