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9 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Kerrgreen2 sentences2021State Bar Ass’n v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180, 181 (1974) (observing that a postconviction proceeding is “an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence,” not “a part of the original criminal cause”). 2021State Bar Ass’n v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180, 181 (1974) (observing that a postconviction proceeding is “an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence,” not “a part of the original criminal cause”). | 6 | 8 |
Trimble v. Stategreen2 sentences2014State Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (observing that a postconviction proceeding is “an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence,” not “a part of the original criminal cause”); Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 234 , 909 A.2d 1020 (2006) (noting that proceeding under DNA postconviction statute is a “collateral attack on a criminal conviction”); Trimble v. State, 157 Md. 2012We also take into account the State’s argument that “Lopez’s action for post-conviction relief was not a part of his *158 criminal cases, but is an independent and collateral civil proceeding.” See Maryland State Bar Assoc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (stating that post-conviction proceedings in Maryland do “not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”); accord State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 308 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. at 563 , 983 A. | 1 | 2 |
Mosley v. Stategreen2 sentences2012We also take into account the State’s argument that “Lopez’s action for post-conviction relief was not a part of his *158 criminal cases, but is an independent and collateral civil proceeding.” See Maryland State Bar Assoc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (stating that post-conviction proceedings in Maryland do “not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”); accord State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 308 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. at 563 , 983 A. 2012We also take into account the State’s argument that “Lopez’s action for post-conviction relief was not a part of his *158 criminal cases, but is an independent and collateral civil proceeding.” See Maryland State Bar Assoc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (stating that post-conviction proceedings in Maryland do “not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”); accord State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 308 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. at 563 , 983 A. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Matthewsgreen2 sentences2012We also take into account the State’s argument that “Lopez’s action for post-conviction relief was not a part of his *158 criminal cases, but is an independent and collateral civil proceeding.” See Maryland State Bar Assoc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (stating that post-conviction proceedings in Maryland do “not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”); accord State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 308 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. at 563 , 983 A. 2012We also take into account the State’s argument that “Lopez’s action for post-conviction relief was not a part of his *158 criminal cases, but is an independent and collateral civil proceeding.” See Maryland State Bar Assoc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (stating that post-conviction proceedings in Maryland do “not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”); accord State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 308 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. at 563 , 983 A. | 1 | 1 |
Bulluck v. Wardengreen2 sentences2009See Section 7-109 of the Criminal Procedure Article, Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.); [11] Coleman v. Warden, 239 Md. 711, 712 , 212 A.2d 463, 463 (1965) ("[N]o appeal as of right lies from the denial of post conviction relief; review may be sought only by way of an application for leave to appeal."); Bulluck v. Warden, 220 Md. 658, 659 , 152 A.2d 184, 184 (1959) ("It is not one of the purposes of the *1095 Post Conviction Procedure Act to grant an additional and fully repetitious appeal."). 2009See Section 7-109 of the Criminal Procedure Article, Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.); [11] Coleman v. Warden, 239 Md. 711, 712 , 212 A.2d 463, 463 (1965) ("[N]o appeal as of right lies from the denial of post conviction relief; review may be sought only by way of an application for leave to appeal."); Bulluck v. Warden, 220 Md. 658, 659 , 152 A.2d 184, 184 (1959) ("It is not one of the purposes of the *1095 Post Conviction Procedure Act to grant an additional and fully repetitious appeal."). | 1 | 1 |
Coleman v. Warden of the Maryland House of Correctiongreen2 sentences2009See Section 7-109 of the Criminal Procedure Article, Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.); [11] Coleman v. Warden, 239 Md. 711, 712 , 212 A.2d 463, 463 (1965) ("[N]o appeal as of right lies from the denial of post conviction relief; review may be sought only by way of an application for leave to appeal."); Bulluck v. Warden, 220 Md. 658, 659 , 152 A.2d 184, 184 (1959) ("It is not one of the purposes of the *1095 Post Conviction Procedure Act to grant an additional and fully repetitious appeal."). 2009See Section 7-109 of the Criminal Procedure Article, Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.); [11] Coleman v. Warden, 239 Md. 711, 712 , 212 A.2d 463, 463 (1965) ("[N]o appeal as of right lies from the denial of post conviction relief; review may be sought only by way of an application for leave to appeal."); Bulluck v. Warden, 220 Md. 658, 659 , 152 A.2d 184, 184 (1959) ("It is not one of the purposes of the *1095 Post Conviction Procedure Act to grant an additional and fully repetitious appeal."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blake v. State
green
2 sentences2014State Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (observing that a postconviction proceeding is “an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence,” not “a part of the original criminal cause”); Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 234 , 909 A.2d 1020 (2006) (noting that proceeding under DNA postconviction statute is a “collateral attack on a criminal conviction”); Trimble v. State, 157 Md. 2014State Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (observing that a postconviction proceeding is “an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence,” not “a part of the original criminal cause”); Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 234 , 909 A.2d 1020 (2006) (noting that proceeding under DNA postconviction statute is a “collateral attack on a criminal conviction”); Trimble v. State, 157 Md. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Pennsylvania v. Finley
green
2 sentences2014App. 73, 78 , 849 A.2d 83 (2004) (stating that proceeding under DNA postconviction statute is “not part of the criminal proceeding itself’ and is “in fact considered to be civil in nature”) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987)). 2014App. 73, 78 , 849 A.2d 83 (2004) (stating that proceeding under DNA postconviction statute is “not part of the criminal proceeding itself’ and is “in fact considered to be civil in nature”) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Arrington v. State
green
2 sentences2012We also take into account the State’s argument that “Lopez’s action for post-conviction relief was not a part of his *158 criminal cases, but is an independent and collateral civil proceeding.” See Maryland State Bar Assoc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (stating that post-conviction proceedings in Maryland do “not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”); accord State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 308 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. at 563 , 983 A. 2012We also take into account the State’s argument that “Lopez’s action for post-conviction relief was not a part of his *158 criminal cases, but is an independent and collateral civil proceeding.” See Maryland State Bar Assoc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (stating that post-conviction proceedings in Maryland do “not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”); accord State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 308 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. at 563 , 983 A. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Ruby v. State
green
2 sentences2012We also take into account the State’s argument that “Lopez’s action for post-conviction relief was not a part of his *158 criminal cases, but is an independent and collateral civil proceeding.” See Maryland State Bar Assoc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (stating that post-conviction proceedings in Maryland do “not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”); accord State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 308 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. at 563 , 983 A. 2012We also take into account the State’s argument that “Lopez’s action for post-conviction relief was not a part of his *158 criminal cases, but is an independent and collateral civil proceeding.” See Maryland State Bar Assoc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (stating that post-conviction proceedings in Maryland do “not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”); accord State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 308 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. at 563 , 983 A. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Maryland v. Kanaras
green
2 sentences2012We also take into account the State’s argument that “Lopez’s action for post-conviction relief was not a part of his *158 criminal cases, but is an independent and collateral civil proceeding.” See Maryland State Bar Assoc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (stating that post-conviction proceedings in Maryland do “not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”); accord State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 308 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. at 563 , 983 A. 2012We also take into account the State’s argument that “Lopez’s action for post-conviction relief was not a part of his *158 criminal cases, but is an independent and collateral civil proceeding.” See Maryland State Bar Assoc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 , 326 A.2d 180 (1974) (stating that post-conviction proceedings in Maryland do “not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”); accord State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 308 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Arrington v. State, 411 Md. at 563 , 983 A. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Andrews v. United States
green
2 sentences1974Andrews v. United States, 373 U. S. 334 , 83 S. Ct. 1236 , 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963); Semet v. United States, 422 F. 2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1970); Evans v. United States, 387 F. 2d 160 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U. S. 968 (1968); McCartney v. United States, 311 F. 2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U. S. 848 (1963). 1974Andrews v. United States, 373 U. S. 334 , 83 S. Ct. 1236 , 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963); Semet v. United States, 422 F. 2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1970); Evans v. United States, 387 F. 2d 160 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U. S. 968 (1968); McCartney v. United States, 311 F. 2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U. S. 848 (1963). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Vairee McCartney v. United States
green
1 sentence1974Andrews v. United States, 373 U. S. 334 , 83 S. Ct. 1236 , 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963); Semet v. United States, 422 F. 2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1970); Evans v. United States, 387 F. 2d 160 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U. S. 968 (1968); McCartney v. United States, 311 F. 2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U. S. 848 (1963). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Stephen Luther Evans v. United States
green
1 sentence1974Andrews v. United States, 373 U. S. 334 , 83 S. Ct. 1236 , 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963); Semet v. United States, 422 F. 2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1970); Evans v. United States, 387 F. 2d 160 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U. S. 968 (1968); McCartney v. United States, 311 F. 2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U. S. 848 (1963). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
William Frederick Semet v. United States
green
1 sentence1974Andrews v. United States, 373 U. S. 334 , 83 S. Ct. 1236 , 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963); Semet v. United States, 422 F. 2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1970); Evans v. United States, 387 F. 2d 160 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U. S. 968 (1968); McCartney v. United States, 311 F. 2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U. S. 848 (1963). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Perry v. New York
green
1 sentence1974Andrews v. United States, 373 U. S. 334 , 83 S. Ct. 1236 , 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963); Semet v. United States, 422 F. 2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1970); Evans v. United States, 387 F. 2d 160 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U. S. 968 (1968); McCartney v. United States, 311 F. 2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U. S. 848 (1963). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Stello v. Strand
green
1 sentence1974Andrews v. United States, 373 U. S. 334 , 83 S. Ct. 1236 , 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963); Semet v. United States, 422 F. 2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1970); Evans v. United States, 387 F. 2d 160 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U. S. 968 (1968); McCartney v. United States, 311 F. 2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U. S. 848 (1963). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.