stated the following rule in Oregon

1980Co., 230 Or. 531, 540 , 371 P.2d 74 , 78 (1962), although also not involving an `Earnest Money Receipt,' this court stated the following rule, quoting from Rosenfield v. United States Trust Co., 290 Mass. 210, 216 , 195 N.E. 323, 325 , 122 A.L.R. 210 (1935): "`"* * * Normally, the fact that parties contemplate the execution of a final written agreement justifies a strong inference that the parties do not intend to be bound by earlier negotiations or agreements until the final terms are settled. * * * Said fact does not conclusively establish such intention. * * * If all the material terms whic

1980Co., 230 Or. 531, 540 , 371 P.2d 74 , 78 (1962), although also not involving an `Earnest Money Receipt,' this court stated the following rule, quoting from Rosenfield v. United States Trust Co., 290 Mass. 210, 216 , 195 N.E. 323, 325 , 122 A.L.R. 210 (1935): "`"* * * Normally, the fact that parties contemplate the execution of a final written agreement justifies a strong inference that the parties do not intend to be bound by earlier negotiations or agreements until the final terms are settled. * * * Said fact does not conclusively establish such intention. * * * If all the material terms whic

1980Co., 230 Or 531, 540 , 371 P2d 74 , 78 (1962), although also not involving an 'Earnest Money Receipt,’ this court stated the following rule, quoting from Rosenfield v. United States Trust Co., 290 Mass 210, 216, 195 NE 323, 325 , 122 ALR 1210 (1935): "' "* * * Normally the fact that parties contemplate the execution of a final written agreement justifies a strong inference that the parties do not intend to be bound by earlier negotiations or agreements until the final terms are settled. * * * Said fact does not conclusively establish such intention. * * * If all the material terms which are to

1980Co., 230 Or. 531, 540 , 371 P.2d 74 , 78 (1962), although also not involving an `Earnest Money Receipt,' this court stated the following rule, quoting from Rosenfield v. United States Trust Co., 290 Mass. 210, 216 , 195 N.E. 323, 325 , 122 A.L.R. 210 (1935): "`"* * * Normally, the fact that parties contemplate the execution of a final written agreement justifies a strong inference that the parties do not intend to be bound by earlier negotiations or agreements until the final terms are settled. * * * Said fact does not conclusively establish such intention. * * * If all the material terms whic

2020This court stated the following test for determining a proper occasion for giving the statutory instruction: The trial court must “determine, from all the testimony, whether or not there has been sufficient evidence for the jury to decide that at least one witness consciously testified falsely.” Id. at 293 .

1994“The integrity of the judicial process demands compliance with court orders until such time as they are altered.” 277 Or at 200 .

1974Co., 222 Or 78, 89-90 , 352 P2d 1072 (1960), this court stated the following rule: “* * * Not only [are] affirmative misrepresentations * * * a basis for an action based upon fraud * * *; half-truths and concealment of special knowledge .[may also provide such a basis] when there is a duty’to speak, and [one] undertaking to speak fails' to tell or conceals the truth.

1974Co., 222 Or 78, 89-90 , 352 P2d 1072 (1960), this court stated the following rule: “* * * Not only [are] affirmative misrepresentations * * * a basis for an action based upon fraud * * *; half-truths and concealment of special knowledge .[may also provide such a basis] when there is a duty’to speak, and [one] undertaking to speak fails' to tell or conceals the truth.

1952In Mooney v. Carter, supra, the court stated the following rule: “* * * In the case at bar plaintiff’s injury was not caused by negligence, either of himself or of defendant, but by the admittedly intentional act of defendant in the application of force to her car *46 for the purpose of throwing plaintiff from the running board. # * é The questions of negligence or contributory negligence are not involved.” (Italics ours.) In removing from the jury’s consideration plaintiff’s second cause of action, the trial court also removed defendant’s affirmative defense of contributory negligence.