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9 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence2024State v. Straley, 159 Ohio St.3d 82 , 2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 14 . “[A] postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.” State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264 (1977). {¶13} As an initial matter, we must acknowledge that there is an arguable claim that Hill’s post-sentence motions to withdraw his guilty pleas may be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. | 1 | 1 |
Damon's Missouri, Inc. v. Davisgreen2 sentences1999In Damon's Missouri, Inc. v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 605 , the Ohio Supreme Court noted that "[a]n insurance sales agency owes its customer a duty to exercise good faith and reasonable diligence in undertaking to acquire the needed insurance coverage." Id. at 613, n. 2 , citing First Catholic Slovak Union v. Buckeye Union Ins. 1999In Damon's Missouri, Inc. v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 605 , the Ohio Supreme Court noted that "[a]n insurance sales agency owes its customer a duty to exercise good faith and reasonable diligence in undertaking to acquire the needed insurance coverage." Id. at 613, n. 2 , citing First Catholic Slovak Union v. Buckeye Union Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Taylor v. City of London
green
2 sentences2001Applying our holding to the facts of this case, which we accept as true according to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), Taylor v. London (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 137, 139 , 723 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 , we find that Bailey presents an arguable claim for compensation under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). 2001Applying our holding to the facts of this case, which we accept as true according to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), Taylor v. London (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 137, 139 , 723 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 , we find that Bailey presents an arguable claim for compensation under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Engle
green
1 sentence2025A defendant must make a guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and “[f]ailure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 1996-Ohio-179 , ¶ 7. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Straley (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2024State v. Straley, 159 Ohio St.3d 82 , 2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 14 . “[A] postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.” State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264 (1977). {¶13} As an initial matter, we must acknowledge that there is an arguable claim that Hill’s post-sentence motions to withdraw his guilty pleas may be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
cluster 381414
green
2 sentences2016Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 628 F.2d 994 , 999 (7th Cir.1980) (“the presence of even an arguable defense peculiar to the named plaintiff or a small subset of the plaintiff class may destroy the required typicality of the class * * *. 2016Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 628 F.2d 994 , 999 (7th Cir.1980) (“the presence of even an arguable defense peculiar to the named plaintiff or a small subset of the plaintiff class may destroy the required typicality of the class * * *. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Penson v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2014“Only after this separate inquiry, and only after the appellate court finds no nonfrivolous issue for appeal, may the court proceed to consider the appeal on the merits without the assistance of counsel.” Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). {¶10} In his brief, appellate counsel raises one potential area for review which may arguably support the appeal: “[w]hether the trial court committed prejudicial error in sentencing the defendant to eighteen years in the penitentiary.” Counsel ultimately concludes that this arguable error lacks merit and did not cause 2014“Only after this separate inquiry, and only after the appellate court finds no nonfrivolous issue for appeal, may the court proceed to consider the appeal on the merits without the assistance of counsel.” Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). {¶10} In his brief, appellate counsel raises one potential area for review which may arguably support the appeal: “[w]hether the trial court committed prejudicial error in sentencing the defendant to eighteen years in the penitentiary.” Counsel ultimately concludes that this arguable error lacks merit and did not cause | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Kalish
red
2 sentences2014“Only after this separate inquiry, and only after the appellate court finds no nonfrivolous issue for appeal, may the court proceed to consider the appeal on the merits without the assistance of counsel.” Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). {¶10} In his brief, appellate counsel raises one potential area for review which may arguably support the appeal: “[w]hether the trial court committed prejudicial error in sentencing the defendant to eighteen years in the penitentiary.” Counsel ultimately concludes that this arguable error lacks merit and did not cause 2014“Only after this separate inquiry, and only after the appellate court finds no nonfrivolous issue for appeal, may the court proceed to consider the appeal on the merits without the assistance of counsel.” Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). {¶10} In his brief, appellate counsel raises one potential area for review which may arguably support the appeal: “[w]hether the trial court committed prejudicial error in sentencing the defendant to eighteen years in the penitentiary.” Counsel ultimately concludes that this arguable error lacks merit and did not cause | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Cornelison
neutral
1 sentence2014Lake No. 2013-L-064, 2014-Ohio-2884, ¶ 6 , citing Kalish at ¶ 26. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Brady, 2005-A-0085 (4-16-2007)
neutral
1 sentence2008Such filing is improper and this court will not examine it." {¶ 25} Bronaka renewed his motion to dismiss based on this court's decision in State v. Brady , 2007-Ohio-1779 , issued after Bronaka had entered his guilty plea. {¶ 26} The circumstances alleged by Bronaka fail to raise an arguable claim that his plea was less than voluntary. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Duncan
green
1 sentence2008Id. at 744 . {¶ 8} In her brief, counsel asserts the following arguable error: {¶ 9} "The trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion to withdraw plea." {¶ 10} Appellate counsel provided the requisite notice to appellant. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.