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9 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1881–1996 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Linder v. Lindergreen1 sentence1990"When the right [to counsel] is asserted after proceedings have been begun * * * it rests within the discretion of the Trial Judge to determine whether to grant such request” (Matter of Silvestris v Silvestris, 24 AD2d 247, 249 ; see also, Linder v Linder, 122 AD2d 27 ; Matter of Roth v Roth, 45 AD2d 758 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul v. Kelly
green
2 sentences1896In the Sisters of Charity v. Kelly, decided by the Court Of Appeals in 1876, 67 N. Y. 409 , the deceased signed his name in the middle of the clause appointing an executor, and also in the middle of the attestation clause.' The witnesses signed their names immediately following the will, and not at the end of the attestation clause. 1891In Sisters of Charity v. Kelly ( 67 N. Y. 409 ), the signature of the testator appeared in the middle of the clause appointing the executors. | 3 | 1891–1913 |
Matter of Crowley v. O'Keefe
green
1 sentence1996Initially, we note that petitioner failed to preserve this argument by not raising it at the hearing or on administrative review (see, Matter of Crowley v O’Keefe, IAS AD2d 816, appeal dismissed 74 NY2d 780 , lv denied 74 NY2d 613 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Jackson
neutral
1 sentence1992The court ruled a per se violation of law required vacatur of the conviction without a showing of prejudice (People v Jackson, 142 Misc 2d 853 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Palmer v. Merges
neutral
1 sentence1990"When the right [to counsel] is asserted after proceedings have been begun * * * it rests within the discretion of the Trial Judge to determine whether to grant such request” (Matter of Silvestris v Silvestris, 24 AD2d 247, 249 ; see also, Linder v Linder, 122 AD2d 27 ; Matter of Roth v Roth, 45 AD2d 758 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Silvestris v. Silvestris
green
1 sentence1990"When the right [to counsel] is asserted after proceedings have been begun * * * it rests within the discretion of the Trial Judge to determine whether to grant such request” (Matter of Silvestris v Silvestris, 24 AD2d 247, 249 ; see also, Linder v Linder, 122 AD2d 27 ; Matter of Roth v Roth, 45 AD2d 758 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Giraldo v. Giraldo
green
1 sentence1988(Giraldo v Giraldo, 85 AD2d 164 , appeal dismissed 56 NY2d 804 .) * Said the court, "[T]he evidence in this record does not permit us to make an informed judgment as to who should obtain custody. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Mathews v. Lucas
green
2 sentences1981In our view, it is this middle test that must be applied here to determine whether the statutory classification of legitimate children and illegitimate children, for the purpose of imposing eligibility requirements for death benefits, passes constitutional muster (see Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 767 ; Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495, 505-506 ; Matter of Lalli, 43 NY2d 65, 67 , affd sub nom. 1981In our view, it is this middle test that must be applied here to determine whether the statutory classification of legitimate children and illegitimate children, for the purpose of imposing eligibility requirements for death benefits, passes constitutional muster (see Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 767 ; Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495, 505-506 ; Matter of Lalli, 43 NY2d 65, 67 , affd sub nom. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Trimble v. Gordon
green
2 sentences1981In our view, it is this middle test that must be applied here to determine whether the statutory classification of legitimate children and illegitimate children, for the purpose of imposing eligibility requirements for death benefits, passes constitutional muster (see Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 767 ; Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495, 505-506 ; Matter of Lalli, 43 NY2d 65, 67 , affd sub nom. 1981In our view, it is this middle test that must be applied here to determine whether the statutory classification of legitimate children and illegitimate children, for the purpose of imposing eligibility requirements for death benefits, passes constitutional muster (see Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 767 ; Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495, 505-506 ; Matter of Lalli, 43 NY2d 65, 67 , affd sub nom. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Lalli v. Lalli
green
1 sentence1981Lalli v Lalli, 439 US 259 ). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
In re the Estate of Lalli
green
2 sentences1981In our view, it is this middle test that must be applied here to determine whether the statutory classification of legitimate children and illegitimate children, for the purpose of imposing eligibility requirements for death benefits, passes constitutional muster (see Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 767 ; Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495, 505-506 ; Matter of Lalli, 43 NY2d 65, 67 , affd sub nom. 1981In our view, it is this middle test that must be applied here to determine whether the statutory classification of legitimate children and illegitimate children, for the purpose of imposing eligibility requirements for death benefits, passes constitutional muster (see Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 767 ; Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495, 505-506 ; Matter of Lalli, 43 NY2d 65, 67 , affd sub nom. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Whidden
green
1 sentence1981When the statutory classification is deemed suspect, i.e., based on race, alienage or nationality, the “strict scrutiny” test requires that the statute promote a compelling State interest, in contrast with the “rational basis” test, which seeks to determine whether the classification is wholly irrelevant to the State objective; but where the classification rests on certain grounds, such as gender, a middle test has evolved, requiring that the statute serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to those objectives (People v Whidden, 51 NY2d 457, 460 ). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Baskin v. . Baskin
green
1 sentence1881In Baskin v. Baskin ( 36 N. Y., 416 ), Mr. Justice- Parker, after stating tlie four requirements of the statute for the due execution of a last will and testament, says that none of these requisites can be dispensed with, and without a substantial compliance with them all, the will cannot be admitted to probate. | 1 | 1881–1881 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.