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9 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Llewellyngreen2 sentences2018We directed oral argument on the application in each case and ordered that they be argued and submitted together and directed the parties to brief: (1) whether, in light of MCL 123.1102, it is necessary to consider the factors set forth in People v. Llewellyn , 401 Mich. 314 [ 257 N.W.2d 902 ] (1977), in order to determine whether the school district's policies are preempted; (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals properly analyzed the Llewellyn factors; and (3) whether *760 the Court of Appeals correctly held that the school district's policies are not preempted. [ 501 Mich. 941 , 904 N.W.2d 2018We directed oral argument on the application in each case and ordered that they be argued and submitted together and directed the parties to brief: (1) whether, in light of MCL 123.1102, it is necessary to consider the factors set forth in People v. Llewellyn , 401 Mich. 314 [ 257 N.W.2d 902 ] (1977), in order to determine whether the school district's policies are preempted; (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals properly analyzed the Llewellyn factors; and (3) whether *760 the Court of Appeals correctly held that the school district's policies are not preempted. [ 501 Mich. 941 , 904 N.W.2d | 1 | 7 |
Gmoser's Septic Service, LLC v. East Bay Charter Townshipgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Gmoser's Septic Serv., LLC v. East Bay Charter Twp. , 299 Mich. App. 504 , 513, 831 N.W.2d 881 (2013) (concluding that although the Llewellyn factors favored a finding that the Legislature preempted the field, "this is not a typical case" because the Legislature by statute had "specifically limited the preemptive effect of its statutory scheme" and finding no field preemption); Granger Land Dev. 2018See, e.g., Gmoser's Septic Serv., LLC v. East Bay Charter Twp. , 299 Mich. App. 504 , 513, 831 N.W.2d 881 (2013) (concluding that although the Llewellyn factors favored a finding that the Legislature preempted the field, "this is not a typical case" because the Legislature by statute had "specifically limited the preemptive effect of its statutory scheme" and finding no field preemption); Granger Land Dev. | 1 | 1 |
Michigan Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners v. City of Ferndalegreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., Michigan Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners v Ferndale, 256 Mich App 401, 413-414 ; 662 NW2d 864 (2003) (holding that when the Legislature has expressly stated its intent to exclusively occupy a field it is unnecessary to consider the other three Llewellyn factors). 2003See, e.g., Michigan Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners v Ferndale, 256 Mich App 401, 413-414 ; 662 NW2d 864 (2003) (holding that when the Legislature has expressly stated its intent to exclusively occupy a field it is unnecessary to consider the other three Llewellyn factors). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Granger Land Development Co. v. Clinton County Board of Zoning Appeals
neutral
2 sentences2018Co. v. Clinton Co. Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 135 Mich. App. 154 , 159, 351 N.W.2d 908 (1984) ("Where a statute contains a provision for limited pre-emption (as in the present case), a court may not imply total pre-emption from the statutory history, the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme, or the need for uniformity arising from the nature of the regulated subject matter. 2018Co. v. Clinton Co. Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 135 Mich. App. 154 , 159, 351 N.W.2d 908 (1984) ("Where a statute contains a provision for limited pre-emption (as in the present case), a court may not imply total pre-emption from the statutory history, the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme, or the need for uniformity arising from the nature of the regulated subject matter. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
SE OAK. CTY. INCINERATOR AUTH. v. Avon Twp.
green
2 sentences2004Moreover, at the time of argument before this Court, the expansion had been substantially completed. 3 This Court quoted the Llewellyn test in Southeastern Oakland Co Incinerator Auth v Avon Twp, 144 Mich App 39, 43-44 , 372 NW2d 678 (1985): “In making the determination that the state has thus pre-empted the field of regulation which the city seeks to enter in this case, we look to certain guidelines. 2004Moreover, at the time of argument before this Court, the expansion had been substantially completed. 3 This Court quoted the Llewellyn test in Southeastern Oakland Co Incinerator Auth v Avon Twp, 144 Mich App 39, 43-44 , 372 NW2d 678 (1985): “In making the determination that the state has thus pre-empted the field of regulation which the city seeks to enter in this case, we look to certain guidelines. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.