change of plea hearing (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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change of plea hearing in Indiana

12 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Brightman v. Stategreen
ind · 2001 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2019–2020
2 sentences

2020See Brightman, 758 N.E.2d at 44 .

2019“In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we examine the statements made by the defendant at the guilty plea hearing to decide whether the plea was offered ‘freely and knowingly.’” Id. (quoting Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001)). [14] Here, the record demonstrates Turner’s statements at the change of plea hearing were offered freely and knowingly.

22
Fisher v. Stategreen
ind · 2004 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019See Fisher, 810 N.E.2d at 679 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). [11] Even if there had been an error, Williams was not prejudiced in any way by Keefe’s representation at the change of plea hearing. “[I]n order to establish that the guilty plea would not have been entered if counsel had performed adequately, the petitioner must show that a defense was overlooked or impaired and that the defense would likely have changed the outcome of the proceeding.” Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ind. 2001).

2019See Fisher , 810 N.E.2d at 679 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). [11] Even if there had been an error, Williams was not prejudiced in any way by Keefe's representation at the change of plea hearing. "[I]n order to establish that the guilty plea would not have been entered if counsel had performed adequately, the petitioner must show that a defense was overlooked or impaired and that the defense would likely have changed the outcome of the proceeding." Segura v. State , 749 N.E.2d 496 , 499 (Ind. 2001).

22
Segura v. Stategreen
ind · 2001 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019See Fisher, 810 N.E.2d at 679 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). [11] Even if there had been an error, Williams was not prejudiced in any way by Keefe’s representation at the change of plea hearing. “[I]n order to establish that the guilty plea would not have been entered if counsel had performed adequately, the petitioner must show that a defense was overlooked or impaired and that the defense would likely have changed the outcome of the proceeding.” Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ind. 2001).

2019See Fisher , 810 N.E.2d at 679 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). [11] Even if there had been an error, Williams was not prejudiced in any way by Keefe's representation at the change of plea hearing. "[I]n order to establish that the guilty plea would not have been entered if counsel had performed adequately, the petitioner must show that a defense was overlooked or impaired and that the defense would likely have changed the outcome of the proceeding." Segura v. State , 749 N.E.2d 496 , 499 (Ind. 2001).

22
Willoughby v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Willoughby v. State, 792 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. *1264 denied.

11
Creech v. Stategreen
ind · 2008 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016See Creech 887 N.E.2d at 77 (explaining by the time the trial court erroneously advised the defendant of the possibility of appeal, the defendant had already pleaded guilty and received the benefit of his bargain, therefore being told at the close of the sentencing hearing that he could appeal presumably had no effect on his decision to enter the plea agreement). [8] Here, the plea agreement was referenced repeatedly at the change of plea hearing, and McCampbell acknowledged having read and signed it.

2016See Creech 887 N.E.2d at 77 (explaining by the time the trial court erroneously advised the defendant of the possibility of appeal, the defendant had already pleaded guilty and received the benefit of his bargain, therefore being told at the close of the sentencing hearing that he could appeal presumably had no effect on his decision to enter the plea agreement). [8] Here, the plea agreement was referenced repeatedly at the change of plea hearing, and McCampbell acknowledged having read and signed it.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Pontius v. State green
indctapp · 2010
2 sentences

2019Pontius, 930 N.E.2d at 1219 . [8] Williams argues he did not receive assistance of counsel at the change of plea hearing because his original public defender, Howard, was not present at the hearing.

2019Pontius , 930 N.E.2d at 1219 . [8] Williams argues he did not receive assistance of counsel at the change of plea hearing because his original public defender, Howard, was not present at the hearing.

22019–2019
Leek v. State green
indctapp · 2007
2 sentences

2013Id. at 279 .

2009Id. at 280 .

22009–2013
Jason Jeffries v. State of Indiana green
indctapp · 2012
1 sentence

2019“In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we examine the statements made by the defendant at the guilty plea hearing to decide whether the plea was offered ‘freely and knowingly.’” Id. (quoting Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001)). [14] Here, the record demonstrates Turner’s statements at the change of plea hearing were offered freely and knowingly.

12019–2019
Carter v. State green
ind · 2000
1 sentence

2017In other words, unlike the defendant in Carter, Ellis did not “concede[ ] guilt in one proceeding but contradict[] that admission by claiming innocence in a later proceeding.” Id.

12017–2017
Minor v. State green
indctapp · 1994
1 sentence

1995Minor v. State (1994), Ind.App., 641 N.E.2d 85, 89 , trans. denied (citing Carney v. State (1991), Ind.App., 580 N.E.2d 286, 289 , trans. denied ). *445 At the change of plea hearing, the court read the allegations of the Bode burglary ("that you did break and enter the dwelling of ...

11995–1995
Jones v. State green
ind · 1976
2 sentences

1995He further points to each information on the burglary charges as alleging he "broke into dwellings." Id.

1995Reynolds directs us to his testimony at the change of plea hearing, where he "never stated that he broke into any house" but rather stated "that Danny Smith kicked in the door." Id.

11995–1995
Carney v. State green
indctapp · 1991
1 sentence

1995Minor v. State (1994), Ind.App., 641 N.E.2d 85, 89 , trans. denied (citing Carney v. State (1991), Ind.App., 580 N.E.2d 286, 289 , trans. denied ). *445 At the change of plea hearing, the court read the allegations of the Bode burglary ("that you did break and enter the dwelling of ...

11995–1995
Wethington v. State green
ind · 1990
1 sentence

1993The rationale of Ryle v. State (1990), Ind.App., 549 N.E.2d 81 , trans. denied, as adopted in Wethington v. State (1990), Ind., 560 N.E.2d 496 , does not affect the body of case law which makes it clear that, given a single criminal transaction, a defendant may appropriately be charged with, convicted of, and sentenced for both confinement and a distinct crime which entails some sort of confinement as necessary to effectuate that crime, such as robbery or rape.

11993–1993
Ryle v. State green
indctapp · 1990
1 sentence

1993The rationale of Ryle v. State (1990), Ind.App., 549 N.E.2d 81 , trans. denied, as adopted in Wethington v. State (1990), Ind., 560 N.E.2d 496 , does not affect the body of case law which makes it clear that, given a single criminal transaction, a defendant may appropriately be charged with, convicted of, and sentenced for both confinement and a distinct crime which entails some sort of confinement as necessary to effectuate that crime, such as robbery or rape.

11993–1993
Klenk v. State green
indctapp · 1989
1 sentence

1993Judge Garrard concluded "lilt was clearly implicit under the cireum-stances that Klenk was entitled to be represented at the trial and confront those witnesses called to testify for the state." Klenk, supra, at 112 .

11993–1993

Where else courts name it

OH 194 (1998–2026) CA 90 (1990–2026) AZ 68 (1972–2026) ND 35 (1990–2026) WY 32 (1996–2026) MT 29 (1994–2025) FL 23 (1983–2025) ID 21 (2008–2024) SD 17 (1999–2024) UT 16 (2002–2025) VT 12 (2014–2026) IN 12 (1993–2020) AK 7 (1984–2026) NM 5 (1993–2020) MA 5 (1989–2025) HI 5 (2005–2025) VI 3 (2013–2026) IL 3 (1976–1988) WI 2 (2001–2003)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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