stated the following rule in California

9 California opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

Case	Followed	Cited
People v. Domagalskigreen calctapp · 1989 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004(Id. at p. 60.) In so concluding, the court stated the following rule of statutory construction: “ ‘[W]here a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute,. . . such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and . . . the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.” (Id. at pp. 58-59, italics added.) The Supreme Court later clarified the Palermo rule by explaining: “Moreover, where the words of 2004(Id. at p. 60.) In so concluding, the court stated the following rule of statutory construction: “ ‘[W]here a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute,. . . such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and . . . the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.” (Id. at pp. 58-59, italics added.) The Supreme Court later clarified the Palermo rule by explaining: “Moreover, where the words of	1	1
People v. Frawleygreen calctapp · 2000 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 1 sentence 2004(Id. at p. 60.) In so concluding, the court stated the following rule of statutory construction: “ ‘[W]here a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute,. . . such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and . . . the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.” (Id. at pp. 58-59, italics added.) The Supreme Court later clarified the Palermo rule by explaining: “Moreover, where the words of	1	1
People v. Peccigreen calctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004(Id. at p. 60.) In so concluding, the court stated the following rule of statutory construction: “ ‘[W]here a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute,. . . such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and . . . the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.” (Id. at pp. 58-59, italics added.) The Supreme Court later clarified the Palermo rule by explaining: “Moreover, where the words of 2004(Id. at p. 60.) In so concluding, the court stated the following rule of statutory construction: “ ‘[W]here a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute,. . . such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and . . . the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.” (Id. at pp. 58-59, italics added.) The Supreme Court later clarified the Palermo rule by explaining: “Moreover, where the words of	1	1
People v. Jovan B.green cal · 1993 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004(Id. at p. 60.) In so concluding, the court stated the following rule of statutory construction: “ ‘[W]here a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute,. . . such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and . . . the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.” (Id. at pp. 58-59, italics added.) The Supreme Court later clarified the Palermo rule by explaining: “Moreover, where the words of 2004(Id. at p. 60.) In so concluding, the court stated the following rule of statutory construction: “ ‘[W]here a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute,. . . such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and . . . the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.” (Id. at pp. 58-59, italics added.) The Supreme Court later clarified the Palermo rule by explaining: “Moreover, where the words of	1	1
Whitson v. City of Long Beachgreen calctapp · 1962 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002The doctrine, however, cannot be made to cover contracts entirely beyond the range of the municipal authority.” (Ibid.) Unlike the conditional grant in City of Arcata , the subject matter of the oral option contract was within the scope of Orange’s powers. “[A] municipality has the power to settle and compromise claims in its favor or against it where there is a bona fide reasonable doubt or dispute as to the validity thereof or the amount due with respect thereto. [Citations.]” (Whitson v. City of Long Beach (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 486, 505-506 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 668 ], fn. omitted.) Appellant rece 2002The doctrine, however, cannot be made to cover contracts entirely beyond the range of the municipal authority.” (Ibid.) Unlike the conditional grant in City of Arcata , the subject matter of the oral option contract was within the scope of Orange’s powers. “[A] municipality has the power to settle and compromise claims in its favor or against it where there is a bona fide reasonable doubt or dispute as to the validity thereof or the amount due with respect thereto. [Citations.]” (Whitson v. City of Long Beach (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 486, 505-506 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 668 ], fn. omitted.) Appellant rece	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

Case	Cited	Years
Friendly Village Community Ass'n v. Silva & Hill Construction Co. green calctapp · 1973 1 sentence 2017The court stated the following principle, which HART contends applies in this case: “An element of a cause of action for injury to real property is the plaintiff’s ownership, lawful possession, or right to possession, of the property.” (Friendly Village, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 224 .) The project’s declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions required the homeowner association to repair the damaged common areas, but also required the association to assess each condominium owner his proportionate share of the costs.	1	2017–2017
Palacin v. All State Insurance green calctapp · 2004 2 sentences 2011Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 855 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 ] (Palacin), the court stated the following rule: “Applying these rules [of insurance policy construction] at the pleading stage, an insurer moving for a demurrer based on insurance policy language must establish conclusively that this language unambiguously negates beyond reasonable controversy the construction alleged in the body of the complaint. [Citation.] To meet this burden, an insurer is required to demonstrate that the policy language supporting its position is so clear that parol evidence would be inadmissible to refute it. [Citatio 2011Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 855 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 ] (Palacin), the court stated the following rule: “Applying these rules [of insurance policy construction] at the pleading stage, an insurer moving for a demurrer based on insurance policy language must establish conclusively that this language unambiguously negates beyond reasonable controversy the construction alleged in the body of the complaint. [Citation.] To meet this burden, an insurer is required to demonstrate that the policy language supporting its position is so clear that parol evidence would be inadmissible to refute it. [Citatio	1	2011–2011
People v. McFarland green cal · 1962 1 sentence 2007However, neither case supports defendant’s assertion. *948 In McFarland , the court stated the following rule: “Where recently stolen property is found in the conscious possession of a defendant who, upon being questioned by the police, gives a false explanation regarding his possession or remains silent under circumstances indicating a consciousness of guilt, an inference of guilt is permissible and it is for the jury to determine whether or not the inference should be drawn in the light of all the evidence.” (McFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 755 .) However, before stating the foregoing rule	1	2007–2007
Webb v. Jewel Companies, Inc. green illappct · 1985 2 sentences 2000The court stated the following rule: "Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be liable for the negligent, willful, malicious or even criminal acts of its employees when such acts are committed in the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer; however, the employer is not liable to an injured third party where the acts complained of thereby were committed solely for the benefit of the employee. [Citations.]" ( Id. at p. 411, 92 Ill.Dec. 598 , italics omitted.) The Illinois court concluded, "[T]he sexual molestation of a young girl by a security 2000The court stated the following rule: "Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be liable for the negligent, willful, malicious or even criminal acts of its employees when such acts are committed in the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer; however, the employer is not liable to an injured third party where the acts complained of thereby were committed solely for the benefit of the employee. [Citations.]" ( Id. at p. 411, 92 Ill.Dec. 598 , italics omitted.) The Illinois court concluded, "[T]he sexual molestation of a young girl by a security	1	2000–2000
Ponder v. Blue Cross of Southern California green calctapp · 1983 2 sentences 1992(Ponder v. Blue Cross of Southern California, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 719 .) In Ponder, supra, the court stated the following test: “First, the exclusion must be positioned in a place and printed in a form which would attract a reader’s attention. 1992Secondly, the substance of the exclusion must be stated in words that convey the proper meaning to persons expected to read the contract.” (Ponder v. Blue Cross of Southern California, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 719 .) We shall consider the Shepards’ claims that this policy provision was both ambiguous and inconspicuous in connection with each of their particular arguments: the clause is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is illogically located and labeled within the policy, and it is inconsistent with other provisions of Plan P. I At trial, the Shepards took the position	1	1992–1992
Town of Ukiah City v. Ukiah Water & Improvement Co. green cal · 1904 2 sentences 1985Citing Ukiah v. Ukiah Water and Improvement Co., supra, 142 Cal. 173 , the court stated the following rule: “[Wjhere liability is sought to be created it can only arise from a private contract between the company and a consumer, under which an obligation to furnish water for a specific purpose is undertaken by the company.” ( 159 Cal. at p. 313 , italics added.) That being the rule, the Supreme Court distinguished Hunt Bros. 1985Co. v. San Lorenzo Water Co. (1906) 150 Cal. 51 [ 87 P. 1093 ], and Ukiah v. Ukiah Water and Improvement Co., supra, 142 Cal. 173 , on which the plaintiff in Niehaus (and respondents in this case) relied.	1	1985–1985
Hunt Bros. Co. v. San Lorenzo Etc. Co. green cal · 1906 2 sentences 1985Co. v. San Lorenzo Water Co. (1906) 150 Cal. 51 [ 87 P. 1093 ], and Ukiah v. Ukiah Water and Improvement Co., supra, 142 Cal. 173 , on which the plaintiff in Niehaus (and respondents in this case) relied. 1985Co. v. San Lorenzo Water Co. (1906) 150 Cal. 51 [ 87 P. 1093 ], and Ukiah v. Ukiah Water and Improvement Co., supra, 142 Cal. 173 , on which the plaintiff in Niehaus (and respondents in this case) relied.	1	1985–1985
Niehaus Bros. Co. v. Contra Costa Water Co. green cal · 1911 1 sentence 1985Citing Ukiah v. Ukiah Water and Improvement Co., supra, 142 Cal. 173 , the court stated the following rule: “[Wjhere liability is sought to be created it can only arise from a private contract between the company and a consumer, under which an obligation to furnish water for a specific purpose is undertaken by the company.” ( 159 Cal. at p. 313 , italics added.) That being the rule, the Supreme Court distinguished Hunt Bros.	1	1985–1985
Brodsky v. California State Board of Pharmacy green calctapp · 1959 1 sentence 1975These statutes do not contain any qualifying words such as “knowingly” or “intentionally.” In Marley the court stated the following rule: “ ‘. . . [Wjhere qualifying words such as knowingly, intentionally, or fraudulently are omitted from provisions creating the offense it is held that guilty knowledge and intent are not elements of the offense ....’” ( 29 Cal.2d at p. 529 ; Brodsky v. Cal. State Bd. of Pharmacy, supra, 173 Cal.App.2d 680, 688 .) Apropos the legislative intent, it is significant to note that the predecessor of the present subdivision (c) of Business and Professions Code sectio	1	1975–1975
In Re Marley green cal · 1946 1 sentence 1975These statutes do not contain any qualifying words such as “knowingly” or “intentionally.” In Marley the court stated the following rule: “ ‘. . . [Wjhere qualifying words such as knowingly, intentionally, or fraudulently are omitted from provisions creating the offense it is held that guilty knowledge and intent are not elements of the offense ....’” ( 29 Cal.2d at p. 529 ; Brodsky v. Cal. State Bd. of Pharmacy, supra, 173 Cal.App.2d 680, 688 .) Apropos the legislative intent, it is significant to note that the predecessor of the present subdivision (c) of Business and Professions Code sectio	1	1975–1975

Where else courts name it

NE 9 (1956–1995) CA 9 (1975–2017) KS 8 (1983–2011) AL 6 (1986–2015) IN 6 (1966–2011) MI 6 (1936–2019) OR 6 (1952–2020) NC 4 (1984–1995) WA 4 (1967–2006) IL 4 (1976–1991) WI 4 (1979–2012) PA 3 (1975–2006) TX 3 (1950–1980) OK 3 (1931–1976) LA 3 (1975–1986) MD 3 (1988–1998) MO 2 (1985–1995) FL 2 (1974–1999)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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