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9 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1984–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schiavone v. Fortunered2 sentences1995As to the third prong of the Brock test, this Court has previously declined to adopt the Second Department’s more stringent standard of "excusable” mistake (see, Virelli v Good-son-Todman Enters., 142 AD2d 479, 482-484 ; see also, Schiavone v Fortune, 477 US 21 ). 1995As to the third prong of the Brock test, this Court has previously declined to adopt the Second Department’s more stringent standard of "excusable” mistake (see, Virelli v Good-son-Todman Enters., 142 AD2d 479, 482-484 ; see also, Schiavone v Fortune, 477 US 21 ). | 4 | 4 |
Virelli v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd.green2 sentences1995As to the third prong of the Brock test, this Court has previously declined to adopt the Second Department’s more stringent standard of "excusable” mistake (see, Virelli v Good-son-Todman Enters., 142 AD2d 479, 482-484 ; see also, Schiavone v Fortune, 477 US 21 ). 1995As to the third prong of the Brock test, this Court has previously declined to adopt the Second Department’s more stringent standard of "excusable” mistake (see, Virelli v Good-son-Todman Enters., 142 AD2d 479, 482-484 ; see also, Schiavone v Fortune, 477 US 21 ). | 2 | 5 |
Brock v. Buagreen2 sentences1995Under the Brock standard it must be shown that: "(1) both claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence * * * (2) the new party is 'united in interest’ with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship he can be charged with such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits * * * and (3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for an excusable mistake by plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against him as well” (Brock v Bua, supra, at 69 1995Under the Brock standard it must be shown that: "(1) both claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence * * * (2) the new party is 'united in interest’ with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship he can be charged with such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits * * * and (3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for an excusable mistake by plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against him as well” (Brock v Bua, supra, at 69 | 2 | 5 |
Mondello v. New York Blood Centergreen2 sentences1995Blood Program, supra, at 226, 230 [where the Court of Appeals explicitly endorsed the Brock test without either overruling this Court’s holding in Virelli or reaching the issue of excusability]). 1995Blood Program, supra, at 226, 230 [where the Court of Appeals explicitly endorsed the Brock test without either overruling this Court’s holding in Virelli or reaching the issue of excusability]). | 1 | 3 |
Town of Guilderland v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc.green2 sentences1995In Virelli v Goodson-Todman Enters, (supra), we merely required that the new defendant have notice of the plaintiff’s claim within the applicable Statute of Limitations period, and that said defendant not be prejudiced by being led into believing, because of the plaintiff’s failure to commence the action, that the plaintiff had opted not to sue (see, Virelli v Goodson-Todman Enters., supra, at 483-484; see also, Town of Guilderland v Texaco Ref. & Mktg., 159 AD2d 829, 832 ; but see, Mondello v New York Blood Ctr.—Greater N. Y. 1995In Virelli v Goodson-Todman Enters, (supra), we merely required that the new defendant have notice of the plaintiff’s claim within the applicable Statute of Limitations period, and that said defendant not be prejudiced by being led into believing, because of the plaintiff’s failure to commence the action, that the plaintiff had opted not to sue (see, Virelli v Goodson-Todman Enters., supra, at 483-484; see also, Town of Guilderland v Texaco Ref. & Mktg., 159 AD2d 829, 832 ; but see, Mondello v New York Blood Ctr.—Greater N. Y. | 1 | 1 |
Neilitz v. Neilitzgreen2 sentences1995Co. v Kevlin, 203 AD2d 681, 682 ), defendants are vicariously liable for each other’s acts (see, Seudath v Mott, 202 AD2d 658, 659 ; see also, Neilitz v Neilitz, 307 NY 882, 884 ) and therefore satisfy the "unity of interest” or second prong of the Brock test (see, Mondello v New York Blood Ctr.—Greater N. Y. 1995Co. v Kevlin, 203 AD2d 681, 682 ), defendants are vicariously liable for each other’s acts (see, Seudath v Mott, 202 AD2d 658, 659 ; see also, Neilitz v Neilitz, 307 NY 882, 884 ) and therefore satisfy the "unity of interest” or second prong of the Brock test (see, Mondello v New York Blood Ctr.—Greater N. Y. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Buran v. Coupal
green
2 sentences1998The Court of Appeals reasoned that the requirement “ ‘shifts the focus away from the primary question of whether the new party had actual notice of the claim’ ” (Buran v Coupal, supra, at 180 , quoting Virelli v Goodson-Todman Enters., 142 AD2d 479, 483 ), noting that the “ ‘linchpin’ ” of the relation back doctrine is “notice to the defendant within the applicable limitations period” (supra, at 180, citing Schiavone v Fortune, 477 US 21, 31). 1998The Court of Appeals reasoned that the requirement “ ‘shifts the focus away from the primary question of whether the new party had actual notice of the claim’ ” (Buran v Coupal, supra, at 180 , quoting Virelli v Goodson-Todman Enters., 142 AD2d 479, 483 ), noting that the “ ‘linchpin’ ” of the relation back doctrine is “notice to the defendant within the applicable limitations period” (supra, at 180, citing Schiavone v Fortune, 477 US 21, 31). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Bruce v. Smith
green
2 sentences1995Adding the word "excusable” to the third prong effectively converts what are already valid considerations under the first and second prongs into an independent factor under the third (see, Bruce v Smith, 581 F Supp 902, 906 , supra; Note, Schiavone v Fortune: A Clarification of the Relation Back Doctrine, 36 Cath U L Rev 499, 511 [1987]). 1995Adding the word "excusable” to the third prong effectively converts what are already valid considerations under the first and second prongs into an independent factor under the third (see, Bruce v Smith, 581 F Supp 902, 906 , supra; Note, Schiavone v Fortune: A Clarification of the Relation Back Doctrine, 36 Cath U L Rev 499, 511 [1987]). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Quine v. Burkhard Bros.
green
2 sentences1995Blood Program, 80 NY2d 219, 226 ; Quine v Burkhard Bros., 167 AD2d 683, 684 ). 3 By reason of the relationship between the parties, Janet Coupal can be charged with such notice of the commencement of the action against her cotenant by the entirety that she has not been prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits in the delayed action against her. 1995Blood Program, 80 NY2d 219, 226 ; Quine v Burkhard Bros., 167 AD2d 683, 684 ). 3 By reason of the relationship between the parties, Janet Coupal can be charged with such notice of the commencement of the action against her cotenant by the entirety that she has not been prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits in the delayed action against her. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Seudath v. Mott
neutral
2 sentences1995Co. v Kevlin, 203 AD2d 681, 682 ), defendants are vicariously liable for each other’s acts (see, Seudath v Mott, 202 AD2d 658, 659 ; see also, Neilitz v Neilitz, 307 NY 882, 884 ) and therefore satisfy the "unity of interest” or second prong of the Brock test (see, Mondello v New York Blood Ctr.—Greater N. Y. 1995Co. v Kevlin, 203 AD2d 681, 682 ), defendants are vicariously liable for each other’s acts (see, Seudath v Mott, 202 AD2d 658, 659 ; see also, Neilitz v Neilitz, 307 NY 882, 884 ) and therefore satisfy the "unity of interest” or second prong of the Brock test (see, Mondello v New York Blood Ctr.—Greater N. Y. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
First American Title Insurance v. Kevlin
green
2 sentences1995Co. v Kevlin, 203 AD2d 681, 682 ), defendants are vicariously liable for each other’s acts (see, Seudath v Mott, 202 AD2d 658, 659 ; see also, Neilitz v Neilitz, 307 NY 882, 884 ) and therefore satisfy the "unity of interest” or second prong of the Brock test (see, Mondello v New York Blood Ctr.—Greater N. Y. 1995Co. v Kevlin, 203 AD2d 681, 682 ), defendants are vicariously liable for each other’s acts (see, Seudath v Mott, 202 AD2d 658, 659 ; see also, Neilitz v Neilitz, 307 NY 882, 884 ) and therefore satisfy the "unity of interest” or second prong of the Brock test (see, Mondello v New York Blood Ctr.—Greater N. Y. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Connell v. Hayden
green
2 sentences1990"The notice required * * * may be informal because it is intended only to satisfy the rationale underlying the Statute of Limitations * * * and not the more stringent notice requirement underlying the acquisition of jurisdiction over a defendant by the service of a summons.” (Brock v Bua, supra, at 69 .) An obviation of the need to satisfy the third prong of the Brock standard will not run afoul of the primary motivation underlying the limitations bar, which, as noted by the court in Connell v Hayden ( 83 AD2d 30 , supra), was designed to relieve defendants of the need to prepare a defense, as 1990"The notice required * * * may be informal because it is intended only to satisfy the rationale underlying the Statute of Limitations * * * and not the more stringent notice requirement underlying the acquisition of jurisdiction over a defendant by the service of a summons.” (Brock v Bua, supra, at 69 .) An obviation of the need to satisfy the third prong of the Brock standard will not run afoul of the primary motivation underlying the limitations bar, which, as noted by the court in Connell v Hayden ( 83 AD2d 30 , supra), was designed to relieve defendants of the need to prepare a defense, as | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Shaw v. . Cock
neutral
2 sentences1990We decline to do so here.” With the obligation to stare decisis clearly in focus, this court in an effort to hármonize the facially conflicting precedents noted above interprets the ruling in Brock (supra) as an expansion of the rule enunciated in Shaw v Cock (supra), so as to permit the maintenance of an action against a defendant belatedly served after expiration of the limitations period, who, though united in interest with a timely served codefendant, was not identified as a party within the action’s caption. 1990We decline to do so here.” With the obligation to stare decisis clearly in focus, this court in an effort to hármonize the facially conflicting precedents noted above interprets the ruling in Brock (supra) as an expansion of the rule enunciated in Shaw v Cock (supra), so as to permit the maintenance of an action against a defendant belatedly served after expiration of the limitations period, who, though united in interest with a timely served codefendant, was not identified as a party within the action’s caption. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Brox v. Riker
green
2 sentences1984Consequently, the notice must be canceled. 7 Moreover, it is simply improper to use a notice of pendency as a form of attachment (see Brox v Riker, 56 App Div 388, 390 , supra). 1984Consequently, the notice must be canceled. 7 Moreover, it is simply improper to use a notice of pendency as a form of attachment (see Brox v Riker, 56 App Div 388, 390 , supra). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Brock v. . Poor
green
2 sentences1984It is well settled that the property interests of a shareholder and the corporation are distinct. “[T]he corporation in respect of corporate property and rights is entirely distinct from the stockholders who are the ultimate or equitable owners of its assets * * * even complete ownership of capital stock does not operate to transfer the title to corporate property and * * * ownership of capital stock is by no means identical with or equivalent to ownership of corporate property.” (Brock v Poor, 216 NY 387, 401 .) To allow plaintiff here to have its notice of pendency would run counter to the B 1984It is well settled that the property interests of a shareholder and the corporation are distinct. “[T]he corporation in respect of corporate property and rights is entirely distinct from the stockholders who are the ultimate or equitable owners of its assets * * * even complete ownership of capital stock does not operate to transfer the title to corporate property and * * * ownership of capital stock is by no means identical with or equivalent to ownership of corporate property.” (Brock v Poor, 216 NY 387, 401 .) To allow plaintiff here to have its notice of pendency would run counter to the B | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.