sufficiently definite warning in Florida

2002In summary, the words in question "convey[] a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." Hagan, 387 So.2d at 945 .

1998Accordingly, the test for vagueness of a constitutional provision is "whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980); see Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994) ("The standard for testing vagueness under Florida law is whether the statute gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct."); Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.1984) ("A vague statute is

1997The established test for statutory vagueness is "whether the language of the *370 statute conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Lindsay, 284 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla.1973).

1981It does not "convey a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Lindsay, 284 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla. 1973).

2015But the “non-residential uses” prohibition is not unconstitutional on its face because contexts exist where it “convey[s] a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.” Marrs v. State, 413 So.2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (internal citation omitted); see also State v. Catalano, 104 So.3d 1069, 1075 (Fla.2012) (“[I]n order to withstand [a vagueness] challenge, a statute must provide persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate notice of the proscribed conduct.”).

1984As stated by the court in Marrs v. State, 413 So.2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) [5] : [i]t is well settled that the language of a statute or ordinance must convey a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.

1987State v. Reese, 222 So.2d 732, 736 (Fla. 1969).

1987State v. Reese, 222 So.2d 732, 736 (Fla. 1969).

1996It is constitutionally impermissible for the Legislature to use such vague and broad language that- a person of common intelligence must speculate about its meaning and be subjected to arrest and punishment if the guess is wrong.... [[Image here]] The test of vagueness of a statute as being whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning of the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice was succinctly stated by this court in Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670 , 154 So. 690 (1934), as follows: ‘...

1996It is constitutionally impermissible for the Legislature to use such vague and broad language that- a person of common intelligence must speculate about its meaning and be subjected to arrest and punishment if the guess is wrong.... [[Image here]] The test of vagueness of a statute as being whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning of the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice was succinctly stated by this court in Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670 , 154 So. 690 (1934), as follows: ‘...

2000State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980) (citing Washington v. State, 302 So.2d 401 (Fla.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 918 , 95 S.Ct. 1582 , 43 L.Ed.2d 786 (1975); Newman v. Carson, 280 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1973)); see also State v. Rawlins, 623 So.2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) ("The vagueness doctrine was developed to insure compliance with the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions which require that a law be declared void if it is so vague that one of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.") (citing Webb v. Department of

1982Finally, we reject the appellee's fall-back position that a limiting construction of § 918.14(1)(b) which negates the overbreadth objection would render it invalid for another reason, that of vagueness. [8] The test of determining if a criminal statute is impermissibly vague is whether it conveys a sufficiently definite warning to one of common understanding of the conduct it proscribes. [9] Newman v. Carson, 280 So.2d 426 *1094 (Fla. 1973).

2005Brown, 629 So.2d at 842 .

1998Accordingly, the test for vagueness of a constitutional provision is "whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980); see Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994) ("The standard for testing vagueness under Florida law is whether the statute gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct."); Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.1984) ("A vague statute is

2005Furthermore, the statutory definition as written has been held to "convey a sufficiently definite warning of proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." Bell v. State, 289 So.2d 388, 390 (Fla.1973).

2000In Bell , we added that the statute "conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." 289 So.2d at 389 (citing Lindsay and Barone ).

1987Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , 77 S.Ct. 1304 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957); State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1980).

1987Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , 77 S.Ct. 1304 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957); State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1980).

1996State v. Wershow, 343 So.2d 605, 609 (Fla.1977); Cuda v. State, 639 So.2d 22 (Fla.1994)(terms "improper" and "illegal" as used in statute making it a crime to financially exploit aged persons or disabled adults, were unconstitutionally vague).

1978State v. Dye, 346 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1977); State v. Wershow, 343 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1977).

1996Whether the words of the Florida statute are sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to its provisions what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is the test by which the statute must stand or fall, because, as was stated in the opinion above mentioned, ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.’ [[Image here]] More recently, this court in State v. Llopis, [ 257 So

1983State v. Gale Distributors, Inc., 349 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1977); compare State v. Llopis, 257 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1971) (statute prohibiting public employee from accepting other employment which might impair his independence of judgment in the performance of his public duties found vague).

2015See Hoberman v. State, 400 So.2d 758, 758 (Fla.1981) (“[A]ppellant was convicted of bribery and unlawful compensation for official behavior pursuant to sections 838.015(1) and 838.016(1), Florida Statutes (1977) — Appellant’s vagueness challenge fails because sections 838.015(1) and 838.016(1) convey a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct ..,.”) (citations omitted).

2015But the “non-residential uses” prohibition is not unconstitutional on its face because contexts exist where it “convey[s] a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.” Marrs v. State, 413 So.2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (internal citation omitted); see also State v. Catalano, 104 So.3d 1069, 1075 (Fla.2012) (“[I]n order to withstand [a vagueness] challenge, a statute must provide persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate notice of the proscribed conduct.”).

2005See also State v. Waller, 621 So.2d 499, 501 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (holding that in defining lewdness in section 796.07 as "indecent or obscene," the legislature "did not suggest that it intended a narrower definition than the common understanding courts have employed to explain that term as a crime involving the concept of indecency").

2003State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980); see also State v. Manfredonia, 649 So.2d 1388 (Fla.1995).

2001The test to determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague is "whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and purpose." Reynolds v. State, 383 So.2d 228, 229 (Fla. 1980); see also Whitaker v. Dep't of Ins. & Treasurer, 680 So.2d 528, 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(the test for vagueness is whether the statutory language is sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to its provisions what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties and conveys a sufficiently definite warning of t

2001The test to determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague is "whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and purpose." Reynolds v. State, 383 So.2d 228, 229 (Fla. 1980); see also Whitaker v. Dep't of Ins. & Treasurer, 680 So.2d 528, 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(the test for vagueness is whether the statutory language is sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to its provisions what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties and conveys a sufficiently definite warning of t

2000State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980) (citing Washington v. State, 302 So.2d 401 (Fla.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 918 , 95 S.Ct. 1582 , 43 L.Ed.2d 786 (1975); Newman v. Carson, 280 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1973)); see also State v. Rawlins, 623 So.2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) ("The vagueness doctrine was developed to insure compliance with the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions which require that a law be declared void if it is so vague that one of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.") (citing Webb v. Department of

2000State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980) (citing Washington v. State, 302 So.2d 401 (Fla.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 918 , 95 S.Ct. 1582 , 43 L.Ed.2d 786 (1975); Newman v. Carson, 280 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1973)); see also State v. Rawlins, 623 So.2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) ("The vagueness doctrine was developed to insure compliance with the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions which require that a law be declared void if it is so vague that one of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.") (citing Webb v. Department of

1998Accordingly, the test for vagueness of a constitutional provision is "whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980); see Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994) ("The standard for testing vagueness under Florida law is whether the statute gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct."); Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.1984) ("A vague statute is

1998Accordingly, the test for vagueness of a constitutional provision is "whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980); see Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994) ("The standard for testing vagueness under Florida law is whether the statute gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct."); Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.1984) ("A vague statute is