Frauds defense in Pennsylvania

1997See Frankel v. Northeast Land Co., 391 Pa.Super. 226 , 570 A.2d 1065 (1990) (in action for potential purchasers against subsequent purchasers for specific performance of sale of condominium, trial court could not determine whether action was barred by Statute of Frauds when defendants objected to action through filing preliminary objections; “a possible failure to comply with the statute of frauds is not grounds for sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer;” “to say that a possible affirmative defense exists is not to say that such a complaint is legally insufficient on it

1997See Frankel v. Northeast Land Co., 391 Pa.Super. 226 , 570 A.2d 1065 (1990) (in action for potential purchasers against subsequent purchasers for specific performance of sale of condominium, trial court could not determine whether action was barred by Statute of Frauds when defendants objected to action through filing preliminary objections; “a possible failure to comply with the statute of frauds is not grounds for sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer;” “to say that a possible affirmative defense exists is not to say that such a complaint is legally insufficient on it

1997However, in Brown v. Hahn, 419 Pa. 42 , 213 A.2d 342 (1965), our supreme court analyzed the Statute of Frauds defense and by what method it should be raised.

1997However, in Brown v. Hahn, 419 Pa. 42 , 213 A.2d 342 (1965), our supreme court analyzed the Statute of Frauds defense and by what method it should be raised.

1995The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not question the propriety of the preservation issue. [3] The appellant cites Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), for the proposition that a state court's enforcement of a penalty provision of a restrictive covenant based on one's race or color constitutes state action allowing for the scrutiny of such penalty provision under the federal constitution's Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection precepts.

1995The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not question the propriety of the preservation issue. [3] The appellant cites Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), for the proposition that a state court's enforcement of a penalty provision of a restrictive covenant based on one's race or color constitutes state action allowing for the scrutiny of such penalty provision under the federal constitution's Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection precepts.

1990And, the fact that the court below permitted the appellant to raise the Statute of Frauds issue at post-trial oral arguments would not save the issue from falling prey to the waiver doctrine, cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Cacciatiore, 343 Pa.Super. 430 , 495 A.2d 540 (1985); Commonwealth v. Santana, 321 Pa.Super. 299 , 468 A.2d 488 (1983), for to hold thusly would be tantamount to paying mere lip-service to our Rules of Civil Procedure.

1990And, the fact that the court below permitted the appellant to raise the Statute of Frauds issue at post-trial oral arguments would not save the issue from falling prey to the waiver doctrine, cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Cacciatiore, 343 Pa.Super. 430 , 495 A.2d 540 (1985); Commonwealth v. Santana, 321 Pa.Super. 299 , 468 A.2d 488 (1983), for to hold thusly would be tantamount to paying mere lip-service to our Rules of Civil Procedure.

1990And, the fact that the court below permitted the appellant to raise the Statute of Frauds issue at post-trial oral arguments would not save the issue from falling prey to the waiver doctrine, cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Cacciatiore, 343 Pa.Super. 430 , 495 A.2d 540 (1985); Commonwealth v. Santana, 321 Pa.Super. 299 , 468 A.2d 488 (1983), for to hold thusly would be tantamount to paying mere lip-service to our Rules of Civil Procedure.

1990And, the fact that the court below permitted the appellant to raise the Statute of Frauds issue at post-trial oral arguments would not save the issue from falling prey to the waiver doctrine, cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Cacciatiore, 343 Pa.Super. 430 , 495 A.2d 540 (1985); Commonwealth v. Santana, 321 Pa.Super. 299 , 468 A.2d 488 (1983), for to hold thusly would be tantamount to paying mere lip-service to our Rules of Civil Procedure.

1982Therefore, for a defendant to invoke the Statute of Frauds in defending himself at trial, the defendant must first raise it in a responsive pleading under the heading “New Matter.” 2 This waiver rule has been strictly adhered to by our courts. 3 In Charles v. Henry, 460 Pa. 673 , 334 A.2d 289 (1975), our Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the Statute of Frauds defense to the appellant by the lower court because appellant failed to set forth the defense, in a responsive pleading under the heading “New Matter”.

1982Therefore, for a defendant to invoke the Statute of Frauds in defending himself at trial, the defendant must first raise it in a responsive pleading under the heading “New Matter.” 2 This waiver rule has been strictly adhered to by our courts. 3 In Charles v. Henry, 460 Pa. 673 , 334 A.2d 289 (1975), our Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the Statute of Frauds defense to the appellant by the lower court because appellant failed to set forth the defense, in a responsive pleading under the heading “New Matter”.