threatened violation in New York

2000“Dilution” under this statute has been described “as the loss of the ‘ability to clearly and unmistakenly distinguish one source’ ” (Nabisco, Inc. v PF Brands, 191 F3d 208 , 216 [2d Cir 1999], quoting Hormel Foods Corp. v Jim Henson Prods., 73 F3d 497, 506 [2d Cir 1996]).

1997In a similar vein, the court in Apple Corps v Adirondack Group ( 124 Misc 2d 351, 354 , supra) stated: "Bennett attempted to avoid a head-on conflict by advising U.M.

1976Thus, in 1970, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, said (Dunlap v Dunlap, 34 AD2d 889 ) that with the enactment of the statutory requirement of submission of matrimonial actions to conciliation, the reasons for restricting disclosure "have been substantially diminished” and held that the Special Term order "properly permitted disclosure of all relevant facts and circumstances in connection with plaintiff’s action, but disclosure by defendant on the issue of the adultery alleged in his counterclaim should not be required because he is not competent to testify on that issue.” The subseque

1976The motion in this case, however, is not specifically addressed to a threatened violation of privilege but — in the words of movant’s brief — rests rather on the supposed principle "that absent some showing of extraordinary circumstances shown by the party seeking it, he should not be permitted to force discovery of facts material to the elements of the cause of action for divorce.” In a 1964 case (Nomako v Ashton, 20 AD2d 331, 333 ), the Appellate Division, First Department, said, albeit in dictum, that: "In [matrimonial] cases the possibility of abuse is so great the burden should be placed

1976The motion in this case, however, is not specifically addressed to a threatened violation of privilege but — in the words of movant’s brief — rests rather on the supposed principle "that absent some showing of extraordinary circumstances shown by the party seeking it, he should not be permitted to force discovery of facts material to the elements of the cause of action for divorce.” In a 1964 case (Nomako v Ashton, 20 AD2d 331, 333 ), the Appellate Division, First Department, said, albeit in dictum, that: "In [matrimonial] cases the possibility of abuse is so great the burden should be placed

1976The motion in this case, however, is not specifically addressed to a threatened violation of privilege but — in the words of movant’s brief — rests rather on the supposed principle "that absent some showing of extraordinary circumstances shown by the party seeking it, he should not be permitted to force discovery of facts material to the elements of the cause of action for divorce.” In a 1964 case (Nomako v Ashton, 20 AD2d 331, 333 ), the Appellate Division, First Department, said, albeit in dictum, that: "In [matrimonial] cases the possibility of abuse is so great the burden should be placed

1953Dick Co. ( 224 U. S. 1, 24 ), when it stated: “ A license is not an assignment of any interest in the patent. * * * As a license passes no interest in the monopoly, it has been described as a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.” It is well recognized law that a covenant not to sue is good consideration, even if the threatened claim is invalid.

1943(Wappler v. Woodbury Co., 246 N. Y. 152 .) Petitioner, however, seeks relief under section 964 of the Penal Law (L. 1937, ch. 638), which provides, in part, that an injunction may summarily issue on five days’ notice whenever there shall be “an actual or threatened violation ” of the section which makes a misdemeanor the use of a trade name simulating another “ with intent to deceive or mislead the public.” Proof that any person has been, in fact, deceived is not required by the statute.

1943Whatever may be said for a construction of this drastic statute which would limit its operation, insofar as its injunctive provisions are concerned, to a situation where summary protection of the public against deception is necessary and where the languid processes of an ordinary issue between private litigants will not suffice for that purpose (cf. Matter of Brennan v. Mahoney, 165 Misc. 276 ; Matter of Pignatelli v. Pignatelli, 175 Misc. 139 ; Club Iceland, Ltd. v. Iceland Restaurant Corp., 29 N. Y.

1943Whatever may be said for a construction of this drastic statute which would limit its operation, insofar as its injunctive provisions are concerned, to a situation where summary protection of the public against deception is necessary and where the languid processes of an ordinary issue between private litigants will not suffice for that purpose (cf. Matter of Brennan v. Mahoney, 165 Misc. 276 ; Matter of Pignatelli v. Pignatelli, 175 Misc. 139 ; Club Iceland, Ltd. v. Iceland Restaurant Corp., 29 N. Y.

1930(Vicksburg Water Works Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65 .) Plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded.

1904Co. ( 108 N. Y. 98 ) as follows: “ The threatened violation of a mere naked legal right, unaccompanied by special circumstances, is not a ground for injunction when, as in this case, legal -remedies are adequate to redress any resulting injury.

1891Johns v. McFarlan, 33 Mich. 72 , it was held that a court of equity had no jurisdiction to restrain a threatened violation of a village ordinance unless the act threatened to be done would, if carried out, be a nuisance; and the erection of a wooden building within the limits of a city or village was not in and of itself a nuisance, nor did the fact that it was prohibited by ordinance make it such.