9 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1954–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
1st of America Bank, Mid-Michigan, N.A. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004Given the absence of testimony on causation supplied by Dr. Gabriel, the jury could have found for plaintiff only if it indulged in this logical error—concluding, in effect, that evidence that plaintiff may have sustained a head injury, combined with evidence that plaintiff now has cerebral palsy, leads to the conclusion that the conduct that caused plaintiff’s head 69 Compare 1st of America Bank, Mid-Michigan v United States, 752 F Supp 764, 765 (ED Mich, 1990) (finding that the negligence of Air Force physicians proximately caused a child’s cerebral palsy where the plaintiff and the defendan 2004Given the absence of testimony on causation supplied by Dr. Gabriel, the jury could have found for plaintiff only if it indulged in this logical error—concluding, in effect, that evidence that plaintiff may have sustained a head injury, combined with evidence that plaintiff now has cerebral palsy, leads to the conclusion that the conduct that caused plaintiff’s head 69 Compare 1st of America Bank, Mid-Michigan v United States, 752 F Supp 764, 765 (ED Mich, 1990) (finding that the negligence of Air Force physicians proximately caused a child’s cerebral palsy where the plaintiff and the defendan | 3 | 3 |
Colorado v. Bertinegreen1 sentence2023Moreover, “[t]he reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.” Bertine, 479 US at 374 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Higgins v. Monroe Evening Newsgreen2 sentences1977See Higgins, supra. Under these circumstances, I would hold that the logical test to use in deciding whether or not defendant can use the WDCA as a shield against the plaintiff must be the WDCA test, not the control test. 1977See Higgins, supra. Under these circumstances, I would hold that the logical test to use in deciding whether or not defendant can use the WDCA as a shield against the plaintiff must be the WDCA test, not the control test. | 1 | 1 |
Chester v. World Football Leaguegreen2 sentences1977Chester v World Football League, supra, at 462. 1977Chester v World Football League, supra, at 462. | 1 | 1 |
Cromie v. Florez, Incorporatedgreen2 sentences1954See Cromie v. Florez, Incorporated, 317 Mich 516 ; Trumble v. Michigan State Police, 325 Mich 237 ; Daniel v. Murray Corporation of America, 326 Mich 1 ." In writing for affirmance, Mr. Chief Justice BUTZEL bases his opinion upon the following: "Under the facts established by the testimony, we cannot say that the commission was in error in concluding that a compelling inference existed that decedent accidentally contacted cyanide during his employment." The commission, in making an award, reasoned as follows: "There was cyanide present in the building in which he worked and although he did not 1954See Cromie v. Florez, Incorporated, 317 Mich 516 ; Trumble v. Michigan State Police, 325 Mich 237 ; Daniel v. Murray Corporation of America, 326 Mich 1 .” In writing for affirmance, Mr. Chief Justice Btjtzel bases his opinion upon the following: “Under the facts established by the testimony, we cannot say that the commission was in error in concluding that a compelling inference existed that decedent accidentally contacted cyanide during his employment.” The commission, in making an award, reasoned as follows: “There was cyanide present in the building in which he worked and although he did no | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. O'Hagan
green
2 sentences2004Given the absence of testimony on causation supplied by Dr. Gabriel, the jury could have found for plaintiff only if it indulged in this logical error—concluding, in effect, that evidence that plaintiff may have sustained a head injury, combined with evidence that plaintiff now has cerebral palsy, leads to the conclusion that the conduct that caused plaintiff’s head 69 Compare 1st of America Bank, Mid-Michigan v United States, 752 F Supp 764, 765 (ED Mich, 1990) (finding that the negligence of Air Force physicians proximately caused a child’s cerebral palsy where the plaintiff and the defendan 2004Given the absence of testimony on causation supplied by Dr. Gabriel, the jury could have found for plaintiff only if it indulged in this logical error—concluding, in effect, that evidence that plaintiff may have sustained a head injury, combined with evidence that plaintiff now has cerebral palsy, leads to the conclusion that the conduct that caused plaintiff’s head 69 Compare 1st of America Bank, Mid-Michigan v United States, 752 F Supp 764, 765 (ED Mich, 1990) (finding that the negligence of Air Force physicians proximately caused a child’s cerebral palsy where the plaintiff and the defendan | 3 | 2004–2004 |
Dick v. Lewis
green
2 sentences2004Given the absence of testimony on causation supplied by Dr. Gabriel, the jury could have found for plaintiff only if it indulged in this logical error—concluding, in effect, that evidence that plaintiff may have sustained a head injury, combined with evidence that plaintiff now has cerebral palsy, leads to the conclusion that the conduct that caused plaintiff’s head 69 Compare 1st of America Bank, Mid-Michigan v United States, 752 F Supp 764, 765 (ED Mich, 1990) (finding that the negligence of Air Force physicians proximately caused a child’s cerebral palsy where the plaintiff and the defendan 2004Given the absence of testimony on causation supplied by Dr. Gabriel, the jury could have found for plaintiff only if it indulged in this logical error—concluding, in effect, that evidence that plaintiff may have sustained a head injury, combined with evidence that plaintiff now has cerebral palsy, leads to the conclusion that the conduct that caused plaintiff’s head 69 Compare 1st of America Bank, Mid-Michigan v United States, 752 F Supp 764, 765 (ED Mich, 1990) (finding that the negligence of Air Force physicians proximately caused a child’s cerebral palsy where the plaintiff and the defendan | 3 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Toohey
green
2 sentences2023“This is the most logical analysis, since the purpose of each activity is interrelated and intended to accomplish similar results.” Toohey, 438 Mich at 285 . “[C]ourts need not second-guess a police officer’s exercise of professional judgment regarding impoundment of an automobile when the judgment was exercised in accordance with otherwise reasonable police department regulations.” Id. at 279 . 2023“This is the most logical analysis, since the purpose of each activity is interrelated and intended to accomplish similar results.” Toohey, 438 Mich at 285 . “[C]ourts need not second-guess a police officer’s exercise of professional judgment regarding impoundment of an automobile when the judgment was exercised in accordance with otherwise reasonable police department regulations.” Id. at 279 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Tata v. Muskovitz
green
2 sentences1979Prior to Tata v Muskovitz, 354 Mich 695 ; 94 NW2d 71 (1959), the only test for determining whether a person was an employee or an independent contractor centered on the question of control. 1979Prior to Tata v Muskovitz, 354 Mich 695 ; 94 NW2d 71 (1959), the only test for determining whether a person was an employee or an independent contractor centered on the question of control. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Norwood
green
1 sentence1978People v Harper, supra, People v Norwood, supra. We are persuaded, therefore, that the great weight of authority supports the logical rule that tracking dog evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to support a conviction.. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
People Ex Rel. McDavid v. Barrett
green
2 sentences1966McDavid, v. Barrett, 370 Ill 478, 482 ( 19 NE2d 356 , 121 ALR 1311 , 1315). 1966McDavid, v. Barrett, 370 Ill 478, 482 ( 19 NE2d 356 , 121 ALR 1311 , 1315). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Trumble v. Michigan State Police
neutral
2 sentences1954See Cromie v. Florez, Incorporated, 317 Mich 516 ; Trumble v. Michigan State Police, 325 Mich 237 ; Daniel v. Murray Corporation of America, 326 Mich 1 ." In writing for affirmance, Mr. Chief Justice BUTZEL bases his opinion upon the following: "Under the facts established by the testimony, we cannot say that the commission was in error in concluding that a compelling inference existed that decedent accidentally contacted cyanide during his employment." The commission, in making an award, reasoned as follows: "There was cyanide present in the building in which he worked and although he did not 1954See Cromie v. Florez, Incorporated, 317 Mich 516 ; Trumble v. Michigan State Police, 325 Mich 237 ; Daniel v. Murray Corporation of America, 326 Mich 1 .” In writing for affirmance, Mr. Chief Justice Btjtzel bases his opinion upon the following: “Under the facts established by the testimony, we cannot say that the commission was in error in concluding that a compelling inference existed that decedent accidentally contacted cyanide during his employment.” The commission, in making an award, reasoned as follows: “There was cyanide present in the building in which he worked and although he did no | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Daniel v. Murray Corp. of America
green
2 sentences1954See Cromie v. Florez, Incorporated, 317 Mich 516 ; Trumble v. Michigan State Police, 325 Mich 237 ; Daniel v. Murray Corporation of America, 326 Mich 1 ." In writing for affirmance, Mr. Chief Justice BUTZEL bases his opinion upon the following: "Under the facts established by the testimony, we cannot say that the commission was in error in concluding that a compelling inference existed that decedent accidentally contacted cyanide during his employment." The commission, in making an award, reasoned as follows: "There was cyanide present in the building in which he worked and although he did not 1954See Cromie v. Florez, Incorporated, 317 Mich 516 ; Trumble v. Michigan State Police, 325 Mich 237 ; Daniel v. Murray Corporation of America, 326 Mich 1 .” In writing for affirmance, Mr. Chief Justice Btjtzel bases his opinion upon the following: “Under the facts established by the testimony, we cannot say that the commission was in error in concluding that a compelling inference existed that decedent accidentally contacted cyanide during his employment.” The commission, in making an award, reasoned as follows: “There was cyanide present in the building in which he worked and although he did no | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.