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9 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
N.J. Land Title Ass'n v. Ronegreen2 sentences2020The Appellate Division reversed and remanded with directions that the Association be granted partial summary judgment on its claim to enjoin the Essex Register from collecting the convenience fee and that the trial court address the Association’s claim for disgorgement. 458 N.J. 2020Super. 120, 122 (App. Div. 2019). 1 The Appellate Division noted that the Legislature has established the fees that a county recording officer can charge “for entering, filing, recording, registering, indexing, copying and certifying copies” of documents that may be recorded, id. at 123 (quoting N.J.S.A. 46:26-1), and that N.J.S.A. 22A:4-4.1 sets forth a specific, enumerated list of fees that can be charged by county clerks and registers, ibid. | 1 | 1 |
Michael Bandler v. Rocco Melillogreen1 sentence2020See Bandler v. Melillo, 443 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Fernandez v. Florida Ins. Guaranty Ass'ngreen1 sentence2004Guaranty Ass'n, 383 So.2d 974, 975 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (finding that the plain language of an immunity provision like New Jersey's unambiguously immunized the association from claim that association's alleged refusal to settle claim within policy limits made it liable for jury award exceeding coverage limits); Veillon v. Louisiana Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Veillon v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'ngreen1 sentence2004Guaranty Ass'n, 608 So. 2d 670, 672 (La.Ct.App.1992) (holding that Louisiana's analog to New Jersey's section 17 immunized state's guaranty's association from liability from "its own independent negligence or breach of fiduciary duty under the policy to settle within the policy limits"); PIE Mut. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rastelligreen1 sentence1993It is not necessary that a RICO defendant have "specific knowledge of every member and component of the enterprise"; rather " it is sufficient that the defendant know the general nature of the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond his individual role. " [ Id. at 577 n. 29 (quoting United States v. Rastelli, 870 F. 2d 822, 827-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982 , 110 S.Ct. 515 , 107 L.Ed. 2d 516 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] See also United States v. Campione, 942 F. 2d 429, 436 (7th Cir.1991) (fact that defendants participated in different predicate *135 | 1 | 1 |
cluster 538369green1 sentence1993It is not necessary that a RICO defendant have "specific knowledge of every member and component of the enterprise"; rather " it is sufficient that the defendant know the general nature of the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond his individual role. " [ Id. at 577 n. 29 (quoting United States v. Rastelli, 870 F. 2d 822, 827-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982 , 110 S.Ct. 515 , 107 L.Ed. 2d 516 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] See also United States v. Campione, 942 F. 2d 429, 436 (7th Cir.1991) (fact that defendants participated in different predicate *135 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Thomas Campione, Marion Collins and John Patricelligreen1 sentence1993It is not necessary that a RICO defendant have "specific knowledge of every member and component of the enterprise"; rather " it is sufficient that the defendant know the general nature of the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond his individual role. " [ Id. at 577 n. 29 (quoting United States v. Rastelli, 870 F. 2d 822, 827-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982 , 110 S.Ct. 515 , 107 L.Ed. 2d 516 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] See also United States v. Campione, 942 F. 2d 429, 436 (7th Cir.1991) (fact that defendants participated in different predicate *135 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Skulskie v. Ceponis
green
1 sentence2018Super. 510 , 514, 962 A.2d 589 (App. Div. 2009), which upheld a waiver scheme in a condominium community, the *485 court holds that the action is barred and grants the Association's motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Jones v. Morey's Pier, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2017We granted the Association’s motion for leave to appeal. 226 N.J. 206 , 141 A.3d 292 (2016). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Comer
neutral
1 sentence2017We granted the Association’s motion for leave to appeal. 226 N.J. 206 , 141 A.3d 292 (2016). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016The panel also distinguished two prior New Jersey cases relied upon by the trial court in finding for the insurers, Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233 , 405 A.2d 788 (1979), and Firemen’s Insurance Co. of Newark v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 387 N.J.Super. 434 , 904 A.2d 754 (App.Div.2006), “because they (1) involved only replacement costs flowing from a business risk, rather than consequential damages caused by defective work; and (2) interpreted different language than the policy language in this appeal,” which was based on the 1986 standard CGL form rather than the 1973 versi 2016The panel also distinguished two prior New Jersey cases relied upon by the trial court in finding for the insurers, Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233 , 405 A.2d 788 (1979), and Firemen’s Insurance Co. of Newark v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 387 N.J.Super. 434 , 904 A.2d 754 (App.Div.2006), “because they (1) involved only replacement costs flowing from a business risk, rather than consequential damages caused by defective work; and (2) interpreted different language than the policy language in this appeal,” which was based on the 1986 standard CGL form rather than the 1973 versi | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2016The panel also distinguished two prior New Jersey cases relied upon by the trial court in finding for the insurers, Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233 , 405 A.2d 788 (1979), and Firemen’s Insurance Co. of Newark v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 387 N.J.Super. 434 , 904 A.2d 754 (App.Div.2006), “because they (1) involved only replacement costs flowing from a business risk, rather than consequential damages caused by defective work; and (2) interpreted different language than the policy language in this appeal,” which was based on the 1986 standard CGL form rather than the 1973 versi 2016The panel also distinguished two prior New Jersey cases relied upon by the trial court in finding for the insurers, Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233 , 405 A.2d 788 (1979), and Firemen’s Insurance Co. of Newark v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 387 N.J.Super. 434 , 904 A.2d 754 (App.Div.2006), “because they (1) involved only replacement costs flowing from a business risk, rather than consequential damages caused by defective work; and (2) interpreted different language than the policy language in this appeal,” which was based on the 1986 standard CGL form rather than the 1973 versi | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Cypress Point Condominium Association, Inc. v. Adria Towers
green
2 sentences2016The panel found that, under the plain language of the CGL policies, the damages alleged in the Association’s claim satisfied the policies’ definitions of “property damage” and “occurrence.” Id. at 375-77 , 118 A.3d 1080 . 2016The panel found that, under the plain language of the CGL policies, the damages alleged in the Association’s claim satisfied the policies’ definitions of “property damage” and “occurrence.” Id. at 375-77 , 118 A.3d 1080 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In re Moses
green
1 sentence2014Ibid. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Six Month Extension of NJAC
green
2 sentences2012In re Six Month Extension, supra, 372 N.J.Super. at 88 , 855 A. 2d 582 ; Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Moffett, 218 N.J.Super. 331 , 337 n. 2, 527 A. 2d 913 (App.Div. 1987); cf. Bergen Pines Hosp. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 N.J. 456, 469-72 , 476 A. 2d 784 (1984) (disallowing a challenge based on the adequacy of the agency record because of the party's failure to participate). [3] In contrast, it appears that Association's challenge to the Department's approval of these carriers' plans is untimely; thus, we decline to consider it. 2012In re Six Month Extension, supra, 372 N.J.Super. at 88 , 855 A. 2d 582 ; Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Moffett, 218 N.J.Super. 331 , 337 n. 2, 527 A. 2d 913 (App.Div. 1987); cf. Bergen Pines Hosp. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 N.J. 456, 469-72 , 476 A. 2d 784 (1984) (disallowing a challenge based on the adequacy of the agency record because of the party's failure to participate). [3] In contrast, it appears that Association's challenge to the Department's approval of these carriers' plans is untimely; thus, we decline to consider it. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Moffett
green
2 sentences2012In re Six Month Extension, supra, 372 N.J.Super. at 88 , 855 A. 2d 582 ; Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Moffett, 218 N.J.Super. 331 , 337 n. 2, 527 A. 2d 913 (App.Div. 1987); cf. Bergen Pines Hosp. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 N.J. 456, 469-72 , 476 A. 2d 784 (1984) (disallowing a challenge based on the adequacy of the agency record because of the party's failure to participate). [3] In contrast, it appears that Association's challenge to the Department's approval of these carriers' plans is untimely; thus, we decline to consider it. 2012In re Six Month Extension, supra, 372 N.J.Super. at 88 , 855 A. 2d 582 ; Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Moffett, 218 N.J.Super. 331 , 337 n. 2, 527 A. 2d 913 (App.Div. 1987); cf. Bergen Pines Hosp. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 N.J. 456, 469-72 , 476 A. 2d 784 (1984) (disallowing a challenge based on the adequacy of the agency record because of the party's failure to participate). [3] In contrast, it appears that Association's challenge to the Department's approval of these carriers' plans is untimely; thus, we decline to consider it. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Bergen Pines County Hospital v. New Jersey Department of Human Services
green
2 sentences2012In re Six Month Extension, supra, 372 N.J.Super. at 88 , 855 A. 2d 582 ; Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Moffett, 218 N.J.Super. 331 , 337 n. 2, 527 A. 2d 913 (App.Div. 1987); cf. Bergen Pines Hosp. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 N.J. 456, 469-72 , 476 A. 2d 784 (1984) (disallowing a challenge based on the adequacy of the agency record because of the party's failure to participate). [3] In contrast, it appears that Association's challenge to the Department's approval of these carriers' plans is untimely; thus, we decline to consider it. 2012In re Six Month Extension, supra, 372 N.J.Super. at 88 , 855 A. 2d 582 ; Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Moffett, 218 N.J.Super. 331 , 337 n. 2, 527 A. 2d 913 (App.Div. 1987); cf. Bergen Pines Hosp. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 N.J. 456, 469-72 , 476 A. 2d 784 (1984) (disallowing a challenge based on the adequacy of the agency record because of the party's failure to participate). [3] In contrast, it appears that Association's challenge to the Department's approval of these carriers' plans is untimely; thus, we decline to consider it. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Barton v. Creasey Co. of Clarksburg
green
1 sentence1993It is not necessary that a RICO defendant have "specific knowledge of every member and component of the enterprise"; rather " it is sufficient that the defendant know the general nature of the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond his individual role. " [ Id. at 577 n. 29 (quoting United States v. Rastelli, 870 F. 2d 822, 827-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982 , 110 S.Ct. 515 , 107 L.Ed. 2d 516 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] See also United States v. Campione, 942 F. 2d 429, 436 (7th Cir.1991) (fact that defendants participated in different predicate *135 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Peterson v. King Tree Center, Inc.
green
1 sentence1993It is not necessary that a RICO defendant have "specific knowledge of every member and component of the enterprise"; rather " it is sufficient that the defendant know the general nature of the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond his individual role. " [ Id. at 577 n. 29 (quoting United States v. Rastelli, 870 F. 2d 822, 827-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982 , 110 S.Ct. 515 , 107 L.Ed. 2d 516 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] See also United States v. Campione, 942 F. 2d 429, 436 (7th Cir.1991) (fact that defendants participated in different predicate *135 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Boylan v. United States
green
1 sentence1993It is not necessary that a RICO defendant have "specific knowledge of every member and component of the enterprise"; rather " it is sufficient that the defendant know the general nature of the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond his individual role. " [ Id. at 577 n. 29 (quoting United States v. Rastelli, 870 F. 2d 822, 827-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982 , 110 S.Ct. 515 , 107 L.Ed. 2d 516 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] See also United States v. Campione, 942 F. 2d 429, 436 (7th Cir.1991) (fact that defendants participated in different predicate *135 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Roca-Suarez v. United States
green
1 sentence1993It is not necessary that a RICO defendant have "specific knowledge of every member and component of the enterprise"; rather " it is sufficient that the defendant know the general nature of the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond his individual role. " [ Id. at 577 n. 29 (quoting United States v. Rastelli, 870 F. 2d 822, 827-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982 , 110 S.Ct. 515 , 107 L.Ed. 2d 516 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] See also United States v. Campione, 942 F. 2d 429, 436 (7th Cir.1991) (fact that defendants participated in different predicate *135 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Agar v. United States
green
1 sentence1993It is not necessary that a RICO defendant have "specific knowledge of every member and component of the enterprise"; rather " it is sufficient that the defendant know the general nature of the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond his individual role. " [ Id. at 577 n. 29 (quoting United States v. Rastelli, 870 F. 2d 822, 827-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982 , 110 S.Ct. 515 , 107 L.Ed. 2d 516 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] See also United States v. Campione, 942 F. 2d 429, 436 (7th Cir.1991) (fact that defendants participated in different predicate *135 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Watts v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1993It is not necessary that a RICO defendant have "specific knowledge of every member and component of the enterprise"; rather " it is sufficient that the defendant know the general nature of the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond his individual role. " [ Id. at 577 n. 29 (quoting United States v. Rastelli, 870 F. 2d 822, 827-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982 , 110 S.Ct. 515 , 107 L.Ed. 2d 516 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] See also United States v. Campione, 942 F. 2d 429, 436 (7th Cir.1991) (fact that defendants participated in different predicate *135 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.