challenged jury instruction in California

2023(People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 525–526.) We review a challenged jury instruction “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner. [Citation.]” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229 .) In that context, we must determine if it is reasonably likely the jurors understood the instruction as appellant suggests.

2015(See People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525-526 .) We also presume on appeal that jurors are able to understand and correlate all of the instructions given.

2016(Bowman v. Wyatt (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 286, 298 .) We independently review claims 7 of instructional error viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant.

2015(Bowman v. Wyatt (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 286, 298 .) When deciding whether an erroneous jury instruction was prejudicial, we evaluate (1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions, (3) the effect of counsel’s arguments, and (4) any indications by the jury that it was misled.

2003Even defendant’s own expert, Dr. Donaldson, while disputing the prosecution’s evidence that defendant’s sexually predatory behavior resulted from mental illness, estimated defendant’s likelihood of committing another sexually violent offense at “better than 50 percent probability.” On this record, we can easily conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Hurtado, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1194 ), that defendant suffered no possible prejudice from the challenged jury instruction.

2003Even defendant’s own expert, Dr. Donaldson, while disputing the prosecution’s evidence that defendant’s sexually predatory behavior resulted from mental illness, estimated defendant’s likelihood of committing another sexually violent offense at “better than 50 percent probability.” On this record, we can easily conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Hurtado, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1194 ), that defendant suffered no possible prejudice from the challenged jury instruction.

1976No Duty to Investigate for Defense The defendant asks us to extend the rule of People v. Kiihoa (1960) 53 Cal.2d 748 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 349 P.2d 673 ] to the facts of this case.

1976No Duty to Investigate for Defense The defendant asks us to extend the rule of People v. Kiihoa (1960) 53 Cal.2d 748 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 349 P.2d 673 ] to the facts of this case.

2024(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050 [Judicial Council goal is to provide “standardized instructions that accurately state the law in a way that is understandable to the average juror”].) As we have noted, a challenged jury instruction “ ‘ “may not be judged in artificial isolation,” but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.’ ” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1335 .) The CSAAS expert testified that CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool.

2023(People v. Nem (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 160, 165 .) We should consider the language of the instruction, the entire trial record, and the arguments of counsel.

2023(People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 525–526.) We review a challenged jury instruction “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner. [Citation.]” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229 .) In that context, we must determine if it is reasonably likely the jurors understood the instruction as appellant suggests.

2023(Id. at p. 16.) The majority further held that the error was prejudicial under People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1 (Aledamat) because, in its view, the evidence at trial did not compel the conclusion that Lewis must have used force against S.D.

2022In the first, People v. Conkling (1896) 111 Cal. 616 (Conkling), the California Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s murder conviction because the challenged jury instruction on contrived self-defense was an 7 incorrect statement of the law.

2020Standard of Review and Legal Background “The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instructions correctly state the law.” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) In this context, “the relevant inquiry is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violated the Constitution. [Citations.] ‘“‘[W]e must assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83

2020Standard of Review and Legal Background “The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instructions correctly state the law.” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) In this context, “the relevant inquiry is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violated the Constitution. [Citations.] ‘“‘[W]e must assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83

2020(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 677 .) We presume the jury followed the court’s instructions.

2020Standard of Review and Legal Background “The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instructions correctly state the law.” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) In this context, “the relevant inquiry is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violated the Constitution. [Citations.] ‘“‘[W]e must assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83

2016(Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 580 ; Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 983 .) Rather, the “reviewing court should consider not only the nature of the error, ‘including its natural and probable effect on a party’s ability to place his full case before the jury,’ but the likelihood of actual prejudice as reflected in the individual trial record, taking into account ‘(1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions, (3) the effect of counsel’s arguments, and (4) any indications by the jury itself that it was misled.’ [Citation.]” (Rutherford, at p. 983.)

2016(Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 580 ; Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 983 .) Rather, the “reviewing court should consider not only the nature of the error, ‘including its natural and probable effect on a party’s ability to place his full case before the jury,’ but the likelihood of actual prejudice as reflected in the individual trial record, taking into account ‘(1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions, (3) the effect of counsel’s arguments, and (4) any indications by the jury itself that it was misled.’ [Citation.]” (Rutherford, at p. 983.)

2015(People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 963 .) To the extent the attempted murder instructions can be viewed as ambiguous, any ambiguity was overcome by the fact the primary basis for Flores-Ventura’s culpability for attempted murder was as an aider and abettor.

2009(See Estrada, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 10 ; Air Couriers, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 935-936.) In so doing, the instruction provided the jury with a correct statement of the substance of the applicable law.

2006Civil Code section 1566 provides: “A consent which is not free . . . may be rescinded by the parties, in the manner prescribed by the Chapter on Rescission.” Finally, Civil Code section 1567 lists the factors that disprove apparent consent, one of which is undue influence. 11 Given the breadth of the challenged jury instruction and the resolution we reach, we need not examine whether the crime of theft is committed whenever one party receives money or property from another as a result of breaching his or her fiduciary duty to that other party. 12 Section 368(a) provides: “The Legislature finds

2006Civil Code section 1566 provides: “A consent which is not free . . . may be rescinded by the parties, in the manner prescribed by the Chapter on Rescission.” Finally, Civil Code section 1567 lists the factors that disprove apparent consent, one of which is undue influence. 11 Given the breadth of the challenged jury instruction and the resolution we reach, we need not examine whether the crime of theft is committed whenever one party receives money or property from another as a result of breaching his or her fiduciary duty to that other party. 12 Section 368(a) provides: “The Legislature finds

1991We previously concluded that we were bound to reverse the special circumstance finding by our supreme court’s opinion in People v. Fuentes (1985) 40 Cal.3d 629, 640-641 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 710 P.2d 240 ], 12 At the *1628 People’s request we granted rehearing to consider whether under Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ], Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ] and related California cases the special circumstance may be affirmed despite the instructional error.

1991We previously concluded that we were bound to reverse the special circumstance finding by our supreme court’s opinion in People v. Fuentes (1985) 40 Cal.3d 629, 640-641 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 710 P.2d 240 ], 12 At the *1628 People’s request we granted rehearing to consider whether under Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ], Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ] and related California cases the special circumstance may be affirmed despite the instructional error.

1991We previously concluded that we were bound to reverse the special circumstance finding by our supreme court’s opinion in People v. Fuentes (1985) 40 Cal.3d 629, 640-641 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 710 P.2d 240 ], 12 At the *1628 People’s request we granted rehearing to consider whether under Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ], Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ] and related California cases the special circumstance may be affirmed despite the instructional error.

1991We previously concluded that we were bound to reverse the special circumstance finding by our supreme court’s opinion in People v. Fuentes (1985) 40 Cal.3d 629, 640-641 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 710 P.2d 240 ], 12 At the *1628 People’s request we granted rehearing to consider whether under Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ], Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ] and related California cases the special circumstance may be affirmed despite the instructional error.

1981The challenged jury instruction stated, “A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime, he aids, promotes, encourages or instigates by act or advice the commission of such crime.” In People v. Yarber (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 895 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 875 ], the court found this particular instruction defective because it failed to require a finding that the defendant intended to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.

1981The challenged jury instruction stated, “A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime, he aids, promotes, encourages or instigates by act or advice the commission of such crime.” In People v. Yarber (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 895 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 875 ], the court found this particular instruction defective because it failed to require a finding that the defendant intended to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.