Ohio Supreme Court analysis in Ohio

2006In Blakely , the Court held that "* * * the `statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. * * * In other words, the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 303-304. {¶ 12} The final case relied upon by the Ohio Supreme Court is United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220 .

2006In Blakely , the Court held that "* * * the `statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. * * * In other words, the relevant `statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 303-304. {¶ 9} The final case relied upon by the Ohio Supreme Court is United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220 .

2006The first decision, Apprendi v. New Jersey , (2000), 530 U.S. 466 , held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490 . {¶ 11} The second decision pertinent to the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in Foster is Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 .

2006The first decision, Apprendi v. New Jersey , (2000), 530 U.S. 466 , held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490 . {¶ 11} The second decision pertinent to the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in Foster is Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 .

2013The court then told the parties it would "proceed to sentencing solely on Count Two charging felonious assault." At that point, Attorney Hurr questioned whether the violation of the protection order was a mergeable offense under the Ohio Supreme Court's test in State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-1 .

2012(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them. {¶ 6} The Ohio Supreme Court’s test for determining when offenses are allied offenses of similar import that must be merged pursuant to R.C. 2941.25 was set forth in State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 .

2013As 9 an initial matter, the State “must avoid insinuations and assertions which are calculated to mislead the jury.” Id. at 14 , citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.78, 88 (1935). {¶27} This Court has adopted the Ohio Supreme Court’s test in evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct arising during closing argument.

2012As an initial matter, the State “must avoid insinuations and assertions which are calculated to mislead the jury.” Id. at 14 , citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.78, 88 (1935). {¶12} This Court has adopted the Ohio Supreme Court’s test in evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct arising during closing argument.

2001The Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in Brown , supra , is particularly relevant here.

2001The Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in Brown , supra , is particularly relevant here.

2026Bethel, 2022-Ohio-783 at ¶ 55 . -8- Butler CA2025-05-041 ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Brand, 2025-Ohio-669, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.); State v McKnight, 2021-Ohio-2673, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.). {¶ 28} In determining the meaning of "unavoidably prevented" in Crim.R. 33(B), we find guidance in the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis of that phrase in State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-134 .

2026Bethel, 2022-Ohio-783 at ¶ 55 . -8- Butler CA2025-05-041 ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Brand, 2025-Ohio-669, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.); State v McKnight, 2021-Ohio-2673, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.). {¶ 28} In determining the meaning of "unavoidably prevented" in Crim.R. 33(B), we find guidance in the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis of that phrase in State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-134 .

2025I find that trial courts should be solely guided by the Ohio Supreme Court’s standard set forth in Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521 and reinforced in State v Barnes, 2022-Ohio-4486 .

2025Id.

2025I find that trial courts should be solely guided by the Ohio Supreme Court’s standard set forth in Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521 and reinforced in State v Barnes, 2022-Ohio-4486 .

2024Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 34 , 665 N.E.2d 1115 (1996).

2024Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 34 , 665 N.E.2d 1115 (1996).

2023Id. {¶ 23} Based upon our holding in Mathews and the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in Allen, the Sixth District affirmed summary judgment in favor of a fast-food restaurant after a patron suffered injuries from consuming a "boneless breast of chicken sandwich" that contained a bone.

2023Thus, for the two provisions to be in conflict, it must be implied 8. that R.C. 5577.05 grants a right to operate a vehicle greater than 80 inches in width as a taxicab.2 {¶ 20} On this issue, we find the Ohio Supreme Court’s instruction in Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33 , 2008-Ohio-270 , 881 N.E.2d 255 , ¶ 31, to be particularly applicable: Although on occasion a state statute and municipal ordinance will directly contradict each other, and thereby make a conflict analysis simple and direct, that is not always the case.

2022Champaign Nos. 2021-CA-30 and 2021-CA-35, 2022-Ohio-2057, ¶ 14 .

2022The court stated, in relevant part, the following: We find the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in Oliver, supra, Skidmore & Hall, supra, and O' Stricker, supra, applicable to the accrual of a libel action under R.C. 2305.11(A).

2022The court stated, in relevant part, the following: We find the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in Oliver, supra, Skidmore & Hall, supra, and O' Stricker, supra, applicable to the accrual of a libel action under R.C. 2305.11(A).

2022The court stated, in relevant part, the following: We find the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in Oliver, supra, Skidmore & Hall, supra, and O' Stricker, supra, applicable to the accrual of a libel action under R.C. 2305.11(A).

2019The court explained: In so holding, we are informed by the Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis in rejecting the “sentencing package” doctrine, “a federal doctrine that requires the court to consider the sanctions imposed on multiple offenses as the components of a single, comprehensive sentencing plan.” State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176 , 2006-Ohio-1245 , 846 N.E.2d 824 , ¶ 5.

2017Herring has not demonstrated a basis for us to conclude that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred. {¶20} With respect to the arguments advanced challenging the aggregate sentence, Herring claims his robbery conviction, with the indictment identifying the victim’s daughter as the person against whom the robbery was committed, should have merged with the aggravated burglary conviction under the Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis in State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892 .

2017Herring has not demonstrated a basis for us to conclude that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred. {¶20} With respect to the arguments advanced challenging the aggregate sentence, Herring claims his robbery conviction, with the indictment identifying the victim’s daughter as the person against whom the robbery was committed, should have merged with the aggravated burglary conviction under the Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis in State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892 .

2017No. 07AP-556, 2008-Ohio-945 , 2008 WL 600201 , ¶ 16 (" 'It is the duty of the appellant, not the appellate court, to construct the legal arguments necessary to support the appellant's assignments of error.' "). {¶ 54} Second, LPO contends that even if the right to a primary is not a fundamental right, the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in Mole should control our analysis here. 3 Specifically, LPO contends that Mole identified a more-protective test to apply in equal protection challenges under the Ohio Constitution.

2016"For a court of appeals to certify a case as being in conflict with another case, it is not enough that the reasoning expressed in the opinions of the two No. 15AP-1043 6 courts of appeals be inconsistent; the judgments of the two courts must be in conflict." State v. Hankerson, 52 Ohio App.3d 73 (2d Dist.1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 19} Here, Thyroff asserts that the rule of law upon which a conflict exists is as follows: For res judicata purposes, where the Ohio Supreme Court doctrine that res judicata is "a rule of fundamental and substantial justice" and is not to be used as a

2016"For a court of appeals to certify a case as being in conflict with another case, it is not enough that the reasoning expressed in the opinions of the two No. 15AP-1043 6 courts of appeals be inconsistent; the judgments of the two courts must be in conflict." State v. Hankerson, 52 Ohio App.3d 73 (2d Dist.1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 19} Here, Thyroff asserts that the rule of law upon which a conflict exists is as follows: For res judicata purposes, where the Ohio Supreme Court doctrine that res judicata is "a rule of fundamental and substantial justice" and is not to be used as a