twelve factors in North Carolina

2019See, e.g., White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777-78 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (explaining that “[i]t is well established that where matters are left to the discretion of the trial court, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion,” and “[a] ruling committed to a trial court’s discretion is to be accorded great deference” and discussing how “[t]he findings of fact show that the trial court admitted and considered evidence relating to several of the twelve factors contained in” the statute at issue (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see als

2019See, e.g., White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777-78 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (explaining that “[i]t is well established that where matters are left to the discretion of the trial court, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion,” and “[a] ruling committed to a trial court’s discretion is to be accorded great deference” and discussing how “[t]he findings of fact show that the trial court admitted and considered evidence relating to several of the twelve factors contained in” the statute at issue (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see als

2024On remand, DSS again considered the UNC School of Government twelve-factor test, see id. at 516-17, 524, but did so “along with the five Wetherington factors.” Although Wetherington I’s recognition of the “flexible definition of just cause” and description of “factors such as” the five it explicitly addressed contemplates that additional factors may sometimes be relevant to just cause, Wetherington I, 368 N.C. at 591-92 (emphasis added) (marks omitted), DSS makes no argument that the twelve factors of the UNC School of Government were either appropriate or necessary to its analysis of just cau

2019See, e.g., White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777-78 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (explaining that “[i]t is well established that where matters are left to the discretion of the trial court, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion,” and “[a] ruling committed to a trial court’s discretion is to be accorded great deference” and discussing how “[t]he findings of fact show that the trial court admitted and considered evidence relating to several of the twelve factors contained in” the statute at issue (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see als

2019See, e.g., White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777-78 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (explaining that “[i]t is well established that where matters are left to the discretion of the trial court, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion,” and “[a] ruling committed to a trial court’s discretion is to be accorded great deference” and discussing how “[t]he findings of fact show that the trial court admitted and considered evidence relating to several of the twelve factors contained in” the statute at issue (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see als

1994Whether to declare a board’s action null and void is within the discretion of the trial court, see In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 97 , 240 S.E.2d 367, 372 (1978) (where “may” is used, it will ordinarily be construed as permissive and not mandatory), and can be reversed on appeal only if the decision is “manifestly unsupported by reason” and “so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” White, 312 N.C. at 777 , 324 S.E.2d at 833 .

1994Whether to declare a board’s action null and void is within the discretion of the trial court, see In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 97 , 240 S.E.2d 367, 372 (1978) (where “may” is used, it will ordinarily be construed as permissive and not mandatory), and can be reversed on appeal only if the decision is “manifestly unsupported by reason” and “so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” White, 312 N.C. at 777 , 324 S.E.2d at 833 .

1990The party claiming the debt to be marital has the burden of proving the value of the debt on the date of separation and that it was “incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the husband and wife.” Id.; see Johnson v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437, 455, n.4 , 346 S.E.2d 430, 440 (1986) (when classifications of assets are disputed, the assets must be labeled “marital” or “separate” “depending upon the proof presented to the trial court of the nature of those assets”); cf. White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 776 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985) (party desiring unequal division of marital property bear

1990The party claiming the debt to be marital has the burden of proving the value of the debt on the date of separation and that it was “incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the husband and wife.” Id.; see Johnson v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437, 455, n.4 , 346 S.E.2d 430, 440 (1986) (when classifications of assets are disputed, the assets must be labeled “marital” or “separate” “depending upon the proof presented to the trial court of the nature of those assets”); cf. White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 776 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985) (party desiring unequal division of marital property bear