9 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1985–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co.green2 sentences2015Nonetheless, we recognize that the language from the Brightman case could be interpreted as extending to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 7 However, doctrinal developments reflected in more recent cases make clear that the Statute of Frauds does not bar recovery on a promissory estoppel theory. 8 In Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. Ct. 722 (1974), S.C., 368 Mass. 811 (1975), this court endorsed the principle that a party may be estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds defense if, through its own representations or conduct, it induces “detrimental reliance.” Id. at 728-729. 2007General Laws c. 259, § 1, provides, in relevant part: “No action shall be brought . . . [u]pan a contract for the sale of land, tenements or hereditaments or of any interest in or concerning them . . . [ujnless the promise, contract or agreement upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.” Estoppel may prevail against a Statute of Frauds defense where the litigant claiming estoppel proves: “(1.) A representation or conduct amounting to a representatio | 1 | 2 |
Johnny's Oil Co. v. Eldayhagreen1 sentence2015Although the court did not use the term “promissory estoppel,” instead referring to “an estoppel” occasioned by “detrimental reliance,” the terms are used interchangeably in the case law. 9 See Johnny’s Oil Co. v. Eldayha, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 714 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
Ames v. Fostergreen1 sentence2007Id. at 177-178 , quoting Ames v. Foster, 106 Mass. 400, 403 (1871). | 1 | 1 |
Industrial Bankers of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Reid, Murdoch & Co.green1 sentence2007General Laws c. 259, § 1, provides, in relevant part: “No action shall be brought . . . [u]pan a contract for the sale of land, tenements or hereditaments or of any interest in or concerning them . . . [ujnless the promise, contract or agreement upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.” Estoppel may prevail against a Statute of Frauds defense where the litigant claiming estoppel proves: “(1.) A representation or conduct amounting to a representatio | 1 | 1 |
Tinkham v. Jenny Craig, Inc.green1 sentence2005See also Tinkham v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 567, 574-575 (1998) (judicial estoppel based on counsel’s representations about amount in controversy made in support of motion to remand case to State court). | 1 | 1 |
Alternative System Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc.green1 sentence2005Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir. 2004) (judicial estoppel applied to inconsistent characterization of claim for purposes of avoiding Statute of Frauds defense). | 1 | 1 |
Nessralla v. Peckgreen1 sentence1997In the instant case, the defendant failed to advance any evidence that he had materially changed his position or relied on the plaintiffs’ oral agreement to his substantial detriment, and that he would suffer an “unjust and unconscientious injury and loss,” Nessralla v. Peck, 403 Mass. 757, 761 (1989), if the plaintiffs were not estopped from asserting a Statute of Frauds defense. | 1 | 1 |
Palandjian v. Pahlavigreen1 sentence1994Frederick v. Conagra, 713 F.Supp. 41, 45 (D.Mass. 1989), citing Greenstein v. Flatley, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 351, 356 (1985); Hoffman v. Optima Systems Inc., 683 F.Supp 865, 869 (D.Mass. 1988), citing Hickey v. Green, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 671 (1982) (holding that the seller of reed estate was bound to her oral contract under the equitable estoppel principles of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §129); Goeken v. Kay, 751 F.2d 469, 472-74 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming district court decision which assumed that Massachusetts law allowed recovery on reasonable reliance on an oral contract notwithstanding t | 1 | 1 |
Greenstein v. Flatleygreen1 sentence1994Frederick v. Conagra, 713 F.Supp. 41, 45 (D.Mass. 1989), citing Greenstein v. Flatley, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 351, 356 (1985); Hoffman v. Optima Systems Inc., 683 F.Supp 865, 869 (D.Mass. 1988), citing Hickey v. Green, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 671 (1982) (holding that the seller of reed estate was bound to her oral contract under the equitable estoppel principles of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §129); Goeken v. Kay, 751 F.2d 469, 472-74 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming district court decision which assumed that Massachusetts law allowed recovery on reasonable reliance on an oral contract notwithstanding t | 1 | 1 |
John Goeken v. Alan Kaygreen1 sentence1994Frederick v. Conagra, 713 F.Supp. 41, 45 (D.Mass. 1989), citing Greenstein v. Flatley, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 351, 356 (1985); Hoffman v. Optima Systems Inc., 683 F.Supp 865, 869 (D.Mass. 1988), citing Hickey v. Green, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 671 (1982) (holding that the seller of reed estate was bound to her oral contract under the equitable estoppel principles of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §129); Goeken v. Kay, 751 F.2d 469, 472-74 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming district court decision which assumed that Massachusetts law allowed recovery on reasonable reliance on an oral contract notwithstanding t | 1 | 1 |
Frederick v. ConAgra, Inc.green1 sentence1994Frederick v. Conagra, 713 F.Supp. 41, 45 (D.Mass. 1989), citing Greenstein v. Flatley, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 351, 356 (1985); Hoffman v. Optima Systems Inc., 683 F.Supp 865, 869 (D.Mass. 1988), citing Hickey v. Green, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 671 (1982) (holding that the seller of reed estate was bound to her oral contract under the equitable estoppel principles of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §129); Goeken v. Kay, 751 F.2d 469, 472-74 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming district court decision which assumed that Massachusetts law allowed recovery on reasonable reliance on an oral contract notwithstanding t | 1 | 1 |
Jet Line Services, Inc. v. American Employers Insurancegreen1 sentence1990Co., 404 Mass. 706, 717-718 (1989). 10 Acton Block argues that we should delete from the award the hours spent in researching the Statute of Frauds issue (seventy-two hours), preparing the trial brief (fifty-nine hours), which was primarily devoted to the Statute of Frauds issue, and preparing a draft of findings and rulings (sixty-two hours), which are said to have been largely transcribed from the trial brief. | 1 | 1 |
Edwin F. Armstrong & Company v. Ben Pearson, Incorporatedgreen1 sentence1985Co., 468 F. Supp. 98, 100 [N.D. 111. 1979]; Edwin F. Armstrong & Co. v. Ben Pearson, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 163, 167 [E.D. | 1 | 1 |
Ehrman v. Cook Electric Co.green1 sentence1985Co., 468 F. Supp. 98, 100 [N.D. 111. 1979]; Edwin F. Armstrong & Co. v. Ben Pearson, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 163, 167 [E.D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co. of Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences2015Nonetheless, we recognize that the language from the Brightman case could be interpreted as extending to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 7 However, doctrinal developments reflected in more recent cases make clear that the Statute of Frauds does not bar recovery on a promissory estoppel theory. 8 In Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. Ct. 722 (1974), S.C., 368 Mass. 811 (1975), this court endorsed the principle that a party may be estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds defense if, through its own representations or conduct, it induces “detrimental reliance.” Id. at 728-729. 2007General Laws c. 259, § 1, provides, in relevant part: “No action shall be brought . . . [u]pan a contract for the sale of land, tenements or hereditaments or of any interest in or concerning them . . . [ujnless the promise, contract or agreement upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.” Estoppel may prevail against a Statute of Frauds defense where the litigant claiming estoppel proves: “(1.) A representation or conduct amounting to a representatio | 2 | 2007–2015 |
Hickey v. Green
green
2 sentences2005The issue of estoppel was discussed in Hickey v. Green, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 671 (1982), where the court noted: A contract for the transfer of an interest in land may be specifically enforced notwithstanding failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds if it is established that the party seeking enforcement, in reasonable reliance on the contract and on the continuing assent of the party against whom enforcement is sought, has so changed his position that injustice can be avoided only by specific performance . . . 1994Frederick v. Conagra, 713 F.Supp. 41, 45 (D.Mass. 1989), citing Greenstein v. Flatley, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 351, 356 (1985); Hoffman v. Optima Systems Inc., 683 F.Supp 865, 869 (D.Mass. 1988), citing Hickey v. Green, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 671 (1982) (holding that the seller of reed estate was bound to her oral contract under the equitable estoppel principles of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §129); Goeken v. Kay, 751 F.2d 469, 472-74 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming district court decision which assumed that Massachusetts law allowed recovery on reasonable reliance on an oral contract notwithstanding t | 2 | 1994–2005 |
Central Ceilings, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the Statute of Frauds issue was properly before the trial court, the undisputed facts clearly bring the case within a well-known exception to the Statute that was recently explained by the Appeals Court in Central Ceilings, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc., 70 Mass. App. Ct. 172 (2007), as follows: [A] case is not within the statute, where, upon the whole transaction, the fair inference is that the leading object or purpose and the effect of the transaction was the purchase or acquisition by the promisor from the promisee of some property, lien or ben 2007Id. at 177-178 , quoting Ames v. Foster, 106 Mass. 400, 403 (1871). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Cabrera v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
green
1 sentence1994Frederick v. Conagra, 713 F.Supp. 41, 45 (D.Mass. 1989), citing Greenstein v. Flatley, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 351, 356 (1985); Hoffman v. Optima Systems Inc., 683 F.Supp 865, 869 (D.Mass. 1988), citing Hickey v. Green, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 671 (1982) (holding that the seller of reed estate was bound to her oral contract under the equitable estoppel principles of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §129); Goeken v. Kay, 751 F.2d 469, 472-74 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming district court decision which assumed that Massachusetts law allowed recovery on reasonable reliance on an oral contract notwithstanding t | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.