logical analysis in Florida

2025Closing arguments are considered improper if they “inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985). 26 During Perez’s trial, which took place in February and March of 2023, the State never mentioned or referred to the May 2020 George Floyd case, his name, his image, or anything related to his death, including during closing argument, as Perez contends.

2024Thus, “an attorney is allowed to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence and to argue [the] credibility of witnesses or any other relevant issue so long as the argument is based on the evidence.” Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243 , 1254–55 (Fla. 2006). 4 Counsel breaches this wide latitude when he makes arguments designed to “inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response . . . rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Bertolotti, 476 So. 2d at 134 ; see also Rodriguez v. State, 210 So. 3d 750, 756

2019One such principle, taken from Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985), provides, “[C]losing argument must not be used to ‘inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response ... rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.’” Murphy, 766 So. 2d at 1028 .

2018See, e.g., Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d 74, 75-76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961) (disapproved on other grounds by Murphy v. Int’l Robotic Syss., Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2000)) (first reported Florida case addressing “golden rule” violation, where plaintiff’s counsel argued to the jury: “[T]he court will instruct you that 8 concept that closing argument “must not be used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Lewis v. State, 780

1969This is the doctrine of the common law as applied to a new instrumentality imminently dangerous to the persons using the public highways." It was also said in a specially concurring opinion in Herr v. Butler, 101 Fla. 1125 , 132 So. 815 (1931), that "* * * the operator in lawful possession of the car with the consent of the owner in effect operates the car under the authority of the owner's license to use the highways pursuant to Florida statute law, as well as for the benefit of such owner whose agent the operator is, at least to the extent of properly controlling the car, looking after it, p

1969This is the doctrine of the common law as applied to a new instrumentality imminently dangerous to the persons using the public highways." It was also said in a specially concurring opinion in Herr v. Butler, 101 Fla. 1125 , 132 So. 815 (1931), that "* * * the operator in lawful possession of the car with the consent of the owner in effect operates the car under the authority of the owner's license to use the highways pursuant to Florida statute law, as well as for the benefit of such owner whose agent the operator is, at least to the extent of properly controlling the car, looking after it, p

2024Consistent with this principle, when a motion for new trial is based on counsel’s allegedly improper closing argument, the moving party must show that the argument was “so highly prejudicial and inflammatory that it denied the [moving party’s] right to a fair trial.” Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, 248 So. 3d 212, 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (quoting Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1271 (Fla. 2006)); see also Lazaroff v. Meek, 361 So. 3d 415 , 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (providing that “to warrant the grant of a new trial,” the improper argument’s impact “must be so prejudicial as to

2023Consistent with this principle, when a motion for new trial is based on counsel’s allegedly improper closing argument, the moving party must show that the argument was “so highly prejudicial and inflammatory that it denied the [moving party’s] right to a fair trial.” Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, 248 So. 3d 212, 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (quoting Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1271 (Fla. 2006)); see also Lazaroff v. Meek, 361 So. 3d 415 , 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (providing that “to warrant the grant of a new trial,” the improper argument’s impact “must be so prejudicial as to

2024Consistent with this principle, when a motion for new trial is based on counsel’s allegedly improper closing argument, the moving party must show that the argument was “so highly prejudicial and inflammatory that it denied the [moving party’s] right to a fair trial.” Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, 248 So. 3d 212, 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (quoting Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1271 (Fla. 2006)); see also Lazaroff v. Meek, 361 So. 3d 415 , 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (providing that “to warrant the grant of a new trial,” the improper argument’s impact “must be so prejudicial as to

2023Consistent with this principle, when a motion for new trial is based on counsel’s allegedly improper closing argument, the moving party must show that the argument was “so highly prejudicial and inflammatory that it denied the [moving party’s] right to a fair trial.” Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, 248 So. 3d 212, 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (quoting Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1271 (Fla. 2006)); see also Lazaroff v. Meek, 361 So. 3d 415 , 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (providing that “to warrant the grant of a new trial,” the improper argument’s impact “must be so prejudicial as to

2024Thus, “an attorney is allowed to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence and to argue [the] credibility of witnesses or any other relevant issue so long as the argument is based on the evidence.” Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243 , 1254–55 (Fla. 2006). 4 Counsel breaches this wide latitude when he makes arguments designed to “inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response . . . rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Bertolotti, 476 So. 2d at 134 ; see also Rodriguez v. State, 210 So. 3d 750, 756

2023Counsel breaches this wide latitude when he makes arguments designed to “inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response . . . rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Bertolotti, 476 So. 2d at 134 ; see also Rodriguez v. 4 State, 210 So. 3d 750, 756 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (noting that unfair prejudice occurs when a lawyer’s improper comments “poison the minds of the jurors” (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 786 So. 2d 559, 567 (Fla. 2001))).

2024Thus, “an attorney is allowed to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence and to argue [the] credibility of witnesses or any other relevant issue so long as the argument is based on the evidence.” Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243 , 1254–55 (Fla. 2006). 4 Counsel breaches this wide latitude when he makes arguments designed to “inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response . . . rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Bertolotti, 476 So. 2d at 134 ; see also Rodriguez v. State, 210 So. 3d 750, 756

2023Counsel breaches this wide latitude when he makes arguments designed to “inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response . . . rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Bertolotti, 476 So. 2d at 134 ; see also Rodriguez v. 4 State, 210 So. 3d 750, 756 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (noting that unfair prejudice occurs when a lawyer’s improper comments “poison the minds of the jurors” (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 786 So. 2d 559, 567 (Fla. 2001))).

2021“A party may not give a closing argument . . . that is ‘designed to inflame the emotions of the jury rather than prompt a logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.’” Calloway, 201 So. 3d at 760 -61 (quoting Intramed, Inc. v. Guider, 93 So. 3d 503, 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)); see also Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016 , 1020–21 (Fla. 4th 7 DCA 1996) (explaining that it is impermissible to “appeal to the passions and prejudices” of the jury in closing arguments).

2020“A party may not give a closing argument . . . that is ‘designed to inflame the emotions of the jury rather than prompt a logical analysis of the 7 evidence in light of the applicable law.’” Calloway, 201 So. 3d at 760 -61 (quoting Intramed, Inc. v. Guider, 93 So. 3d 503, 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)); see also Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016 , 1020–21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (it is impermissible to “appeal to the passions and prejudices” of the jury in closing arguments).

2021“A party may not give a closing argument . . . that is ‘designed to inflame the emotions of the jury rather than prompt a logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.’” Calloway, 201 So. 3d at 760 -61 (quoting Intramed, Inc. v. Guider, 93 So. 3d 503, 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)); see also Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016 , 1020–21 (Fla. 4th 7 DCA 1996) (explaining that it is impermissible to “appeal to the passions and prejudices” of the jury in closing arguments).

2020“A party may not give a closing argument . . . that is ‘designed to inflame the emotions of the jury rather than prompt a logical analysis of the 7 evidence in light of the applicable law.’” Calloway, 201 So. 3d at 760 -61 (quoting Intramed, Inc. v. Guider, 93 So. 3d 503, 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)); see also Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016 , 1020–21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (it is impermissible to “appeal to the passions and prejudices” of the jury in closing arguments).

2018See, e.g., Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d 74, 75-76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961) (disapproved on other grounds by Murphy v. Int’l Robotic Syss., Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2000)) (first reported Florida case addressing “golden rule” violation, where plaintiff’s counsel argued to the jury: “[T]he court will instruct you that 8 concept that closing argument “must not be used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Lewis v. State, 780

2018See, e.g., Cumbie v. State, 378 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (quashed on other grounds by State v. Cumbie, 380 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980)) (holding it was a golden rule violation for state to argue to jury in sexual battery case: “Now, we men often times can't appreciate the assault on a body that a woman has to undergo when she is being raped or attempted to be raped, but I think we can think about it and kind of try to imagine, if you think of yourself in a similar situation . . . .”) Nevertheless, most of the decisions condemning arguments as golden rule 8 concept that closing argument “must n

2018The Florida Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly cautioned lawyers and judges alike that closing arguments “must not be used to ‘inflame the minds and 33 passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response . . . rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Murphy v. Int’l Robotic Sys., Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010, 1028 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2D 130, 134 (Fla. 1985)); see also Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 1988) (noting that comments in closing arguments that inject elements of emotion and fea

2018“Any error in prosecutorial comments is harmless, however, if there is no reasonable possibility that those comments affected the verdict.” King v. State, 623 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 1993).

2018"Any error in prosecutorial comments is harmless, however, if there is no reasonable possibility that those comments affected the verdict." King v. State , 623 So.2d 486 , 488 (Fla. 1993).

2018The Florida Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly cautioned lawyers and judges alike that closing arguments “must not be used to ‘inflame the minds and 33 passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response . . . rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Murphy v. Int’l Robotic Sys., Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010, 1028 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2D 130, 134 (Fla. 1985)); see also Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 1988) (noting that comments in closing arguments that inject elements of emotion and fea

2018See, e.g., Cumbie v. State, 378 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (quashed on other grounds by State v. Cumbie, 380 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980)) (holding it was a golden rule violation for state to argue to jury in sexual battery case: “Now, we men often times can't appreciate the assault on a body that a woman has to undergo when she is being raped or attempted to be raped, but I think we can think about it and kind of try to imagine, if you think of yourself in a similar situation . . . .”) Nevertheless, most of the decisions condemning arguments as golden rule 8 concept that closing argument “must n

2018See, e.g., Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d 74, 75-76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961) (disapproved on other grounds by Murphy v. Int’l Robotic Syss., Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2000)) (first reported Florida case addressing “golden rule” violation, where plaintiff’s counsel argued to the jury: “[T]he court will instruct you that 8 concept that closing argument “must not be used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Lewis v. State, 780

2018Importantly, the State “can comment on the crime as long as the comments ‘are based on evidence introduced at trial and are relevant to the circumstances of [the crime] . . .’ but may not ‘cross the line by inviting the jurors to place themselves in the position of the victim.’” Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 842 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Mosley, 46 So. 3d at 521 ).

2018See, e.g., Cumbie v. State, 378 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (quashed on other grounds by State v. Cumbie, 380 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980)) (holding it was a golden rule violation for state to argue to jury in sexual battery case: “Now, we men often times can't appreciate the assault on a body that a woman has to undergo when she is being raped or attempted to be raped, but I think we can think about it and kind of try to imagine, if you think of yourself in a similar situation . . . .”) Nevertheless, most of the decisions condemning arguments as golden rule 8 concept that closing argument “must n

2016The court- reasoned that the comments were “numerous, even when viewed in context, and made the argument such that it was not designed to prompt a logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Id. at 960 (citation- and internal quotation marks omitted).

2009Additionally, closing arguments “must not be used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Jackson v. State, 832 So.2d 773, 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla.1985)).

2009Additionally, closing arguments "must not be used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law." Jackson v. State, 832 So.2d 773, 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla.1985)).

2008The comments were not likely to "inflame the minds and passions of the jurors" such that their verdict and sentencing recommendation reflect "an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law." Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla.1985); see Kearse v. State, 770 So.2d 1119, 1130 (Fla.2000).

2001See Jackson v. State, 522 So.2d 802 (Fla.1988)("[Closing argument] may not be used to inflame the minds and passions of jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law."); see also Spriggs v. State, 392 So.2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)(rebuking and admonishing prosecutor for picking up knife admitted into evidence and sticking it into jury rail but finding harmless error because of defendant's own bizarre conduct and overwhelming evidence *875 against him); Clark v. State, 553 S

2001See Jackson v. State, 522 So.2d 802 (Fla.1988)("[Closing argument] may not be used to inflame the minds and passions of jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law."); see also Spriggs v. State, 392 So.2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)(rebuking and admonishing prosecutor for picking up knife admitted into evidence and sticking it into jury rail but finding harmless error because of defendant's own bizarre conduct and overwhelming evidence *875 against him); Clark v. State, 553 S

1991See Bernal v. Department of Professional Regulation, 517 So.2d 113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), approved, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla.1988).

1991See Bernal v. Department of Professional Regulation, 517 So.2d 113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), approved, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla.1988).