67 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hamiltongreen2 sentences2025State v. Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521 , 525 ¶ 12 (App. 2017); see State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984) (recognizing statements to court at a change of plea hearing about voluntariness normally bind the defendant). 2022See Hamilton, 142 Ariz. at 93 . ¶6 At the change of plea hearing, Edwards advised the superior court that he conferred with counsel, understood the terms of the plea agreement, and had not been threatened or coerced into pleading guilty. | 12 | 12 |
State v. Leyvagreen2 sentences2025State v. Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521 , 525 ¶ 12 (App. 2017); see State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984) (recognizing statements to court at a change of plea hearing about voluntariness normally bind the defendant). 2023See Leyva, 241 Ariz. at 525 ¶ 12. ¶45 Similarly, nothing that happened after the change of plea hearing supports prejudice. | 3 | 4 |
State v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2025State v. Rodriguez, 112 Ariz. 193, 194-95 (1975). 1995State v. Rodriguez, 112 Ariz. 193, 194-95 , 540 P.2d 665, 666-67 (1975); accord State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz.App. 251, 252-54, 532 P.2d 193, 194-96 (1975), approved and adopted in, 112 Ariz. 165 , 540 P.2d 131 (1975). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Salinasgreen2 sentences2023P. 17.3(b) (“[T]he court may consider the defendant’s statements, police reports, certified transcripts of grand jury 3 STATE v. SUTHERLAND Decision of the Court proceedings, or other satisfactory information.”); State v. Sodders, 130 Ariz. 23, 25 (1981) (“The factual basis may be determined from the extended record which may include presentence report, preliminary hearing transcripts, statements of the defendant, proceedings before the grand jury, and other sources.”); State v. Salinas, 181 Ariz. 104 , 106 (1994) (court may consider the statements of prosecutors); State v. Brooks, 156 Ariz. 5 2013When the trial court asked Chairez at the change-of-plea hearing whether he agreed with the facts as the prosecutor had represented them to be, Chairez responded, “Yes, I do.” ¶ 10 These statements and the extended record provided a sufficient factual basis for the pleas, see State v. Salinas, 181 Ariz. 104, 107 , 887 P.2d 985, 988 (1994), demonstrating Chairez had directed another person to perform acts that were designed to help finance the Arizona Mexican Mafia. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Djerfgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, ¶ 25 , 959 P.2d 1274, 1283 (1998) (holding “defendant's appropriate and rational responses” relevant to conclusion that defendant fully understood consequences of waiver). 2015See State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, ¶ 25 , 959 P.2d 1274, 1283 (1998) (holding “defendant's appropriate and rational responses” relevant to conclusion that defendant fully understood consequences of waiver). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Vargasgreen2 sentences2013Both these rules “plainly preclude[ ] the state from using statements a defendant made during ‘the plea discussion,’ that is, statements made in a discussion that precedes the plea agreement and anything in the agreement itself, as well as statements made during a change-of-plea hearing.” State v. Campoy, 220 Ariz. 539, ¶¶ 13-14 , 207 P.3d 792, 797-98 (App.2009); see also State v. Vargas, 127 Ariz. 59, 61 , 618 P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (holding Rules 410 and 17.4(f) preclude impeaching defendant with “statements made in the expectation of a plea agreement,” including “document ... signed during pl 2013Both these rules “plainly preclude[ ] the state from using statements a defendant made during ‘the plea discussion,’ that is, statements made in a discussion that precedes the plea agreement and anything in the agreement itself, as well as statements made during a change-of-plea hearing.” State v. Campoy, 220 Ariz. 539, ¶¶ 13-14 , 207 P.3d 792, 797-98 (App.2009); see also State v. Vargas, 127 Ariz. 59, 61 , 618 P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (holding Rules 410 and 17.4(f) preclude impeaching defendant with “statements made in the expectation of a plea agreement,” including “document ... signed during pl | 2 | 2 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2005Virgo, 190 Ariz. at 354 , 947 P.2d at 928 ; see State v. Thompson, 200 Ariz. 439, ¶ 7 , 27 P.3d 796, 798 (2001) (“One is convicted when there has been a determina *542 tion of guilt by verdict, finding, or the acceptance of a plea.”). ¶21 We therefore conclude that a trial court may consider as appropriate aggravating factors under Blakely only the elements of the offense a defendant admits at a change-of-plea hearing or those facts that are inherent in the finding of guilt and that have been established either by admission or stipulation after the defendant has validly waived the right to a j 2005Virgo, 190 Ariz. at 354 , 947 P.2d at 928 ; see State v. Thompson, 200 Ariz. 439, ¶ 7 , 27 P.3d 796, 798 (2001) (“One is convicted when there has been a determina *542 tion of guilt by verdict, finding, or the acceptance of a plea.”). ¶21 We therefore conclude that a trial court may consider as appropriate aggravating factors under Blakely only the elements of the offense a defendant admits at a change-of-plea hearing or those facts that are inherent in the finding of guilt and that have been established either by admission or stipulation after the defendant has validly waived the right to a j | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mendiolagreen2 sentences1995State v. Rodriguez, 112 Ariz. 193, 194-95 , 540 P.2d 665, 666-67 (1975); accord State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz.App. 251, 252-54, 532 P.2d 193, 194-96 (1975), approved and adopted in, 112 Ariz. 165 , 540 P.2d 131 (1975). 1995State v. Rodriguez, 112 Ariz. 193, 194-95 , 540 P.2d 665, 666-67 (1975); accord State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz.App. 251, 252-54, 532 P.2d 193, 194-96 (1975), approved and adopted in, 112 Ariz. 165 , 540 P.2d 131 (1975). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mendiolagreen2 sentences1995State v. Rodriguez, 112 Ariz. 193, 194-95 , 540 P.2d 665, 666-67 (1975); accord State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz.App. 251, 252-54, 532 P.2d 193, 194-96 (1975), approved and adopted in, 112 Ariz. 165 , 540 P.2d 131 (1975). 1995State v. Rodriguez, 112 Ariz. 193, 194-95 , 540 P.2d 665, 666-67 (1975); accord State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz.App. 251, 252-54, 532 P.2d 193, 194-96 (1975), approved and adopted in, 112 Ariz. 165 , 540 P.2d 131 (1975). | 2 | 2 |
State of Arizona v. Phil Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2019State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573 , 576–77, ¶ 19 (2012). ¶4 In his petition for review, Irvin argues that: (1) his counsel failed to effectively represent him; (2) the trial court was required to conduct a further inquiry into the factual basis and voluntariness of his plea because of his assertions of innocence; (3) his testimony at the change of plea hearing repudiated his counsel’s statement that Irvin knowingly possessed a firearm; and (4) there was no evidence to support a conclusion he constructively possessed the firearm with his passenger. 2018State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). ¶3 Bunescu argues his trial counsel did not investigate "a possible exculpatory defense witness." Bunescu also claims his "mental state and health condition" at the change-of-plea hearing resulted in undue coercion to plead guilty. ¶4 To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that the lawyer's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that the deficient performance caused the defendant prejudice. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Bowlesgreen2 sentences2022See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214 (App. 1992) (holding that the trial court intended to impose a consecutive sentence where, despite describing the sentence as “concurrent” during its oral pronouncement, the court “clearly stated at both the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing that the sentence was to be consecutive per the plea agreement,” and “[a]t no time did she state that she was not going to follow the plea agreement”). ¶15 Rule 24.4 may not be used “to cause an order or judgment that was never previously made or rendered to be placed upon the record of the court.” State v 2009Id. ¶ 26 Here, there was no plea agreement and no dispositive evidence in the record of the trial court’s intent. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Chairezgreen1 sentence2026The superior court "was entitled to rely on [Thomas's] responses to the court's questions at the change-of-plea hearing . . . ." Chairez, 235 Ariz. at 100, ¶ 8 ; see also United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The most important consideration in resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is an evaluation of the [] colloquy at which the guilty plea was accepted."). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ronnie Bowman, A/K/A Younggreen1 sentence2026The superior court "was entitled to rely on [Thomas's] responses to the court's questions at the change-of-plea hearing . . . ." Chairez, 235 Ariz. at 100, ¶ 8 ; see also United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The most important consideration in resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is an evaluation of the [] colloquy at which the guilty plea was accepted."). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Guntergreen1 sentence2026Cf. State v. Gunter, 132 Ariz. 64, 71 (App. 1982) (concluding the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the 7 STATE v. PETKOVIC Decision of the Court voluntariness of his plea agreement because his medical records indicated he had taken anti-psychotic medication at the time of his plea). ¶17 The exchanges between the court and Petkovic during the change-of-plea hearing, in which he provided contradictory answers to the court’s questions, also provide evidence that he did not understand his plea at the time he entered it. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Piercegreen1 sentence2024See State v. Lopez, 110 Ariz. 198, 199 (1973) (finding no due process violation in the determination of the defendant's competence to plead guilty where the competency proceedings complied with statutory requirements and defense counsel agreed to a determination 8 STATE v. SILLS Decision of the Court based on written reports of psychiatrists); State v. Pierce, 116 Ariz. 435, 43839 (App. 1977) ("[U]nless counsel has indicated a contrary view on the record, the offering by an accused client of a plea of guilty should logically constitute a representation on the part of defense counsel that at le | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen1 sentence2024See State v. Lopez, 110 Ariz. 198, 199 (1973) (finding no due process violation in the determination of the defendant's competence to plead guilty where the competency proceedings complied with statutory requirements and defense counsel agreed to a determination 8 STATE v. SILLS Decision of the Court based on written reports of psychiatrists); State v. Pierce, 116 Ariz. 435, 43839 (App. 1977) ("[U]nless counsel has indicated a contrary view on the record, the offering by an accused client of a plea of guilty should logically constitute a representation on the part of defense counsel that at le | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bishopgreen1 sentence2024See Bishop, 162 Ariz. at 105 (reasoning that the defendant's comportment and responses at the change-of-plea and sentencing hearings supported a finding of competency). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Soddersgreen1 sentence2023P. 17.3(b) (“[T]he court may consider the defendant’s statements, police reports, certified transcripts of grand jury 3 STATE v. SUTHERLAND Decision of the Court proceedings, or other satisfactory information.”); State v. Sodders, 130 Ariz. 23, 25 (1981) (“The factual basis may be determined from the extended record which may include presentence report, preliminary hearing transcripts, statements of the defendant, proceedings before the grand jury, and other sources.”); State v. Salinas, 181 Ariz. 104 , 106 (1994) (court may consider the statements of prosecutors); State v. Brooks, 156 Ariz. 5 | 1 | 1 |
John H. Chizen v. John J. Huntergreen1 sentence2023See id. at 74 ; see also Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Blackledge v. Allisongreen1 sentence2023See id. at 74 ; see also Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brooksgreen1 sentence2023P. 17.3(b) (“[T]he court may consider the defendant’s statements, police reports, certified transcripts of grand jury 3 STATE v. SUTHERLAND Decision of the Court proceedings, or other satisfactory information.”); State v. Sodders, 130 Ariz. 23, 25 (1981) (“The factual basis may be determined from the extended record which may include presentence report, preliminary hearing transcripts, statements of the defendant, proceedings before the grand jury, and other sources.”); State v. Salinas, 181 Ariz. 104 , 106 (1994) (court may consider the statements of prosecutors); State v. Brooks, 156 Ariz. 5 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mendozagreen1 sentence2023State v. Mendoza, 248 Ariz. 6, 11, ¶ 1, n.1 (App. 2019). 2 STATE v. STEWART Decision of the Court ¶5 At the change-of-plea hearing, the State laid the following factual basis for the guilty verdicts: Mr. Stewart and his codefendant were subjects of a traffic stop. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pyeattgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Murdaughgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. D'AMBROSIOgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Moodygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Brewergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pobletegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Strickland v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Nashgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Salazargreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Swoopesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tennard v. Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divisiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Campoygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fillmoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Guttendorfgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dominguez v. Meehangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Denninggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Diazgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Boykin v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2017Indeed, the trial court specifically asked Valdez whether anyone had promised him that he would receive less than 14 years, and Valdez answered “no.” The trial court also asked Valdez whether anyone had made any threats or used any force to get him to plead guilty, to which he also responded “no.” All claims regarding threats or promises inducing a guilty plea are foreclosed by the trial court’s questioning pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Valdez’s responses at the change of plea hearing. 1985At the change of plea hearing, the trial judge questioned Chudy extensively about any possible concerns he might have with the agreement above and beyond the usual questions, asked in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed. 274 (1969), regarding his understanding of the consequences of the plea. | 5 | 1972–2017 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2006No discussion about potential aggravating circumstances, or how they would be found, occurred during the change-of-plea hearing. ¶ 3 The judge accepted the guilty plea on March 31, 2004, stating, “[I]t is ... my practice at the time of the change of plea to accept the plea agreement, enter it of record so that neither side can back out, leaving only the Court’s discretion, of course, to reject the sentencing provisions.” After the court accepted Felix’s guilty plea but before the sentencing hearing, the United States Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 2006No discussion about potential aggravating circumstances, or how they would be found, occurred during the change-of-plea hearing. ¶ 3 The judge accepted the guilty plea on March 31, 2004, stating, “[I]t is ... my practice at the time of the change of plea to accept the plea agreement, enter it of record so that neither side can back out, leaving only the Court’s discretion, of course, to reject the sentencing provisions.” After the court accepted Felix’s guilty plea but before the sentencing hearing, the United States Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , | 4 | 2005–2006 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2005Furthermore, the judge found portions of §§ 13-702 and 13-702.01 facially unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely . 2005Furthermore, the judge found portions of §§ 13-702 and 13-702.01 facially unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Virgo
green
2 sentences2005Virgo, 190 Ariz. at 354 , 947 P.2d at 928 ; see State v. Thompson, 200 Ariz. 439, ¶ 7 , 27 P.3d 796, 798 (2001) (“One is convicted when there has been a determina *542 tion of guilt by verdict, finding, or the acceptance of a plea.”). ¶21 We therefore conclude that a trial court may consider as appropriate aggravating factors under Blakely only the elements of the offense a defendant admits at a change-of-plea hearing or those facts that are inherent in the finding of guilt and that have been established either by admission or stipulation after the defendant has validly waived the right to a j 2005Virgo, 190 Ariz. at 354 , 947 P.2d at 928 ; see State v. Thompson, 200 Ariz. 439, ¶ 7 , 27 P.3d 796, 798 (2001) (“One is convicted when there has been a determina *542 tion of guilt by verdict, finding, or the acceptance of a plea.”). ¶21 We therefore conclude that a trial court may consider as appropriate aggravating factors under Blakely only the elements of the offense a defendant admits at a change-of-plea hearing or those facts that are inherent in the finding of guilt and that have been established either by admission or stipulation after the defendant has validly waived the right to a j | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Brown
red
2 sentences2005But the respondent judge subsequently found §§ 13-702 and 13-702.01 unconstitutional insofar as they permit judges to impose a prison term that exceeds the *537 presumptive sentence based on facts in aggravation found by the judge rather than a jury. 2 The state sought special action relief, which this court granted, State v. Brown, 205 Ariz. 325 , 70 P.3d 454 (App.2003), and McMullen sought review by our supreme court. ¶3 While McMullen’s petition for review was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Blakely . 2005But the respondent judge subsequently found §§ 13-702 and 13-702.01 unconstitutional insofar as they permit judges to impose a prison term that exceeds the *537 presumptive sentence based on facts in aggravation found by the judge rather than a jury. 2 The state sought special action relief, which this court granted, State v. Brown, 205 Ariz. 325 , 70 P.3d 454 (App.2003), and McMullen sought review by our supreme court. ¶3 While McMullen’s petition for review was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Blakely . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
North Carolina v. Alford
green
2 sentences1991At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel informed the judge that his client was pleading pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). 1991At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel informed the judge that his client was pleading pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). | 2 | 1978–1991 |
State v. Brown
green
1 sentence2026Cf. State v. Brown, 212 Ariz. 225 , 229 ¶¶ 16–18 (2006) (holding the defendant was entitled to jury trial on aggravating factors because he expressly reserved right to challenge aggravating factors in plea agreement). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Sanchez
green
1 sentence2026He cites Sanchez, 174 Ariz. at 45–46, contending that "[a]ttempting to flee from law enforcement is encompassed within the completed act of unlawful flight," and thus, the subsequent sentence was illegal and this Court "must vacate the conviction and sentence." ¶12 At the change of plea hearing, the State presented the following factual basis for the attempted unlawful flight: On the date and location, the defendant was driving a vehicle when an officer in a marked vehicle noticed the defendant and knew that he had a warrant for his arrest. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Hanson green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Padilla v. Kentucky green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Bell green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Contreras green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Chavez v. SUPERIOR COURT CTY. OF MARICOPA green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Harris green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Fierroa green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Crowder green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Georgeoff green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Wallace green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Lamas green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Heublein, Inc. v. Waters green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Broncucia v. Colorado green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Marriott Corp. v. Richard green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| United States v. William Boyd Ewing, Jr. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| United States v. Peter A. Crusco and Phillip A. Cimmino. Appeal of Phillip Cimmino green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| United States v. Ralph Carmine Grandinetti green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Bergman v. Lefkowitz green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Henderson v. Morgan green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| State v. Ellison green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Anders v. California green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| State v. Jameson green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.