stated the following rule in Nebraska

1991Conway at 782 , 472 N.W.2d at 412 .

1966In support thereof the defendant cites Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc., 174 Neb. 1 , 115 N. W. 2d 776 , in which case this court stated the following rule: “A mere scintilla of evidence is: not enough to require the submission of an issue to the jury.” The defendant also cites Kohl v. Unkel, 163 Neb. 257 , 79 N. W. 2d 405 , where this court held: “Where the facts adduced to sustain an issue are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom, it is the duty of the court to decide the question, as a matter of law, rather than submit it to a jury for determination.” The def

1966In support thereof the defendant cites Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc., 174 Neb. 1 , 115 N. W. 2d 776 , in which case this court stated the following rule: “A mere scintilla of evidence is: not enough to require the submission of an issue to the jury.” The defendant also cites Kohl v. Unkel, 163 Neb. 257 , 79 N. W. 2d 405 , where this court held: “Where the facts adduced to sustain an issue are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom, it is the duty of the court to decide the question, as a matter of law, rather than submit it to a jury for determination.” The def

1966In support thereof the defendant cites Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc., 174 Neb. 1 , 115 N. W. 2d 776 , in which case this court stated the following rule: “A mere scintilla of evidence is: not enough to require the submission of an issue to the jury.” The defendant also cites Kohl v. Unkel, 163 Neb. 257 , 79 N. W. 2d 405 , where this court held: “Where the facts adduced to sustain an issue are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom, it is the duty of the court to decide the question, as a matter of law, rather than submit it to a jury for determination.” The def

1966In support thereof the defendant cites Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc., 174 Neb. 1 , 115 N. W. 2d 776 , in which case this court stated the following rule: “A mere scintilla of evidence is: not enough to require the submission of an issue to the jury.” The defendant also cites Kohl v. Unkel, 163 Neb. 257 , 79 N. W. 2d 405 , where this court held: “Where the facts adduced to sustain an issue are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom, it is the duty of the court to decide the question, as a matter of law, rather than submit it to a jury for determination.” The def

1966In support thereof the defendant cites Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc., 174 Neb. 1 , 115 N. W. 2d 776 , in which case this court stated the following rule: “A mere scintilla of evidence is: not enough to require the submission of an issue to the jury.” The defendant also cites Kohl v. Unkel, 163 Neb. 257 , 79 N. W. 2d 405 , where this court held: “Where the facts adduced to sustain an issue are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom, it is the duty of the court to decide the question, as a matter of law, rather than submit it to a jury for determination.” The def

1966In support thereof the defendant cites Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc., 174 Neb. 1 , 115 N. W. 2d 776 , in which case this court stated the following rule: “A mere scintilla of evidence is: not enough to require the submission of an issue to the jury.” The defendant also cites Kohl v. Unkel, 163 Neb. 257 , 79 N. W. 2d 405 , where this court held: “Where the facts adduced to sustain an issue are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom, it is the duty of the court to decide the question, as a matter of law, rather than submit it to a jury for determination.” The def

1962The court could have rendered such judgment had no application therefor been made.” In the case of In re Estate of Lindekugel, 148 Neb. 271 , *513 27 N. W. 2d 169 , this court stated the following rule: “When the plaintiff fails to file a petition on appeal in the district court within 50 days from the date of the rendition of the judgment in the lower court, or at any time thereafter, and good cause is not shown for failure for so doing, upon motion to nonsuit the plaintiff for such failure and no competent evidence appearing in the record to show good cause, this court will not presume such

1962The court could have rendered such judgment had no application therefor been made.” In the case of In re Estate of Lindekugel, 148 Neb. 271 , *513 27 N. W. 2d 169 , this court stated the following rule: “When the plaintiff fails to file a petition on appeal in the district court within 50 days from the date of the rendition of the judgment in the lower court, or at any time thereafter, and good cause is not shown for failure for so doing, upon motion to nonsuit the plaintiff for such failure and no competent evidence appearing in the record to show good cause, this court will not presume such

1962In Abbas v. Demont, 152 Neb. 77 , 40 N. W. 2d 265 , this court stated the following rule: “Where a vendee is in default under a contract of sale of real estate, making time the essence and providing for a forfeiture in case of default, and there has been no waiver of the provisions of the agreement or a defense thereto established, the contract will be enforced as made.” The cited case was an ejectment case where the defendant vendee claimed a waiver of timely paymént and a counterclaim as an equitable defense.

1962In Abbas v. Demont, 152 Neb. 77 , 40 N. W. 2d 265 , this court stated the following rule: “Where a vendee is in default under a contract of sale of real estate, making time the essence and providing for a forfeiture in case of default, and there has been no waiver of the provisions of the agreement or a defense thereto established, the contract will be enforced as made.” The cited case was an ejectment case where the defendant vendee claimed a waiver of timely paymént and a counterclaim as an equitable defense.

1957In Corbitt v. Omaha Transit Co., supra, [ 162 Neb. 598 , 77 N.W.2d 151 ] this court stated the following rule: "When one, being in a place of safety, sees and is aware of the approach of a moving vehicle in close proximity to him, suddenly moves from the place of safety into the path of such vehicle and is struck, his own conduct constitutes contributory negligence more than slight in degree, as a matter of law, and precludes recovery." See, also, Cuevas v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., supra; Ring v. Duey, supra. The plaintiff, by his own testimony, saw the defendant's automobile approaching the

1956Co., 137 Neb. 168 , 288 N. W. 512 , this court stated the following rule: “When one, being in a place of safety, sees and is aware of the approach of a moving vehicle in close proximity to him, suddenly moves from the place of safety into the path of such vehicle and is struck, his own conduct constitutes contributory negligence more than slight in degree, as a matter of law, and precludes recovery.” See, also, Cuevas v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., supra. In Halliday v. Raymond, 147 Neb. 179 , 22 N. W. 2d 614 , we said: “However, as stated in Travinsky v. Omaha & C.

1956Co., 137 Neb. 168 , 288 N. W. 512 , this court stated the following rule: “When one, being in a place of safety, sees and is aware of the approach of a moving vehicle in close proximity to him, suddenly moves from the place of safety into the path of such vehicle and is struck, his own conduct constitutes contributory negligence more than slight in degree, as a matter of law, and precludes recovery.” See, also, Cuevas v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., supra. In Halliday v. Raymond, 147 Neb. 179 , 22 N. W. 2d 614 , we said: “However, as stated in Travinsky v. Omaha & C.

1956Co., 137 Neb. 168 , 288 N. W. 512 , this court stated the following rule: “When one, being in a place of safety, sees and is aware of the approach of a moving vehicle in close proximity to him, suddenly moves from the place of safety into the path of such vehicle and is struck, his own conduct constitutes contributory negligence more than slight in degree, as a matter of law, and precludes recovery.” See, also, Cuevas v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., supra. In Halliday v. Raymond, 147 Neb. 179 , 22 N. W. 2d 614 , we said: “However, as stated in Travinsky v. Omaha & C.

1956Co., 137 Neb. 168 , 288 N. W. 512 , this court stated the following rule: “When one, being in a place of safety, sees and is aware of the approach of a moving vehicle in close proximity to him, suddenly moves from the place of safety into the path of such vehicle and is struck, his own conduct constitutes contributory negligence more than slight in degree, as a matter of law, and precludes recovery.” See, also, Cuevas v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., supra. In Halliday v. Raymond, 147 Neb. 179 , 22 N. W. 2d 614 , we said: “However, as stated in Travinsky v. Omaha & C.