challenged jury instruction in Rhode Island

2023In reviewing jury instructions, “it is our role to examine the instructions in their entirety to ascertain the manner in which a jury of ordinary intelligent lay people would have understood them, and we review challenged portions of jury instructions in the context in which they were rendered.” Adefusika, 989 A.2d at 475 (deletion omitted) (quoting John, 881 A.2d at 929 ).

2011Even if a challenged jury instruction was erroneous, “reversal is warranted only if a jury could have been misled to the prejudice of the complaining party.” Adefusika, 989 A.2d at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Palmer, 962 A.2d at 764-65 ; Graham, 941 A.2d at 855 .

2007General intent means that a person means to commit the act itself without a specific intent to bring about some particular end or result.” The defendant alleges two errors relating to the trial justice’s jury instructions: (1) the trial justice erred when he instructed the jury on the level of intent required to find defendant guilty of first-degree child abuse beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial justice erroneously instructed the jury that the child’s age already was proven as a matter of law, thus removing from the jury’s deliberations an essential element of the crime. *913 When thi

2002In reviewing a challenged jury instruction, we examine the charge “in its entirety, ‘in light of the meaning and interpretation that a jury composed of ordinary, intelligent lay persons would give [to the instructions].’ ” Patino v. Suchnik, 770 A.2d 861, 866 (R.I.2001) (quoting Neri v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 719 A.2d 1150, 1153 (R.I.1998)).

2012Compare State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195, 1202 (R.I.1995) (stating that the aiding and abetting “standards do not require * * * that the accused must foresee the consequences of such unlawful acts”), with Amado, 433 A.2d at 238 (stating that “[t]he challenged instruction bears directly on * * * whether defendant possessed the intent to kill and, for second-degree murder, the added elements of malice aforethought or premeditation ” (emphases added)), and Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520 -21 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (describing as follows the pertinent murder statute: “In Montana, a person commits the offense

2012Compare State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195, 1202 (R.I.1995) (stating that the aiding and abetting “standards do not require * * * that the accused must foresee the consequences of such unlawful acts”), with Amado, 433 A.2d at 238 (stating that “[t]he challenged instruction bears directly on * * * whether defendant possessed the intent to kill and, for second-degree murder, the added elements of malice aforethought or premeditation ” (emphases added)), and Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520 -21 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (describing as follows the pertinent murder statute: “In Montana, a person commits the offense

2012Compare State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195, 1202 (R.I.1995) (stating that the aiding and abetting “standards do not require * * * that the accused must foresee the consequences of such unlawful acts”), with Amado, 433 A.2d at 238 (stating that “[t]he challenged instruction bears directly on * * * whether defendant possessed the intent to kill and, for second-degree murder, the added elements of malice aforethought or premeditation ” (emphases added)), and Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520 -21 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (describing as follows the pertinent murder statute: “In Montana, a person commits the offense

2012Compare State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195, 1202 (R.I.1995) (stating that the aiding and abetting “standards do not require * * * that the accused must foresee the consequences of such unlawful acts”), with Amado, 433 A.2d at 238 (stating that “[t]he challenged instruction bears directly on * * * whether defendant possessed the intent to kill and, for second-degree murder, the added elements of malice aforethought or premeditation ” (emphases added)), and Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520 -21 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (describing as follows the pertinent murder statute: “In Montana, a person commits the offense

2011Even if a challenged jury instruction was erroneous, “reversal is warranted only if a jury could have been misled to the prejudice of the complaining party.” Adefusika, 989 A.2d at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Palmer, 962 A.2d at 764-65 ; Graham, 941 A.2d at 855 .

2007General intent means that a person means to commit the act itself without a specific intent to bring about some particular end or result.” The defendant alleges two errors relating to the trial justice’s jury instructions: (1) the trial justice erred when he instructed the jury on the level of intent required to find defendant guilty of first-degree child abuse beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial justice erroneously instructed the jury that the child’s age already was proven as a matter of law, thus removing from the jury’s deliberations an essential element of the crime. *913 When thi

2007The trial justice is bound to ensure that the jury charge “sufficiently addresses the requested instructions and correctly states the applicable law.” State v. Coleman, 909 A.2d 929, 938 (R.I.2006) (quoting State v. Aponte, 800 A.2d 420, 427 (R.I.2002)).

2007The trial justice is bound to ensure that the jury charge “sufficiently addresses the requested instructions and correctly states the applicable law.” State v. Coleman, 909 A.2d 929, 938 (R.I.2006) (quoting State v. Aponte, 800 A.2d 420, 427 (R.I.2002)).

2005Contois v. Town of West Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019, 1022 (R.I.2004).

2002In reviewing a challenged jury instruction, we examine the charge “in its entirety, ‘in light of the meaning and interpretation that a jury composed of ordinary, intelligent lay persons would give [to the instructions].’ ” Patino v. Suchnik, 770 A.2d 861, 866 (R.I.2001) (quoting Neri v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 719 A.2d 1150, 1153 (R.I.1998)).

2002“An erroneous charge warrants reversal only if it can be shown that the jury ‘could have been misled’ to the resultant prejudice of the complaining party.” Id. (quoting Brodeur v. Desrosiers, 505 A.2d 418, 422 (R.I.1986)).

2002“An erroneous charge warrants reversal only if it can be shown that the jury ‘could have been misled’ to the resultant prejudice of the complaining party.” Id. (quoting Brodeur v. Desrosiers, 505 A.2d 418, 422 (R.I.1986)).

2001State *916 v. Brezinski, 731 A.2d 711, 713 (R.I.1999). “[T]his [Cjourt examines jury instructions in their entirety to determine the manner in which a jury of ordinary, intelligent lay persons would have comprehended them.” State v. Anderson, 752 A.2d 946, 951 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Leuthavone, 640 A.2d 515, 521 (R.I.1994)).

2001State *916 v. Brezinski, 731 A.2d 711, 713 (R.I.1999). “[T]his [Cjourt examines jury instructions in their entirety to determine the manner in which a jury of ordinary, intelligent lay persons would have comprehended them.” State v. Anderson, 752 A.2d 946, 951 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Leuthavone, 640 A.2d 515, 521 (R.I.1994)).

2001State *916 v. Brezinski, 731 A.2d 711, 713 (R.I.1999). “[T]his [Cjourt examines jury instructions in their entirety to determine the manner in which a jury of ordinary, intelligent lay persons would have comprehended them.” State v. Anderson, 752 A.2d 946, 951 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Leuthavone, 640 A.2d 515, 521 (R.I.1994)).

1998Instead we consider the manner in which the instruction “would be interpreted by a jury composed of ordinarily intelligent lay persons listening to it at the close of the trial.” State v. Reid, 101 R.I. 863 , 366, 223 A.2d 444, 446 (1966).