now familiar standard in Mississippi

2009The United States Supreme Court established the now-familiar standard for determining whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components.

2009The United States Supreme Court established the now-familiar standard for determining whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components.

2005Pharmacy of Jackson, Inc., 320 So.2d 776, 779 (Miss.1975) (citing Akers v. Estate of Johnson, 236 So.2d 437 (Miss.1970)).

2004Pharmacy of Jackson, Inc., 320 So.2d 776, 779 (Miss. 1975) (citing Akers v. Estate of Johnson, 236 So.2d 437 (Miss. 1970)).

1995The now familiar principle applies that a showing of purposeful discrimination must be made before the full Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) analysis is triggered.

1995The now familiar principle applies that a showing of purposeful discrimination must be made before the full Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) analysis is triggered.

1989Leatherwood, 473 So.2d at 968 ; see also, Marks v. State, 532 So.2d 976, 978-80 (Miss. 1988).

1982In Simmons , the Court uses the now familiar clause that no conviction based on pretrial identification will be set aside because of a due process of law violation unless "the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." In Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 , 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969), Foster was convicted in a California state court of armed robbery of a Western Union office.

1982In Simmons , the Court uses the now familiar clause that no conviction based on pretrial identification will be set aside because of a due process of law violation unless "the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." In Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 , 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969), Foster was convicted in a California state court of armed robbery of a Western Union office.

1982It is important to note the Court, in determining whether or not the pretrial confrontation denied an accused due process of law, used the now familiar clause, that it "depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it... ." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), was the first United States Supreme Court case following the Wade trilogy.

1982It is important to note the Court, in determining whether or not the pretrial confrontation denied an accused due process of law, used the now familiar clause, that it "depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it... ." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), was the first United States Supreme Court case following the Wade trilogy.

1982As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. [10] Id. at 199 , 93 S.Ct. at 382 .

1982As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. [10] Id. at 199 , 93 S.Ct. at 382 .