now familiar standard in New Jersey

2022Under its landmark ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court required that suspects be advised of the following now familiar warnings before they can be questioned in custody: *that the person “has the right to remain silent”; *“that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law”; *“that he has the right to the presence of an attorney”; and *“that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Id. at 479 .

2021Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 , 468–72.

2020Super. at ___ (slip op. at 21), "personnel records of government employees have historically been treated differently from other sorts of public records." Well before OPRA, Governor Byrne in Executive Order 11 directed that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law . . . an instrumentality of government shall not disclose to anyone other than a person duly authorized by this State or the United States to inspect such information in connection with his official duties, personnel or pension records of an individual," with the now-familiar exception for an employee's name, title, position, salary, l

2013Instead, the Court adopted the now-familiar standard: "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.

2013Instead, the Court adopted the now-familiar standard: "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.

2013Id. at 4 , 526 A.2d 109 ; see Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment, 127 N.J. 152, 154-55 , 603 A.2d 30 (1992) (holding that requirement of enhanced proofs for negative criteria does not apply to variance based on inherently beneficial use).

2013Id. at 4 , 526 A.2d 109 ; see Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment, 127 N.J. 152, 154-55 , 603 A.2d 30 (1992) (holding that requirement of enhanced proofs for negative criteria does not apply to variance based on inherently beneficial use).

1992Also instructive in N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(2) is the use of the words "escaping or escaped person. " The other three subsections refer to either "prisoners" or a "person resisting arrest." The use of the expression "escaping person" then suggests a broader class than just "escaping prisoners" or "persons resisting arrest." Logically, we think that a broader class would include persons escaping arrest who have not yet been arrested or become prisoners, i.e., persons like the pursued driver, in this case, William Logan. [1] *649 As Justice Pollock reminded us in Pico v. State, 116 N.J. 55, 59 , 560

1992Also instructive in N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(2) is the use of the words "escaping or escaped person. " The other three subsections refer to either "prisoners" or a "person resisting arrest." The use of the expression "escaping person" then suggests a broader class than just "escaping prisoners" or "persons resisting arrest." Logically, we think that a broader class would include persons escaping arrest who have not yet been arrested or become prisoners, i.e., persons like the pursued driver, in this case, William Logan. [1] *649 As Justice Pollock reminded us in Pico v. State, 116 N.J. 55, 59 , 560

1979The now familiar rule of Miranda was paraphrased early on by the Supreme Court of New Jersey: The exclusionary rule of Miranda bars from evidence statements of a defendant made during in-custody interrogation unless he has been advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to have counsel present, to be furnished if there is financial inability to hire, and has knowingly and intelligently waived such rights. [ State v. Gosser, 50 N.J. 438, 445-446 (1967), cert. den., 390 U.S. 1035 , 88 S.Ct. 1434 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 295 (1968)].

1964It then held that the state was preempted from regulating the activities in question and that it could grant neither an injunction nor damages; in the course of its opinion the Court formulated the now familiar rule that "when an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." 359 U.S., at p. 245 , 79 S.Ct., at p. 780 , 3 L.Ed. 2 d, at p. 783.

1964It then held that the state was preempted from regulating the activities in question and that it could grant neither an injunction nor damages; in the course of its opinion the Court formulated the now familiar rule that "when an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." 359 U.S., at p. 245 , 79 S.Ct., at p. 780 , 3 L.Ed. 2 d, at p. 783.