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9 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hutchinson National Bank & Trust Co. v. Englishgreen2 sentences1979Penachio v. Walker, 207 Kan. 54 , 483 P.2d 1119 (1971), states in syllabus ¶ 2 as follows: “Two of the elements which must be present before the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to further action are (1) a judgment on the merits which determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings or issues presented for trial and (2) the parties must be the same or in privity therein.” In Hutchinson Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan. 127, 129, 130 , 495 P.2d 1011 (1972), it was held that the doctrin 1979Penachio v. Walker, 207 Kan. 54 , 483 P.2d 1119 (1971), states in syllabus ¶ 2 as follows: “Two of the elements which must be present before the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to further action are (1) a judgment on the merits which determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings or issues presented for trial and (2) the parties must be the same or in privity therein.” In Hutchinson Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan. 127, 129, 130 , 495 P.2d 1011 (1972), it was held that the doctrin | 1 | 3 |
Weaver v. Frazeegreen2 sentences1979See also Weaver v. Frazee, 219 Kan. 42, 51, 52 , 547 P.2d 1005 (1976). 1979See also Weaver v. Frazee, 219 Kan. 42, 51, 52 , 547 P.2d 1005 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Evans
green
2 sentences2000The appellant cites Williams v. Evans, 220 Kan. 394, 396 , 552 P.2d 876 (1976), a civil case, concerning our rules on collateral estoppel: “ ‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment, (2) the parties must be *311 the same or in privity therein and (3) tire issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support tire judgment.’ ” (Quoting Bud 2000The appellant cites Williams v. Evans, 220 Kan. 394, 396 , 552 P.2d 876 (1976), a civil case, concerning our rules on collateral estoppel: “ ‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment, (2) the parties must be *311 the same or in privity therein and (3) tire issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support tire judgment.’ ” (Quoting Bud | 4 | 1983–2000 |
Bud Jennings Carpets & Draperies, Inc. v. Greenhouse
green
2 sentences2000The appellant cites Williams v. Evans, 220 Kan. 394, 396 , 552 P.2d 876 (1976), a civil case, concerning our rules on collateral estoppel: “ ‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment, (2) the parties must be *311 the same or in privity therein and (3) tire issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support tire judgment.’ ” (Quoting Bud 2000The appellant cites Williams v. Evans, 220 Kan. 394, 396 , 552 P.2d 876 (1976), a civil case, concerning our rules on collateral estoppel: “ ‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment, (2) the parties must be *311 the same or in privity therein and (3) tire issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support tire judgment.’ ” (Quoting Bud | 3 | 1976–2000 |
State v. Starbuck
green
2 sentences2000State v. Starbuck, 239 Kan. 132, 133 , 715 P.2d 1291 (1986). 2000State v. Starbuck, 239 Kan. 132, 133 , 715 P.2d 1291 (1986). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Gigot v. Cities Service Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1996The district court specifically found that Griffin could not perform any of the available positions at Exchange. “ ‘ “The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown: (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue, based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment; (2) the parties are the same or in privity; and (3) the issue was actually determined and was necessary to support the judgment.” ’ ” Gigot v. Cities Service Oil Co., 241 Kan. 304, 311 , 737 P 1996The district court specifically found that Griffin could not perform any of the available positions at Exchange. “ ‘ “The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown: (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue, based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment; (2) the parties are the same or in privity; and (3) the issue was actually determined and was necessary to support the judgment.” ’ ” Gigot v. Cities Service Oil Co., 241 Kan. 304, 311 , 737 P | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Kearney v. Kansas Public Service Co.
green
2 sentences1987In Kearney v. Kansas Public Service Co., 233 Kan. 492, 508 , 665 P.2d 757 (1983) (quoting Williams v. Evans, 220 Kan. 394 , Syl. ¶ 2, 552 P.2d 876 [1976]), the court stated tire elements of collateral estoppel: “ ‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown: (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue, based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment; (2) the parties are the same or in privity; and (3) the issue was actually determined and was ne 1987In Kearney v. Kansas Public Service Co., 233 Kan. 492, 508 , 665 P.2d 757 (1983) (quoting Williams v. Evans, 220 Kan. 394 , Syl. ¶ 2, 552 P.2d 876 [1976]), the court stated tire elements of collateral estoppel: “ ‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown: (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue, based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment; (2) the parties are the same or in privity; and (3) the issue was actually determined and was ne | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Goetz v. Board of Trustees, Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement System
green
2 sentences1983The elements of collateral estoppel were stated in Bud Jennings Carpets & Draperies, Inc. v. Greenhouse, 210 Kan. 92, 96 , 499 P.2d 1096 (1972), thus: “The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment, (2) the parties must be the same or in privity therein and (3) the issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support the judgment.” See William 1983The elements of collateral estoppel were stated in Bud Jennings Carpets & Draperies, Inc. v. Greenhouse, 210 Kan. 92, 96 , 499 P.2d 1096 (1972), thus: “The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment, (2) the parties must be the same or in privity therein and (3) the issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support the judgment.” See William | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Penachio v. Walker
green
2 sentences1979Penachio v. Walker, 207 Kan. 54 , 483 P.2d 1119 (1971), states in syllabus ¶ 2 as follows: “Two of the elements which must be present before the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to further action are (1) a judgment on the merits which determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings or issues presented for trial and (2) the parties must be the same or in privity therein.” In Hutchinson Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan. 127, 129, 130 , 495 P.2d 1011 (1972), it was held that the doctrin 1979Penachio v. Walker, 207 Kan. 54 , 483 P.2d 1119 (1971), states in syllabus ¶ 2 as follows: “Two of the elements which must be present before the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to further action are (1) a judgment on the merits which determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings or issues presented for trial and (2) the parties must be the same or in privity therein.” In Hutchinson Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan. 127, 129, 130 , 495 P.2d 1011 (1972), it was held that the doctrin | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Neville v. Hennigh
green
2 sentences1976Instead of preventing a second assertion of the same claim or cause of action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents a second litigation of the same issues between the same parties or their privies even in connection with a different claim or cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) We are thus looking for “issues” which have been litigated “between the same parties.” Put another way: “The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on t 1976Instead of preventing a second assertion of the same claim or cause of action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents a second litigation of the same issues between the same parties or their privies even in connection with a different claim or cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) We are thus looking for “issues” which have been litigated “between the same parties.” Put another way: “The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked as a bar to litigating an issue when the following is shown (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on t | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.