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9 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2025“Accordingly, ‘the fundamental or primary inquiry at the dispositional phase of . . . juvenile proceedings is not whether the parents of a previously adjudicated “dependent” child are either fit or unfit,’ rather, it is ‘the best interests and welfare of the child [that] are of paramount importance.’” Id., quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979) (emphasis in original); In re D.A., 2007-Ohio-1105 , ¶ 11 (“[o]nce the case reaches the disposition phase, the best interest of the child controls”). {¶11} “No specific test or set of criteria has been delineated to guide the juvenile c 2025“However, when a child is adjudicated a dependent child, the juvenile court may, as its dispositional order, place the child under the protective supervision or temporary custody of a children services agency, or award legal custody of the child to a third party.” In re P.V.A. at ¶ 14; R.C. 2151.353(A)(1), (2), and (3). {¶45} Accordingly, “‘the fundamental or primary inquiry at the dispositional phase of . . . juvenile proceedings is not whether the parents of a previously adjudicated ‘dependent’ child are either fit or unfit,’ rather, it is ‘the best interests and welfare of the child [that] | 6 | 8 |
Perales v. Ninogreen2 sentences2017Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d at 455 ; In re Willmann (1986), 24 Ohio App.3d 191 , paragraph one of the syllabus; cf. In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 98 (‘parents may be denied custody only if a preponderance of the evidence indicates (* * *) that an award of custody would be detrimental to the child’).” In re J.F., supra, at ¶39-40. {¶23} In this case, Mother points out that during the pendency of the matters involving L.M.L. and D.A.G., she gave birth to another child, N.L.W. 2017Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d at 455 ; In re Willmann (1986), 24 Ohio App.3d 191 , paragraph one of the syllabus; cf. In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 98 (“parents may be denied custody only if a preponderance of the evidence indicates * * * that an award of custody would be detrimental to the child”). | 3 | 3 |
In Re Pryorgreen1 sentence2025“As a result, the juvenile court ‘“should consider the totality of the circumstances, including, to the extent they are applicable, the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F).”’” Id., quoting Memic at ¶ 26 , quoting In re Pryor, 86 Ohio App.3d 327, 336 (4th Dist. 1993). {¶12} Mother asserts that the juvenile court did not properly apply the best-interest factors in R.C. 3109.04 because it did not mention them in its dispositional entry. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re D.A.
green
2 sentences2020Portage No. 2016-P-0069, 2017-Ohio-7451, at ¶ 21 , quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 , 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979) (“Accordingly, ‘the fundamental or primary inquiry at the dispositional phase of (* * *) juvenile proceedings is not whether the parents of a previously adjudicated “dependent” child are either fit or unfit,’ rather, it is ‘the best interests and welfare of the child (that) are of paramount importance.’ ”); In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88 , 2007-Ohio- 1105, 862 N.E.2d 829 , ¶ 11 (“Once the case reaches the disposition phase, the best interest of the child controls.”). 2017Accordingly, ‘the fundamental or primary inquiry at the dispositional phase of (* * *) juvenile proceedings is not whether the parents of a previously adjudicated “dependent” child are either fit or unfit,’ rather, it is ‘the best interests and welfare of the child (that) are of paramount importance.’ In re Cunningham (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (emphasis sic); In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88 , 2007-Ohio-1105 , at ¶11 (‘(o)nce the case reaches the disposition phase, the best interest of the child controls’). 7 {¶22} “Moreover, the applicable standard for granting legal custody at the disposit | 3 | 2017–2020 |
In Re Willmann
green
2 sentences2017Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d at 455 ; In re Willmann (1986), 24 Ohio App.3d 191 , paragraph one of the syllabus; cf. In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 98 (‘parents may be denied custody only if a preponderance of the evidence indicates (* * *) that an award of custody would be detrimental to the child’).” In re J.F., supra, at ¶39-40. {¶23} In this case, Mother points out that during the pendency of the matters involving L.M.L. and D.A.G., she gave birth to another child, N.L.W. 2017Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d at 455 ; In re Willmann (1986), 24 Ohio App.3d 191 , paragraph one of the syllabus; cf. In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 98 (“parents may be denied custody only if a preponderance of the evidence indicates * * * that an award of custody would be detrimental to the child”). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
In the Matter of Nice
green
2 sentences2017Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d at 455 ; In re Willmann (1986), 24 Ohio App.3d 191 , paragraph one of the syllabus; cf. In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 98 (‘parents may be denied custody only if a preponderance of the evidence indicates (* * *) that an award of custody would be detrimental to the child’).” In re J.F., supra, at ¶39-40. {¶23} In this case, Mother points out that during the pendency of the matters involving L.M.L. and D.A.G., she gave birth to another child, N.L.W. 2017Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d at 455 ; In re Willmann (1986), 24 Ohio App.3d 191 , paragraph one of the syllabus; cf. In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 98 (“parents may be denied custody only if a preponderance of the evidence indicates * * * that an award of custody would be detrimental to the child”). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
In re L.M.L.
neutral
1 sentence2020Portage No. 2016-P-0069, 2017-Ohio-7451, at ¶ 21 , quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 , 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979) (“Accordingly, ‘the fundamental or primary inquiry at the dispositional phase of (* * *) juvenile proceedings is not whether the parents of a previously adjudicated “dependent” child are either fit or unfit,’ rather, it is ‘the best interests and welfare of the child (that) are of paramount importance.’ ”); In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88 , 2007-Ohio- 1105, 862 N.E.2d 829 , ¶ 11 (“Once the case reaches the disposition phase, the best interest of the child controls.”). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Matter of Stillman
green
2 sentences2006These are of "paramount importance." In re Cunningham (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 100 , 106 (emphasis sic); also In re Stillman (11th Dist.), 155 Ohio App.3d 333 , 2003-Ohio-6228 , at ¶ 52 ; Winfield v. Winfield , 11th Dist. 2006These are of "paramount importance." In re Cunningham (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 100 , 106 (emphasis sic); also In re Stillman (11th Dist.), 155 Ohio App.3d 333 , 2003-Ohio-6228 , at ¶ 52 ; Winfield v. Winfield , 11th Dist. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In re Baby Girl S.
green
1 sentence1979See, e. g., Gishwiler v. Dodez (1855), 4 Ohio St. 615 ; Clark v. Bayer (1877), 32 Ohio St. 299 ; Children’s Home of Marion County v. Fetter (1914), 90 Ohio St. 110 , 127; In re Tilton (1954), 161 Ohio St. 571 ; In re Christopher (1977), 54 Ohio App. 2d 137 ; In re Baby Girl S. (1972), 32 Ohio Misc. 217 ; In re Turner (1967), 12 Ohio Misc. 171 . 6 Thus the fundamental or primary inquiry at the dis-positional phase of these juvenile proceedings is not whether the parents of a previously adjudicated “dependent” child are either fit or unfit. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
In Re Christopher
green
1 sentence1979See, e. g., Gishwiler v. Dodez (1855), 4 Ohio St. 615 ; Clark v. Bayer (1877), 32 Ohio St. 299 ; Children’s Home of Marion County v. Fetter (1914), 90 Ohio St. 110 , 127; In re Tilton (1954), 161 Ohio St. 571 ; In re Christopher (1977), 54 Ohio App. 2d 137 ; In re Baby Girl S. (1972), 32 Ohio Misc. 217 ; In re Turner (1967), 12 Ohio Misc. 171 . 6 Thus the fundamental or primary inquiry at the dis-positional phase of these juvenile proceedings is not whether the parents of a previously adjudicated “dependent” child are either fit or unfit. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.