now familiar rule in California

2022Miranda established the now familiar rule that any statements of a criminal suspect that stem from a custodial police interrogation are inadmissible against the suspect in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, unless the suspect has been advised of certain rights—including the right to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney—and the suspect has expressly or implicitly waived those rights. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 443 [“Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part

2021There Was No Miranda Violation The Fifth Amendment, which applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment (Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 6 ), provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) Miranda established the now familiar rule that any statements of a criminal suspect that stem from a custodial police interrogation are inadmissible against the suspect in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, unless the suspect has been advised of certain rights—including the right to remain silent and to the p

2026(People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 811 (Orozco).) Miranda was based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which “has consistently been accorded a liberal construction.” ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 8 at p. 461 .) The exercise of that privilege “will be scrupulously honored,” and “the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’ ” (Id. at pp. 460, 479.) “Critically, however, Miranda’s rule has a limit: It only applies when the suspect-defendant was the

2015“The now familiar rule in Miranda relies on the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution to preclude the evidentiary use of statements made pursuant to a custodial interrogation unless the suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived the rights to remain silent and to the presence and assistance of an attorney, the latter provided at state expense for indigent suspects. [Citation.]” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 735 , italics added, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. Uni

2022Miranda established the now familiar rule that any statements of a criminal suspect that stem from a custodial police interrogation are inadmissible against the suspect in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, unless the suspect has been advised of certain rights—including the right to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney—and the suspect has expressly or implicitly waived those rights. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 443 [“Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part

2022Miranda established the now familiar rule that any statements of a criminal suspect that stem from a custodial police interrogation are inadmissible against the suspect in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, unless the suspect has been advised of certain rights—including the right to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney—and the suspect has expressly or implicitly waived those rights. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 443 [“Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part

2022Miranda established the now familiar rule that any statements of a criminal suspect that stem from a custodial police interrogation are inadmissible against the suspect in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, unless the suspect has been advised of certain rights—including the right to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney—and the suspect has expressly or implicitly waived those rights. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 443 [“Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part

2021(Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 204-206 [After a suspect has been charged with a crime, the government’s use of an undercover agent to elicit incriminating statements from the suspect violates the suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.].) 11 incrimination during incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.” (People v. Plyler (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 535, 544 (Plyler).) Perkins limited Miranda’s application by holding that a conversation between an incarcerated suspect and an undercover agent posing as a fellow inmate did not implicate the concer

2022Miranda established the now familiar rule that any statements of a criminal suspect that stem from a custodial police interrogation are inadmissible against the suspect in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, unless the suspect has been advised of certain rights—including the right to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney—and the suspect has expressly or implicitly waived those rights. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 443 [“Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part

2021There Was No Miranda Violation The Fifth Amendment, which applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment (Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 6 ), provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) Miranda established the now familiar rule that any statements of a criminal suspect that stem from a custodial police interrogation are inadmissible against the suspect in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, unless the suspect has been advised of certain rights—including the right to remain silent and to the p

2021(Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 204-206 [After a suspect has been charged with a crime, the government’s use of an undercover agent to elicit incriminating statements from the suspect violates the suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.].) 11 incrimination during incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.” (People v. Plyler (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 535, 544 (Plyler).) Perkins limited Miranda’s application by holding that a conversation between an incarcerated suspect and an undercover agent posing as a fellow inmate did not implicate the concer

2020(People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901 [meaning of constitutional law]; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 385 [application of Miranda].) “Miranda established the now-familiar rule that prosecutors may not admit a suspect’s statements in their case- in-chief against the suspect-defendant unless: (1) the defendant was advised that (a) ‘he has a right to remain silent,’ (b) anything he says ‘may be used as evidence against him,’ (c) ‘he has a right to the presence of an attorney,’ and (d) the defendant will be provided an attorney if he cannot afford one; (2) the defendant waived tho

2020(In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 810-811 .) Miranda’s protections only apply, however, to statements made in the course of “custodial interrogation.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444 .) There is no doubt that minor was in police “custody” when he was being booked, so the critical question is whether the questions put to him by the booking officer constituted “interrogation.” For purposes of Miranda, “interrogation” means (1) “express questioning,” or (2) “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally was able to verify minor’s age and date of birth through ot

2020(In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 810-811 .) Miranda’s protections only apply, however, to statements made in the course of “custodial interrogation.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444 .) There is no doubt that minor was in police “custody” when he was being booked, so the critical question is whether the questions put to him by the booking officer constituted “interrogation.” For purposes of Miranda, “interrogation” means (1) “express questioning,” or (2) “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally was able to verify minor’s age and date of birth through ot

2020(People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901 [meaning of constitutional law]; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 385 [application of Miranda].) “Miranda established the now-familiar rule that prosecutors may not admit a suspect’s statements in their case- in-chief against the suspect-defendant unless: (1) the defendant was advised that (a) ‘he has a right to remain silent,’ (b) anything he says ‘may be used as evidence against him,’ (c) ‘he has a right to the presence of an attorney,’ and (d) the defendant will be provided an attorney if he cannot afford one; (2) the defendant waived tho

2020(People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901 [meaning of constitutional law]; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 385 [application of Miranda].) “Miranda established the now-familiar rule that prosecutors may not admit a suspect’s statements in their case- in-chief against the suspect-defendant unless: (1) the defendant was advised that (a) ‘he has a right to remain silent,’ (b) anything he says ‘may be used as evidence against him,’ (c) ‘he has a right to the presence of an attorney,’ and (d) the defendant will be provided an attorney if he cannot afford one; (2) the defendant waived tho

2015“The now familiar rule in Miranda relies on the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution to preclude the evidentiary use of statements made pursuant to a custodial interrogation unless the suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived the rights to remain silent and to the presence and assistance of an attorney, the latter provided at state expense for indigent suspects. [Citation.]” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 735 , italics added, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. Uni

2015“The now familiar rule in Miranda relies on the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution to preclude the evidentiary use of statements made pursuant to a custodial interrogation unless the suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived the rights to remain silent and to the presence and assistance of an attorney, the latter provided at state expense for indigent suspects. [Citation.]” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 735 , italics added, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. Uni

2015“The now familiar rule in Miranda relies on the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution to preclude the evidentiary use of statements made pursuant to a custodial interrogation unless the suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived the rights to remain silent and to the presence and assistance of an attorney, the latter provided at state expense for indigent suspects. [Citation.]” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 735 , italics added, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. Uni

2015“The now familiar rule in Miranda relies on the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution to preclude the evidentiary use of statements made pursuant to a custodial interrogation unless the suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived the rights to remain silent and to the presence and assistance of an attorney, the latter provided at state expense for indigent suspects. [Citation.]” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 735 , italics added, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. Uni

2015“The now familiar rule in Miranda relies on the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution to preclude the evidentiary use of statements made pursuant to a custodial interrogation unless the suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived the rights to remain silent and to the presence and assistance of an attorney, the latter provided at state expense for indigent suspects. [Citation.]” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 735 , italics added, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. Uni

2015“The now familiar rule in Miranda relies on the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution to preclude the evidentiary use of statements made pursuant to a custodial interrogation unless the suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived the rights to remain silent and to the presence and assistance of an attorney, the latter provided at state expense for indigent suspects. [Citation.]” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 735 , italics added, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. Uni

2012(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.) The court explained: “This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” (Ibid.) Further, also relevant to the issue presented here, the court again explained prejudice is presumed in certain Sixth Amendment contexts, such as those it had identified in Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at page 659, footnote 25, because “[prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. [Citation.] Moreover, such circumstances involv

2012(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.) The court explained: “This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” (Ibid.) Further, also relevant to the issue presented here, the court again explained prejudice is presumed in certain Sixth Amendment contexts, such as those it had identified in Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at page 659, footnote 25, because “[prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. [Citation.] Moreover, such circumstances involv

2005(See People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1021 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 , 52 P.3d 52 ].) “ ‘Interrogation’ consists of express questioning, or words or actions on the part of the police that ‘are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 993, quoting Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 297 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ].) Just as well established, however, is that “[statements volunteered when not in response to an interrogation are admissible against a defendant, even after an initial assertion of the

2005(See People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1021 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 , 52 P.3d 52 ].) “ ‘Interrogation’ consists of express questioning, or words or actions on the part of the police that ‘are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 993, quoting Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 297 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ].) Just as well established, however, is that “[statements volunteered when not in response to an interrogation are admissible against a defendant, even after an initial assertion of the

2005(See People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1021 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 , 52 P.3d 52 ].) “ ‘Interrogation’ consists of express questioning, or words or actions on the part of the police that ‘are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 993, quoting Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 297 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ].) Just as well established, however, is that “[statements volunteered when not in response to an interrogation are admissible against a defendant, even after an initial assertion of the

2005(See People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1021 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 , 52 P.3d 52 ].) “ ‘Interrogation’ consists of express questioning, or words or actions on the part of the police that ‘are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 993, quoting Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 297 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ].) Just as well established, however, is that “[statements volunteered when not in response to an interrogation are admissible against a defendant, even after an initial assertion of the