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9 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2023In other words, when the defendant successfully moves for a mistrial, retrial is barred only if the State “intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” Id. at 673, 679 (emphasis added); see also id. at 676 (“Only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.”). 2023In other words, when the defendant successfully moves for a mistrial, retrial is barred only if the State “intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” Id. at 673, 679 (emphasis added); see also id. at 676 (“Only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.”). | 4 | 9 |
State v. Gallegangreen2 sentences2020Stated another way, it is "[o]nly where the governmental conduct in question is intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion." Gallegan, 117 N.J. at 358 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982)). 2017"Only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion." State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 358 (1989) (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 , 102 S. Ct. 2083, 2089 , 72 L. | 2 | 4 |
State v. DeMarcogreen2 sentences1997Thus, our Supreme Court has stated that retrial is not barred when a case is mistried pursuant to a defendant’s motion absent a “showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor,” State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 357 , 567 A.2d 204 (1989), 2 and “[o]nly where the government conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.” [ 117 N.J. at 358 , 567 A.2d 204 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. at 676 , 102 S.Ct at 2089 , 72 1997Thus, our Supreme Court has stated that retrial is not barred when a case is mistried pursuant to a defendant’s motion absent a “showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor,” State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 357 , 567 A.2d 204 (1989), 2 and “[o]nly where the government conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.” [ 117 N.J. at 358 , 567 A.2d 204 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. at 676 , 102 S.Ct at 2089 , 72 | 1 | 2 |
State v. Browngreen1 sentence2023We adopted the Kennedy standard in Gallegan, 117 N.J. at 357-58 (discussing Kennedy and assessing “whether the prosecution intended to subvert [the] defendants’ protection against double jeopardy by prosecutorial misconduct”), and have continued to apply it since, see, e.g., State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 527-28 (2019) (“[T]he bar of double jeopardy is limited to ‘those cases in which the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial .’” (quoting Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679 )). | 1 | 1 |
State v. D'AMATOgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J.Super. 595 , 602 n. 1, 528 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 170 , 540 A.2d 169 (1988); State v. DeMarco, 211 N.J.Super. 421, 423-25 , 511 A.2d 1251 (App.Div.1986). 1997See, e.g., State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J.Super. 595 , 602 n. 1, 528 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 170 , 540 A.2d 169 (1988); State v. DeMarco, 211 N.J.Super. 421, 423-25 , 511 A.2d 1251 (App.Div.1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. D'AMATOgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J.Super. 595 , 602 n. 1, 528 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 170 , 540 A.2d 169 (1988); State v. DeMarco, 211 N.J.Super. 421, 423-25 , 511 A.2d 1251 (App.Div.1986). 1997See, e.g., State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J.Super. 595 , 602 n. 1, 528 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 170 , 540 A.2d 169 (1988); State v. DeMarco, 211 N.J.Super. 421, 423-25 , 511 A.2d 1251 (App.Div.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Gori v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992The former restrictive rule of Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 , 81 S.Ct. 1523, 1526 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 901, 905 (1961) that if a trial judge declared a mistrial sua sponte, the Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar a retrial only where the mistrial had been granted for the sole benefit of the defendant, no longer prevails. 1992The former restrictive rule of Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 , 81 S.Ct. 1523, 1526 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 901, 905 (1961) that if a trial judge declared a mistrial sua sponte, the Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar a retrial only where the mistrial had been granted for the sole benefit of the defendant, no longer prevails. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Andrial
green
2 sentences1997Thus, our Supreme Court has stated that retrial is not barred when a case is mistried pursuant to a defendant’s motion absent a “showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor,” State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 357 , 567 A.2d 204 (1989), 2 and “[o]nly where the government conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.” [ 117 N.J. at 358 , 567 A.2d 204 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. at 676 , 102 S.Ct at 2089 , 72 1997Thus, our Supreme Court has stated that retrial is not barred when a case is mistried pursuant to a defendant’s motion absent a “showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor,” State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 357 , 567 A.2d 204 (1989), 2 and “[o]nly where the government conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.” [ 117 N.J. at 358 , 567 A.2d 204 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. at 676 , 102 S.Ct at 2089 , 72 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Scott
green
2 sentences1997A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” United States v. Scott, [ 437 U.S. 82, 93 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978).] Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, [ 424 U.S. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at 1997A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” United States v. Scott, [ 437 U.S. 82, 93 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978).] Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, [ 424 U.S. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Dinitz
green
2 sentences1997A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” United States v. Scott, [ 437 U.S. 82, 93 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978).] Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, [ 424 U.S. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at 1997A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” United States v. Scott, [ 437 U.S. 82, 93 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978).] Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, [ 424 U.S. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.