challenged jury instruction in North Carolina

2021The trial court did not err, much less plainly err, in its instruction on constructive possession or its instruction on possession of a firearm by a felon. ¶ 31 Moreover, even if the inclusion of a general constructive possession instruction was given in error, after a review of the entire record, we cannot say that the challenged jury instruction “had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.” Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518 , 723 S.E.2d at 334 .

2021The trial court did not err, much less plainly err, in its instruction on constructive possession or its instruction on possession of a firearm by a felon. ¶ 31 Moreover, even if the inclusion of a general constructive possession instruction was given in error, after a review of the entire record, we cannot say that the challenged jury instruction “had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.” Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518 , 723 S.E.2d at 334 .

2015Moreover, while the defendant in Hargett , who was charged with murder, was present at the scene with the man who actually killed the victim, "he refused to strike [the] deceased when requested by [the killer] and protested against the assault made by [the killer]." Id. at 416 , 121 S.E.2d at 592 .

2015Moreover, while the defendant in Hargett , who was charged with murder, was present at the scene with the man who actually killed the victim, "he refused to strike [the] deceased when requested by [the killer] and protested against the assault made by [the killer]." Id. at 416 , 121 S.E.2d at 592 .

2006Ed. 2d 79 , 126 S. Ct. 47 (2005).

2005It is well established that: [t]he plain error rule ... is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a " fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done," or "where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused," or the error has "`resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial'" or where the error is such as to "seriously affect the fairness, int

2005It is well established that: [t]he plain error rule ... is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a " fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done," or "where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused," or the error has "`resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial'" or where the error is such as to "seriously affect the fairness, int

2005It is well established that: [t]he plain error rule ... is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a " fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done," or "where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused," or the error has "`resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial'" or where the error is such as to "seriously affect the fairness, int

1997He says the jury should have been told that the weight it gave any statutory mitigating circumstance was up to it but that it “would have to give it some weight.” The challenged jury instruction in this case complies with what we said in State v. Fullwood, 323 N.C. 371, 396 , 373 S.E.2d 518, 533 (1988), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022 , 108 L.

1986The United States Supreme Court explained in Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 521 , 61 L.Ed. 2d at 49 , and in Francis , — U.S. at —, 85 L.Ed. 2d at 353 , that in addressing the issue of “ ‘whether the challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof [beyond a reasonable doubt] on the critical question of state of mind’ by creating a mandatory presumption of intent upon proof by the State of other elements of the offense,” the “threshold inquiry” is a determination of the nature of the presumption described by the instruction.

1986The United States Supreme Court explained in Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 521 , 61 L.Ed. 2d at 49 , and in Francis , — U.S. at —, 85 L.Ed. 2d at 353 , that in addressing the issue of “ ‘whether the challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof [beyond a reasonable doubt] on the critical question of state of mind’ by creating a mandatory presumption of intent upon proof by the State of other elements of the offense,” the “threshold inquiry” is a determination of the nature of the presumption described by the instruction.

1986This mandate assumes, *118 of course, that the jury instruction amounts to some kind of presumption in the first place. 1 This Court has had occasion to address the issue of the constitutionality of presumptions in criminal cases in State v. Joyner, 312 N.C. 779 , 324 S.E. 2d 841 (1985), and State v. White, 300 N.C. 494 , 268 S.E. 2d 481 , reh’g denied, 301 N.C. 107 , 273 S.E. 2d 443 (1980), in light of Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1979).

1986This mandate assumes, *118 of course, that the jury instruction amounts to some kind of presumption in the first place. 1 This Court has had occasion to address the issue of the constitutionality of presumptions in criminal cases in State v. Joyner, 312 N.C. 779 , 324 S.E. 2d 841 (1985), and State v. White, 300 N.C. 494 , 268 S.E. 2d 481 , reh’g denied, 301 N.C. 107 , 273 S.E. 2d 443 (1980), in light of Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1979).

1986The United States Supreme Court explained in Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 521 , 61 L.Ed. 2d at 49 , and in Francis , — U.S. at —, 85 L.Ed. 2d at 353 , that in addressing the issue of “ ‘whether the challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof [beyond a reasonable doubt] on the critical question of state of mind’ by creating a mandatory presumption of intent upon proof by the State of other elements of the offense,” the “threshold inquiry” is a determination of the nature of the presumption described by the instruction.

1986This mandate assumes, *118 of course, that the jury instruction amounts to some kind of presumption in the first place. 1 This Court has had occasion to address the issue of the constitutionality of presumptions in criminal cases in State v. Joyner, 312 N.C. 779 , 324 S.E. 2d 841 (1985), and State v. White, 300 N.C. 494 , 268 S.E. 2d 481 , reh’g denied, 301 N.C. 107 , 273 S.E. 2d 443 (1980), in light of Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1979).

1986This mandate assumes, *118 of course, that the jury instruction amounts to some kind of presumption in the first place. 1 This Court has had occasion to address the issue of the constitutionality of presumptions in criminal cases in State v. Joyner, 312 N.C. 779 , 324 S.E. 2d 841 (1985), and State v. White, 300 N.C. 494 , 268 S.E. 2d 481 , reh’g denied, 301 N.C. 107 , 273 S.E. 2d 443 (1980), in light of Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1979).

1986This mandate assumes, *118 of course, that the jury instruction amounts to some kind of presumption in the first place. 1 This Court has had occasion to address the issue of the constitutionality of presumptions in criminal cases in State v. Joyner, 312 N.C. 779 , 324 S.E. 2d 841 (1985), and State v. White, 300 N.C. 494 , 268 S.E. 2d 481 , reh’g denied, 301 N.C. 107 , 273 S.E. 2d 443 (1980), in light of Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1979).

1986This mandate assumes, *118 of course, that the jury instruction amounts to some kind of presumption in the first place. 1 This Court has had occasion to address the issue of the constitutionality of presumptions in criminal cases in State v. Joyner, 312 N.C. 779 , 324 S.E. 2d 841 (1985), and State v. White, 300 N.C. 494 , 268 S.E. 2d 481 , reh’g denied, 301 N.C. 107 , 273 S.E. 2d 443 (1980), in light of Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1979).

1986This mandate assumes, *118 of course, that the jury instruction amounts to some kind of presumption in the first place. 1 This Court has had occasion to address the issue of the constitutionality of presumptions in criminal cases in State v. Joyner, 312 N.C. 779 , 324 S.E. 2d 841 (1985), and State v. White, 300 N.C. 494 , 268 S.E. 2d 481 , reh’g denied, 301 N.C. 107 , 273 S.E. 2d 443 (1980), in light of Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1979).

1986This mandate assumes, *118 of course, that the jury instruction amounts to some kind of presumption in the first place. 1 This Court has had occasion to address the issue of the constitutionality of presumptions in criminal cases in State v. Joyner, 312 N.C. 779 , 324 S.E. 2d 841 (1985), and State v. White, 300 N.C. 494 , 268 S.E. 2d 481 , reh’g denied, 301 N.C. 107 , 273 S.E. 2d 443 (1980), in light of Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1979).