18 California opinions name it 3 courts 1895–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hillgreen2 sentences2018Added as components of the foreseeability equation here are the observations of the court in Mercado and the court's earlier prediction in Hill that "[t]here is some reason to believe that the California Supreme Court may be prepared to recognize the logical error in Gardeley and Thomas ." ( Hill, supra , 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131, fn. 18 , 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 251 .) The dissent actually appears to concede that the change in the law here was foreseeable, acknowledging that " Williams and Dungo suggested that if called upon to decide the issue, a majority of justices on the United States Supreme C 2018Added as components of the foreseeability equation here are the observations of the court in Mercado and the court's earlier prediction in Hill that "[t]here is some reason to believe that the California Supreme Court may be prepared to recognize the logical error in Gardeley and Thomas ." ( Hill, supra , 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131, fn. 18 , 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 251 .) The dissent actually appears to concede that the change in the law here was foreseeable, acknowledging that " Williams and Dungo suggested that if called upon to decide the issue, a majority of justices on the United States Supreme C | 3 | 3 |
Kinahan v. Malonegreen2 sentences1959In other words, the court cannot, under the guise of construction, make a will for the testator in place of the one he has made.” (Estate of Spreckels, 162 Cal. 559, 567 [ 123 P. 371 ]; Estate of Fritze, 85 Cal.App. 500, 505-506 [ 259 P. 992 ].) It seems to us more reasonable to hold that when a testator has made a gift upon one clearly expressed condition it would violate the logical rule of expressio unius est ex-clusio alterius to read into the will an implied intent that the gift should be made effective upon the fulfillment of some different and unexpressed condition. 1959In other words, the court cannot, under the guise of construction, make a will for the testator in place of the one he has made.” (Estate of Spreckels, 162 Cal. 559, 567 [ 123 P. 371 ]; Estate of Fritze, 85 Cal.App. 500, 505-506 [ 259 P. 992 ].) It seems to us more reasonable to hold that when a testator has made a gift upon one clearly expressed condition it would violate the logical rule of expressio unius est ex-clusio alterius to read into the will an implied intent that the gift should be made effective upon the fulfillment of some different and unexpressed condition. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Estate of Spreckelsgreen2 sentences1959In other words, the court cannot, under the guise of construction, make a will for the testator in place of the one he has made.” (Estate of Spreckels, 162 Cal. 559, 567 [ 123 P. 371 ]; Estate of Fritze, 85 Cal.App. 500, 505-506 [ 259 P. 992 ].) It seems to us more reasonable to hold that when a testator has made a gift upon one clearly expressed condition it would violate the logical rule of expressio unius est ex-clusio alterius to read into the will an implied intent that the gift should be made effective upon the fulfillment of some different and unexpressed condition. 1959In other words, the court cannot, under the guise of construction, make a will for the testator in place of the one he has made.” (Estate of Spreckels, 162 Cal. 559, 567 [ 123 P. 371 ]; Estate of Fritze, 85 Cal.App. 500, 505-506 [ 259 P. 992 ].) It seems to us more reasonable to hold that when a testator has made a gift upon one clearly expressed condition it would violate the logical rule of expressio unius est ex-clusio alterius to read into the will an implied intent that the gift should be made effective upon the fulfillment of some different and unexpressed condition. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hoardgreen2 sentences2007Similarly, the statement, “if there are not clouds in the sky, it is not raining” is true, but its inverse, “if there are clouds in the sky, it is raining” is not. 8 A similar logical error appears in People v. Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 605-606 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 ], in which the court criticizes another case, People v. Salazar (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 341 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 337 ], which held that a movement that was not necessary to the commission of a rape was not incidental to it. 2007Similarly, the statement, “if there are not clouds in the sky, it is not raining” is true, but its inverse, “if there are clouds in the sky, it is raining” is not. 8 A similar logical error appears in People v. Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 605-606 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 ], in which the court criticizes another case, People v. Salazar (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 341 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 337 ], which held that a movement that was not necessary to the commission of a rape was not incidental to it. | 1 | 1 |
Ward v. Taggartgreen2 sentences1990(See Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [ 336 P.2d 534 ]; Fenton v. Board of Directors (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 388 ]; Terry v. Bender (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 198, 201 [ 300 P.2d 119 ].) On appeal Petery points out that, though the State is limited to seeking injunctive relief in actions brought by the State in its representative capacity for maintenance of a public nuisance generally, a logical exception to this limitation exists when the State owns the adversely affected property. 1990(See Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [ 336 P.2d 534 ]; Fenton v. Board of Directors (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 388 ]; Terry v. Bender (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 198, 201 [ 300 P.2d 119 ].) On appeal Petery points out that, though the State is limited to seeking injunctive relief in actions brought by the State in its representative capacity for maintenance of a public nuisance generally, a logical exception to this limitation exists when the State owns the adversely affected property. | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Bendergreen2 sentences1990(See Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [ 336 P.2d 534 ]; Fenton v. Board of Directors (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 388 ]; Terry v. Bender (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 198, 201 [ 300 P.2d 119 ].) On appeal Petery points out that, though the State is limited to seeking injunctive relief in actions brought by the State in its representative capacity for maintenance of a public nuisance generally, a logical exception to this limitation exists when the State owns the adversely affected property. 1990(See Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [ 336 P.2d 534 ]; Fenton v. Board of Directors (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 388 ]; Terry v. Bender (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 198, 201 [ 300 P.2d 119 ].) On appeal Petery points out that, though the State is limited to seeking injunctive relief in actions brought by the State in its representative capacity for maintenance of a public nuisance generally, a logical exception to this limitation exists when the State owns the adversely affected property. | 1 | 1 |
Fenton v. Board of Directorsgreen2 sentences1990(See Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [ 336 P.2d 534 ]; Fenton v. Board of Directors (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 388 ]; Terry v. Bender (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 198, 201 [ 300 P.2d 119 ].) On appeal Petery points out that, though the State is limited to seeking injunctive relief in actions brought by the State in its representative capacity for maintenance of a public nuisance generally, a logical exception to this limitation exists when the State owns the adversely affected property. 1990(See Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [ 336 P.2d 534 ]; Fenton v. Board of Directors (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 388 ]; Terry v. Bender (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 198, 201 [ 300 P.2d 119 ].) On appeal Petery points out that, though the State is limited to seeking injunctive relief in actions brought by the State in its representative capacity for maintenance of a public nuisance generally, a logical exception to this limitation exists when the State owns the adversely affected property. | 1 | 1 |
Walsh v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Controlgreen2 sentences1967(Walsh v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1963) 59 Cal.2d 757, 762 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 382 P.2d 337 ]; Koehn v. State Board of Equalization (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 109, 115 [ 333 P.2d 125 ].) In its decision, the board pointed to what we believe is the intended relationship between subdivisions (c) and (g) of section 19141: “While Section 19141(c) places a general limitation on the right of an employee to return to a civil service position after an extended absence in an exempt position, Section 19141(g) makes a specific and logical exception to this general rule. 1967(Walsh v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1963) 59 Cal.2d 757, 762 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 382 P.2d 337 ]; Koehn v. State Board of Equalization (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 109, 115 [ 333 P.2d 125 ].) In its decision, the board pointed to what we believe is the intended relationship between subdivisions (c) and (g) of section 19141: “While Section 19141(c) places a general limitation on the right of an employee to return to a civil service position after an extended absence in an exempt position, Section 19141(g) makes a specific and logical exception to this general rule. | 1 | 1 |
Koehn v. State Board of Equalizationgreen2 sentences1967(Walsh v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1963) 59 Cal.2d 757, 762 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 382 P.2d 337 ]; Koehn v. State Board of Equalization (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 109, 115 [ 333 P.2d 125 ].) In its decision, the board pointed to what we believe is the intended relationship between subdivisions (c) and (g) of section 19141: “While Section 19141(c) places a general limitation on the right of an employee to return to a civil service position after an extended absence in an exempt position, Section 19141(g) makes a specific and logical exception to this general rule. 1967(Walsh v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1963) 59 Cal.2d 757, 762 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 382 P.2d 337 ]; Koehn v. State Board of Equalization (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 109, 115 [ 333 P.2d 125 ].) In its decision, the board pointed to what we believe is the intended relationship between subdivisions (c) and (g) of section 19141: “While Section 19141(c) places a general limitation on the right of an employee to return to a civil service position after an extended absence in an exempt position, Section 19141(g) makes a specific and logical exception to this general rule. | 1 | 1 |
Stephens v. Toomeygreen1 sentence1959(Stephens v. Toomey (1959), supra, 51 Cal.2d 864, 873 [18, 19].) (We are not here considering the situation of a defendant who is committed to prison and serves a term.) The effects of a stay of execution on appeal in various eases are delineated in Penal Code, sections 1242 to 1245, inclusive. | 1 | 1 |
Kyne v. Kynegreen2 sentences1954Code,. § 172; Berniker v. Berniker, 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ].) Although as a rule only the parties and those claiming under them can invoke the illegality of an agreement (Kyne v. Kyne, 16 Cal.2d 436, 439 [ 106 P.2d 620 ], appellant’s community interest might bring her under a logical exception to said rule recognized in 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, 671-672, for the case where the “interests of the person asserting the invalidity are affected.” However, even if originally appellant would have had the right to attack as illegal the exchange agreement of which she accepted half of the pr 1954Code,. § 172; Berniker v. Berniker, 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ].) Although as a rule only the parties and those claiming under them can invoke the illegality of an agreement (Kyne v. Kyne, 16 Cal.2d 436, 439 [ 106 P.2d 620 ], appellant’s community interest might bring her under a logical exception to said rule recognized in 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, 671-672, for the case where the “interests of the person asserting the invalidity are affected.” However, even if originally appellant would have had the right to attack as illegal the exchange agreement of which she accepted half of the pr | 1 | 1 |
Marshall v. Packard-Bell Co.green2 sentences1954An action for recovery of payments made under a void *473 contract was held to be barred under the two years limitation of section 339, subdivision 1, Code of Civil Procedure in Smith v. Bach, 53 Cal.App. 63 [ 199 P. 1106 ] (compare also Marshall v. Pachard-Bell Co., 106 Cal.App.2d 770, 773 [ 236 P.2d 201 ]). 1954An action for recovery of payments made under a void *473 contract was held to be barred under the two years limitation of section 339, subdivision 1, Code of Civil Procedure in Smith v. Bach, 53 Cal.App. 63 [ 199 P. 1106 ] (compare also Marshall v. Pachard-Bell Co., 106 Cal.App.2d 770, 773 [ 236 P.2d 201 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Berniker v. Bernikergreen2 sentences1954Code,. § 172; Berniker v. Berniker, 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ].) Although as a rule only the parties and those claiming under them can invoke the illegality of an agreement (Kyne v. Kyne, 16 Cal.2d 436, 439 [ 106 P.2d 620 ], appellant’s community interest might bring her under a logical exception to said rule recognized in 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, 671-672, for the case where the “interests of the person asserting the invalidity are affected.” However, even if originally appellant would have had the right to attack as illegal the exchange agreement of which she accepted half of the pr 1954Code,. § 172; Berniker v. Berniker, 30 Cal.2d 439, 447 [ 182 P.2d 557 ].) Although as a rule only the parties and those claiming under them can invoke the illegality of an agreement (Kyne v. Kyne, 16 Cal.2d 436, 439 [ 106 P.2d 620 ], appellant’s community interest might bring her under a logical exception to said rule recognized in 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, 671-672, for the case where the “interests of the person asserting the invalidity are affected.” However, even if originally appellant would have had the right to attack as illegal the exchange agreement of which she accepted half of the pr | 1 | 1 |
Keogh v. Mauldinggreen2 sentences1948It was held in Keogh v. Maulding, 52 Cal.App.2d 17, 21 [ 125 P.2d 858 ] : “The logical test, for the determination of such a question would appear to be that, if a second trial, limited to one issue, might be prejudicial to either party, then obviously,, to order such a retrial would be an abuse of discretion. 1948It was held in Keogh v. Maulding, 52 Cal.App.2d 17, 21 [ 125 P.2d 858 ] : “The logical test, for the determination of such a question would appear to be that, if a second trial, limited to one issue, might be prejudicial to either party, then obviously,, to order such a retrial would be an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Employers' L. A. Corp. v. Indus. Acc. Com.green2 sentences1929A. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 179 Cal. 432, 439 [ 177 Pac. 273, 275 ].) We may, therefore, assume that the principles involved in the two classes of cases are identical. 1929A. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 179 Cal. 432, 439 [ 177 Pac. 273, 275 ].) We may, therefore, assume that the principles involved in the two classes of cases are identical. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gallardo
green
2 sentences2018(Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 128 .) Thus, the Gallardo court never expressly stated whether Descamps made rejection of McGee foreseeable or not. 39 (Dis. opn., post, p. 7.) We disagree, but also note that the timing of when the issue would be reached seems beside the point. 2018(Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 128 .) Thus, the Gallardo court never expressly stated whether Descamps made rejection of McGee foreseeable or not. 39 (Dis. opn., post, p. 7.) We disagree, but also note that the timing of when the issue would be reached seems beside the point. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Williams v. Illinois
red
2 sentences2018In defendant’s original briefing on appeal, he relied on Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. 50 [ 183 L.Ed.2d 89 ] (Williams) in support of his confrontation clause claim, but his reliance on that case is misplaced because it only helps illustrate why much of the opinion in Sanchez concerning expert witness basis testimony was foreseeable and that it was not futile to make the objection he claims was not forfeited here. 2018In defendant’s original briefing on appeal, he relied on Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. 50 [ 183 L.Ed.2d 89 ] (Williams) in support of his confrontation clause claim, but his reliance on that case is misplaced because it only helps illustrate why much of the opinion in Sanchez concerning expert witness basis testimony was foreseeable and that it was not futile to make the objection he claims was not forfeited here. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Villatoro
green
2 sentences2017Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1) ["[I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible ..."].) Considering Amanda's testimony in this case, there really was no "other" domestic *1015 violence. 16 Unlike Villatoro where there were five discrete rapes such that a jury could conclude, for instance, that the defendant had a propensity to commit a charged rape against victim N.G. in June 2006 because he raped another victim R.I. in May 2005 ( Villatoro , supra , 54 Ca 2017Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1) ["[I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible ..."].) Considering Amanda's testimony in this case, there really was no "other" domestic *1015 violence. 16 Unlike Villatoro where there were five discrete rapes such that a jury could conclude, for instance, that the defendant had a propensity to commit a charged rape against victim N.G. in June 2006 because he raped another victim R.I. in May 2005 ( Villatoro , supra , 54 Ca | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Geier
green
2 sentences2011People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 161 P.3d 104 ] (Geier) involved a Sixth Amendment challenge to a DNA expert’s testimony. 2011People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 161 P.3d 104 ] (Geier) involved a Sixth Amendment challenge to a DNA expert’s testimony. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hahn v. State Board of Equalization
green
2 sentences2008Which was a logical error, of course, as the Hahn court easily recognized. “ ‘[F]unction,’ ” said the court, “was never the sole relevant factor to determine whether computer software was taxable.” (Hahn, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 997 , italics added.) The court then explained why functionality was not dispositive. 2008There were two foci from the beginning in 1972: (1) the idea that the only software that would be taxed was that which was taxed in 1972, and (2) the idea that only “bundled” programs would be taxed, “not separately acquired software.” (Hahn, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 997 .) All that remained was for the court to address one argument. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Salazar
green
2 sentences2007Similarly, the statement, “if there are not clouds in the sky, it is not raining” is true, but its inverse, “if there are clouds in the sky, it is raining” is not. 8 A similar logical error appears in People v. Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 605-606 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 ], in which the court criticizes another case, People v. Salazar (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 341 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 337 ], which held that a movement that was not necessary to the commission of a rape was not incidental to it. 2007Similarly, the statement, “if there are not clouds in the sky, it is not raining” is true, but its inverse, “if there are clouds in the sky, it is raining” is not. 8 A similar logical error appears in People v. Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 605-606 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 ], in which the court criticizes another case, People v. Salazar (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 341 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 337 ], which held that a movement that was not necessary to the commission of a rape was not incidental to it. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Smith v. Bach
green
2 sentences1954An action for recovery of payments made under a void *473 contract was held to be barred under the two years limitation of section 339, subdivision 1, Code of Civil Procedure in Smith v. Bach, 53 Cal.App. 63 [ 199 P. 1106 ] (compare also Marshall v. Pachard-Bell Co., 106 Cal.App.2d 770, 773 [ 236 P.2d 201 ]). 1954An action for recovery of payments made under a void *473 contract was held to be barred under the two years limitation of section 339, subdivision 1, Code of Civil Procedure in Smith v. Bach, 53 Cal.App. 63 [ 199 P. 1106 ] (compare also Marshall v. Pachard-Bell Co., 106 Cal.App.2d 770, 773 [ 236 P.2d 201 ]). | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Claim of Schweitzer v. Thompson & Norris Co. of New Jersey
neutral
2 sentences1929(Schweitzer v. Thompson & Norris Co., 229 N. Y. 97 [ 127 N. E. 904 ].) This would seem to be the logical rule, and in the first California case holding both a general and special employer liable for workmen’s compensation our supreme court said: “The definitions of ‘emplojmr’ and ‘employee’ in our workmen’s compensation law (sections 13, 14) are broad enough to include both the general and the special employer, and as such contracts of employment, express and implied, were recognized before the constitutional amendment, we do not see why either or both might not give jurisdiction to the Indust 1929(Schweitzer v. Thompson & Norris Co., 229 N. Y. 97 [ 127 N. E. 904 ].) This would seem to be the logical rule, and in the first California case holding both a general and special employer liable for workmen’s compensation our supreme court said: “The definitions of ‘emplojmr’ and ‘employee’ in our workmen’s compensation law (sections 13, 14) are broad enough to include both the general and the special employer, and as such contracts of employment, express and implied, were recognized before the constitutional amendment, we do not see why either or both might not give jurisdiction to the Indust | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Cain v. Vogt
green
1 sentence1927Such a distinction is clearly pointed out and what appears to be the logical rule is stated in Cain v. Vogt, 138 Iowa, 631 [128 Am. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Cowell v. Springs Co.
green
2 sentences1919Notwithstanding the obvious distinction between a restriction upon use, as in the case of a building restriction, for example, and a direct restraint upon the power of alienation, as in the present case, we find Mr. Justice Field, in Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55 , [ 25 L. 1919Notwithstanding the obvious distinction between a restriction upon use, as in the case of a building restriction, for example, and a direct restraint upon the power of alienation, as in the present case, we find Mr. Justice Field, in Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55 , [ 25 L. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Rogers v. Benton
green
1 sentence1895As was said by the supreme court of Minnesota: “The only logical rule is that, to constitute ‘ a mortgagee in possession,’ the mortgagee must be in possession by reason of the agreement or assent of the mortgagor or his assigns, that he have the possession under the mortgage, and because of it.” (Rogers v. Benton, 39 Minn. 39 ; 12 Am. | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.