due process of law clause in New York

1978In United States v Hudson ( 299 US 498, 500 , supra), where the period was 35 days, the court held that "[a]s respects income tax statutes it long has been the practice of Congress to make them retroactive for relatively short periods so as to include profits from transactions consummated while the statute was in process of enactment, or within so much of the calendar year as preceded the enactment; and repeated decisions of this Court have recognized this practice and sustained it as consistent with the due process of law clause of the Constitution.” On the other hand, in striking down so muc

1978Beck v Graves, 280 NY 405, 409 , supra).

1935The Court sustained the tax, but distinctly recognized that the State’s power was subject to constitutional limitations, including the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and also that it would be a violation of that clause for a State to impose a tax on a thing within its jurisdiction 1 in such a way as to really amount to taxing that which is beyond the authority.’ ” (Italics not in original.) In Smith v. Loughman ( 245 N. Y. 486 ) the case of Maxwell v. Bugbee (supra) is referred to with approval in commenting on the idea (in support of which the case is cited) that a tax

1935The Court sustained the tax, but distinctly recognized that the State’s power was subject to constitutional limitations, including the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and also that it would be a violation of that clause for a State to impose a tax on a thing within its jurisdiction 1 in such a way as to really amount to taxing that which is beyond the authority.’ ” (Italics not in original.) In Smith v. Loughman ( 245 N. Y. 486 ) the case of Maxwell v. Bugbee (supra) is referred to with approval in commenting on the idea (in support of which the case is cited) that a tax

1934(Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 ; Sálzman v. Attrean, 142 Misc. 245 .) It is only when such statute fails to make provision for a reasonable time and opportunity for defense that it violates the mentioned provision of the Federal Constitution.

1934(Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 ; Sálzman v. Attrean, 142 Misc. 245 .) It is only when such statute fails to make provision for a reasonable time and opportunity for defense that it violates the mentioned provision of the Federal Constitution.

1931Mrs. Day transferred the property to the trustee; and with the assent of the trustee she had power until her death to change the enjoyment of it. “ The decisive question is therefore whether the statute is constitutional. ‘ The possibility that a federal statute passed under the taxing power may be so arbitrary and capricious as to cause it to fall before the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment must be conceded.’ Sutherland, J., Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497, at 504 , citing cases.

1922In view, therefore, of the fact that the proceedings heretofore had herein are in conformity with the statute governing this court; and in view of the following language in the opinion of the Appellate Division (Rockaway Pacific Corporation v. State of New York, 200 App. Div. 172, 176 ): “ But the claim of the city has been improperly dismissed as to the 5| acres and, therefore, it is in a position to insist that the usual practice shall be followed and that it shall not be subjected to double judgments and perhaps double appeals.

1921(Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146 .) *644 In Matter of Jacobs ( 98 N. Y. 98, 108 ) this court, referring to this.power, said: “ The limit of the power cannot be accurately defined, and the courts have not been able or willing definitely to circumscribe it.

1921However, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189 , held that the' courts of one state may not without violating the due process of law clause of the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, render a money judgment against a corporation organized under the laws of another state, upon service on a resident director where the corporation has not come into the former state for the purpose of doing business therein and has done no business therein, and has no property therein, and no qualified agent therein upon wh

1921In Producers Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission (supra) Mr. Justice Van Devanter, speaking for the court, said: “ It is, of course, true that if the pipe line was constructed" solely to carry oil for particular producers under strictly private contracts and never was devoted by its owner to public use, that is, to carrying for the public, the State could not by mere legislative fiat or by any regulating order of a commission convert it into á public utility or make its owner a common carrier; for that would be taking private property for public use without just compensation, which no St

1921(Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146 .) *644 In Matter of Jacobs ( 98 N. Y. 98, 108 ) this court, referring to this.power, said: “ The limit of the power cannot be accurately defined, and the courts have not been able or willing definitely to circumscribe it.

1921The Court of Appeals of this state, following the rule enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Dollar Company v. Canadian Car & Foundry Co., 220 N. Y. 270 , gave the Code section referred to an interpretation in harmony with the decision of the United States Supreme Court, thus modifying the previous doctrine expressed in the case of Pope v. Terra Haute Car Mfg.

1898The decision in the Van Antwerp case ( 56 N. Y. 261 ) marks the distinction.