municipality of its home rule in Ohio

2024In City of Canton, the Court reiterated its prior understanding that “ ‘the meaning of [the third prong] is that a statute which prohibits the exercise by a municipality of its home rule powers without such statute serving an 19 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS overriding statewide interest would directly contravene the constitutional grant of municipal power.’ ” City of Canton, 95 Ohio St.3d 149 , 2002-Ohio-2005 , 766 N.E.2d 963 , at ¶ 32, quoting Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 2 Ohio St.3d 44, 48 , 442 N.E.2d 1278 (1982).

2024In City of Canton, the Court reiterated its prior understanding that “ ‘the meaning of [the third prong] is that a statute which prohibits the exercise by a municipality of its home rule powers without such statute serving an 19 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS overriding statewide interest would directly contravene the constitutional grant of municipal power.’ ” City of Canton, 95 Ohio St.3d 149 , 2002-Ohio-2005 , 766 N.E.2d 963 , at ¶ 32, quoting Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 2 Ohio St.3d 44, 48 , 442 N.E.2d 1278 (1982).

2024In City of Canton, the Court reiterated its prior understanding that “ ‘the meaning of [the third prong] is that a statute which prohibits the exercise by a municipality of its home rule powers without such statute serving an 19 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS overriding statewide interest would directly contravene the constitutional grant of municipal power.’ ” City of Canton, 95 Ohio St.3d 149 , 2002-Ohio-2005 , 766 N.E.2d 963 , at ¶ 32, quoting Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 2 Ohio St.3d 44, 48 , 442 N.E.2d 1278 (1982).

2016The state also urges that the trial court erred in examining the 11. constitutionality of S.B. 342 under a rational basis framework, which it argues is inapplicable in a home rule analysis. {¶ 22} The city responds by asserting that the relevant provisions of S.B. 342 are unconstitutional because they “serve only to limit municipal legislative power.” It describes S.B. 342 as a de facto ban on the use of cameras. {¶ 23} In expounding on the third element of the “general law” analysis, the court in Canton explained that this “‘principle of law is that a statute which prohibits the exercise by a

2024In City of Canton, the Court reiterated its prior understanding that “ ‘the meaning of [the third prong] is that a statute which prohibits the exercise by a municipality of its home rule powers without such statute serving an 19 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS overriding statewide interest would directly contravene the constitutional grant of municipal power.’ ” City of Canton, 95 Ohio St.3d 149 , 2002-Ohio-2005 , 766 N.E.2d 963 , at ¶ 32, quoting Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 2 Ohio St.3d 44, 48 , 442 N.E.2d 1278 (1982).

2016The state also urges that the trial court erred in examining the 11. constitutionality of S.B. 342 under a rational basis framework, which it argues is inapplicable in a home rule analysis. {¶ 22} The city responds by asserting that the relevant provisions of S.B. 342 are unconstitutional because they “serve only to limit municipal legislative power.” It describes S.B. 342 as a de facto ban on the use of cameras. {¶ 23} In expounding on the third element of the “general law” analysis, the court in Canton explained that this “‘principle of law is that a statute which prohibits the exercise by a

2007R.C. 9.481 provides: “Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2) of this section, no political subdivision shall require any of its employees, as a condition of employment, to reside in any specific area of the state.” Thus, on its face, R.C. 9.481 clearly purports “to limit the legislative powers of a municipal corporation to adopt or enforce police, sanitary or other similar regulations.” Id. {¶ 73} However, in Canton the court determined that paragraph three of Robinson, supra, really meant “that a statute which prohibits the exercise by a municipality of its home rule powers without s

2002Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St.2d 113 , 30 O.O.2d 474 , 205 N.E.2d 382 , we held that “[t]he words ‘general laws’ as set forth in Section 3 of Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution means [sic] statutes setting forth police, sanitary or similar regulations and not statutes which purport only to grant or to limit the legislative powers of a municipal corporation to adopt or enforce police, sanitary or other similar regulations.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 32} We later clarified that “[t]he meaning of this syllabus principle of law is that a statute which prohibits the exercise

2021In Dayton v. State, 151 Ohio St.3d 168 , 2017-Ohio-6909 , 87 N.E.3d 176 , the Ohio Supreme Court stated: In Canton, the court considered whether R.C. 3781.184, which -19- related to the zoning of property for manufactured homes, violated the Home Rule Amendment.