offending instruction in Maine

1999To vacate a judgment on the basis of obvious error, we must determine that “the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” Id. (quoting State v. Weidul, 628 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1993)) (emphasis added). [¶ 8] We have broken down the burglary statute into four elements that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) entry (2) of a structure (3) with the knowledge that the entry is not licensed and (4) with the intent to commit a crime within the structure.” State v. Thibeault, 402 A.2d

1997To vacate a judgment on the basis of obvious error the defendant must show that the offending instruction “ ‘constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.’ ” State v. Weidul, 628 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1993) (quoting State v. Quint, 448 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me.1982)). [¶ 15] The court’s failure to instruct the jury regarding a culpable mental state for the offense of a failure to stop for a police officer constitutes obvious error.

1997To vacate a judgment on the basis of obvious error the defendant must show that the offending instruction “ ‘constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.’ ” State v. Weidul, 628 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1993) (quoting State v. Quint, 448 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me.1982)). [¶ 15] The court’s failure to instruct the jury regarding a culpable mental state for the offense of a failure to stop for a police officer constitutes obvious error.

1994To vacate the judgment against Googins on the basis of obvious error, we must determine that “the offending instruction “when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.’ ” State v. Weidul, 628 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1993) (quoting State v. Quint, 448 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me.1982)).

1993Since no objection *137 was raised to the trial justice's language departing from the ABA standard, we review to determine "whether the offending instruction `when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.'" See State v. Quint, 448 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me.1982) ( quoting State v. Mahaney, 437 A.2d 613, 618-19 (Me.1981)).

1993Since no objection was raised to the trial justice’s language departing from the ABA standard, we review to determine “whether the offending instruction ‘when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.’ ” See State v. Quint, 448 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me.1982) (quoting State v. Mahaney, 437 A.2d 613, 618-19 (Me.1981)).

1982Our review of the error asserted on this appeal, therefore, “will be limited to whether the offending instruction ‘when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.’ ” State v. Mahaney, Me., 437 A.2d 613, 618-19 (1981), quoting State v. Doughty, Me., 399 A.2d 1319, 1326 (1979).

1981In examination of the charge itself, we proceed on the premise that where no objection has been raised at trial to the instructions given by the court, the Law Court’s review will be limited to whether the offending instruction *619 “when viewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” State v. Doughty, Me., 399 A.2d 1319, 1326 (1979).

2025As in Baker and Villacci, the instructions given “were highly prejudicial and tended to produce a manifest injustice,” Villacci, 2018 ME 80, ¶ 20 , 187 A.3d 576 ; see Baker, 2015 ME 39, ¶ 11 , 114 A.3d 214 ; Weaver, 2016 ME 12 , ¶¶ 9 n.4, 11, 130 A.3d 972 (“[T]o vacate the judgment on the basis of obvious error we must determine that the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” (quotation marks 11The court’s instruction that the jury should consider all three defenses—self-defense, competing harm

2025As in Baker and Villacci, the instructions given “were highly prejudicial and tended to produce a manifest injustice,” Villacci, 2018 ME 80, ¶ 20 , 187 A.3d 576 ; see Baker, 2015 ME 39, ¶ 11 , 114 A.3d 214 ; Weaver, 2016 ME 12 , ¶¶ 9 n.4, 11, 130 A.3d 972 (“[T]o vacate the judgment on the basis of obvious error we must determine that the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” (quotation marks 11The court’s instruction that the jury should consider all three defenses—self-defense, competing harm

1999To vacate a judgment on the basis of obvious error, we must determine that “the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” Id. (quoting State v. Weidul, 628 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1993)) (emphasis added). [¶ 8] We have broken down the burglary statute into four elements that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) entry (2) of a structure (3) with the knowledge that the entry is not licensed and (4) with the intent to commit a crime within the structure.” State v. Thibeault, 402 A.2d

1995Thus, to vacate the judgment on the basis of obvious error we must determine that “the offending instruction ‘when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to pro *107 duce manifest injustice.’ ” Googins, 640 A.2d at 1062 (citations omitted).

2016P. 30(b), 52(b). “[T]o vacate the judgment on the basis of obvious error we must determine that the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” State v. Ashley, 666 A.2d 103, 106-07 (Me.1995) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 12] In Baker , which we decided about nine months after the trial in this case, we concluded that a defendant had met this high burden, based on the combined effect of two “structural flaws.” 2015 ME 39, ¶ 13 , 114 A.3d 214 .

1999To vacate a judgment on the basis of obvious error, we must determine that “the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” Id. (quoting State v. Weidul, 628 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1993)) (emphasis added). [¶ 8] We have broken down the burglary statute into four elements that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) entry (2) of a structure (3) with the knowledge that the entry is not licensed and (4) with the intent to commit a crime within the structure.” State v. Thibeault, 402 A.2d

1993We agree with Weidul that the court's instructions were erroneous in the following particulars: 1) The court's instructions failed to strike the crucial balance between the competing considerations of the desirability of a juror's reconsideration of his opinions in order to reach a verdict and the need that any verdict rendered accurately reflect honestly held beliefs, see State v. Cote, 507 A.2d 584, 586 (Me. 1986); 2) The charge repeatedly emphasized the desirability of reaching a verdict while failing to properly note the countervailing, but no less important, requirement that an individual

1993We agree with Weidul that the court's instructions were erroneous in the following particulars: 1) The court's instructions failed to strike the crucial balance between the competing considerations of the desirability of a juror's reconsideration of his opinions in order to reach a verdict and the need that any verdict rendered accurately reflect honestly held beliefs, see State v. Cote, 507 A.2d 584, 586 (Me. 1986); 2) The charge repeatedly emphasized the desirability of reaching a verdict while failing to properly note the countervailing, but no less important, requirement that an individual

1993We agree with Weidul that the court's instructions were erroneous in the following particulars: 1) The court's instructions failed to strike the crucial balance between the competing considerations of the desirability of a juror's reconsideration of his opinions in order to reach a verdict and the need that any verdict rendered accurately reflect honestly held beliefs, see State v. Cote, 507 A.2d 584, 586 (Me. 1986); 2) The charge repeatedly emphasized the desirability of reaching a verdict while failing to properly note the countervailing, but no less important, requirement that an individual

1993We agree with Weidul that the court’s instructions were erroneous in the following particulars: 1) The court’s instructions failed to strike the crucial balance between the competing considerations of the desirability of a juror’s reconsideration of his opinions in order to reach a verdict and the need that any verdict rendered accurately reflect honestly held beliefs, see State v. Cote, 507 A.2d 584, 586 (Me. 1986); 2) The charge repeatedly emphasized the desirability of reaching a verdict while failing to properly note the countervailing, but no less important, requirement that an individual

1982The instruction challenged here represents a variation of the Allen “dynamite” charge, see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 , 17 S.Ct. 154, 157 , 41 L.Ed. 528, 530 (1886), which when properly used is intended to assure the existence of a genuine impasse as a predicate for a determination of “manifest necessity” for a mistrial if the jury cannot ultimately agree on a verdict.

1982The instruction challenged here represents a variation of the Allen “dynamite” charge, see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 , 17 S.Ct. 154, 157 , 41 L.Ed. 528, 530 (1886), which when properly used is intended to assure the existence of a genuine impasse as a predicate for a determination of “manifest necessity” for a mistrial if the jury cannot ultimately agree on a verdict.