obscenity standard in Maryland

1993The Court noted later, at 764, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that, “[a]s with all legislation in this sensitive area, the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.” Although the test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard, the Court said that it may be compared to that standard for the purpose of clarity, and, it was in that context that the Court observed, at 765, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that “[a]s with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part

1993The Court noted later, at 764, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that, “[a]s with all legislation in this sensitive area, the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.” Although the test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard, the Court said that it may be compared to that standard for the purpose of clarity, and, it was in that context that the Court observed, at 765, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that “[a]s with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part

1993The Court noted later, at 764, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that, “[a]s with all legislation in this sensitive area, the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.” Although the test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard, the Court said that it may be compared to that standard for the purpose of clarity, and, it was in that context that the Court observed, at 765, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that “[a]s with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part

1993The Court noted later, at 764, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that, “[a]s with all legislation in this sensitive area, the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.” Although the test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard, the Court said that it may be compared to that standard for the purpose of clarity, and, it was in that context that the Court observed, at 765, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that “[a]s with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part

1993The Court noted later, at 764, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that, “[a]s with all legislation in this sensitive area, the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.” Although the test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard, the Court said that it may be compared to that standard for the purpose of clarity, and, it was in that context that the Court observed, at 765, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that “[a]s with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part

1993The Court noted later, at 764, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that, “[a]s with all legislation in this sensitive area, the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.” Although the test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard, the Court said that it may be compared to that standard for the purpose of clarity, and, it was in that context that the Court observed, at 765, 102 S.Ct. at 3358 , that “[a]s with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part

1973Sanea determined that the obscenity standard was severable, the invalidity of the other standards of § 6 not rendering the entire Act unconstitutional. 245 Md. at 338 . 10 .

1970In New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 , a civil case in which a city commissioner sued several defendants for libel based on a paid "editorial advertisement", the Court said at 376 U.S. at 279 , 84 S.Ct. at 726: "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice' — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false

1970In New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 , a civil case in which a city commissioner sued several defendants for libel based on a paid "editorial advertisement", the Court said at 376 U.S. at 279 , 84 S.Ct. at 726: "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice' — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false

1961The record shows that publications of a similar type had been on display and sold in the city for at least five years prior to the arrest of the appellants. *316 The trial court — applying the obscenity test set forth in Roth v. United States (and Alberts v. California ), 354 U.S. 476 (1957) — concluded that the magazines and photographs were "neither literary in nature, artful in presentation, nor innocent in purpose" and that the dominant theme of the magazines and photographs dealt "with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest" in that they had a "tendency to excite lustful thoughts,

1961The trial court—applying the obscenity test set forth in Roth v. United States (and Alberts v. California), 354 U. S. 476 (1957)—concluded that the magazines and photographs were “neither literary in nature, artful in presentation, nor innocent in purpose” and that the dominant theme of the magazines and photographs dealt “with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest” in that they had a “tendency to excite lustful thoughts,” and found that such materials were “lewd, obscene and indecent” and therefore violated the obscenity statute of this State.

1961It may well be that the Supreme Court will in time (assuming it has not already done so) declare that only "hard-core pornography" is not protected by the constitution, as a majority of four of the Court of Appeals of New York (in two opinions — the latter concurring in the result reached in the former — each of which was concurred in by one other judge) did recently in construing the meaning of the obscenity statute of that State in People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 175 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1960), involving the sale and distribution of the magazine Gent, when, in discarding the Roth test, it

1961It may well be that the Supreme Court will in time (assuming it has not already done so) declare that only “hardcore pornography” is not protected by the constitution, as a majority of four of the Court of Appeals of New York (in two opinions—the latter concurring in the result reached in the former—each of which was concurred in by one other judge) did recently in construing the meaning of the obscenity statute of that State in People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 175 N. E. 2d 681 (N. Y. 1960), involving the sale and distribution of the magazine Gent, when, in discarding the Roth test, it ad