four Barker factors in New Mexico

2026Length of delay 4 {14} The initial Barker factor, the length of delay, serves “a dual function: it acts 5 as a triggering mechanism for considering the four Barker factors if the delay crosses 6 the threshold of being ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ and it is an independent factor to 7 consider in evaluating whether a speedy trial violation has occurred.” Serros, 2016- 8 NMSC-008, ¶ 22 (quoting Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 21, 23 ).

2023See State v. Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 4 , 406 P.3d 505 (listing the four Barker factors: “the length of delay, the reason for delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice to the defendant”); State v. Garza, 2009- NMSC-038, ¶¶ 25-27, 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (differentiating three reasons for delay: the government’s “intentional delay,” its “negligent or administrative delay,” and its delay for “a valid reason”).

2024“The first factor, the length of delay, has a dual function: it acts as a triggering mechanism for considering the four Barker factors if the delay crosses the threshold of being presumptively prejudicial, and it is an independent factor to consider in evaluating whether a speedy trial violation has occurred.” Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023“The first factor, the length of delay, has a dual function: it acts as a triggering mechanism for considering the four Barker factors if the delay crosses the threshold of being presumptively prejudicial, and it is an independent factor to consider in evaluating whether a speedy trial violation has occurred.” Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023Garza, 2009-NMSC- 038, ¶ 13 (listing the factors in Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ). {11} The first Barker factor, length of delay, is an objective factor that serves two functions: (1) first, the length of delay “acts as a triggering mechanism for considering the four Barker factors if the delay crosses the threshold of being ‘presumptively prejudicial’”; and (2) second, the length of delay “is an independent factor to consider in evaluating whether a speedy trial violation has occurred.” State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC- 008, ¶ 22, 366 P.3d 1121 .

2014Here, although Defendant 9 filed a demand for speedy trial shortly after the case was refiled in district court and 10 another one seven months later, there is no indication that he ever filed a motion, that 11 the district court ever ruled on any motion, or that the court ever had any occasion to 12 apply the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 13 See State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (describing 14 the analytical framework for addressing a speedy trial violation, which requires 15 weighing the four Barker factors).

2014A. Length of Delay “Considering the length of delay as one of the four Barker factors, the greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the State.” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 24 ; see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992) (noting that, once a defendant establishes that delay was presumptively prejudicial, “the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim”).

2014We therefore proceed to analyze and weigh the four Barker factors. 3 A. Length of Delay {8} “Considering the length of delay as one of the four Barker factors, the greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the State.” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 24 ; see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992) (noting that, once a defendant establishes that delay was presumptively prejudicial, “the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim”). {9

2014Although this delay is not so extraordinary as to weigh heavily in Defendant’s favor, it nonetheless weighs in his favor; see also id. ¶ 24 (“Considering the length of delay as one of the four Barker factors, the greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [s]tate.”); compare State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 676 , 147 P.3d 885 (concluding that the three and one-half years delay was “particularly egregious” and weighing the factor heavily in the [defendant's favor), with Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 24 (concluding that a delay of one month beyond the thresh

2014Although this delay is not so extraordinary as to weigh heavily in Defendant’s favor, it nonetheless weighs in his favor; see also id. ¶ 24 (“Considering the length of delay as one of the four Barker factors, the greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [s]tate.”); compare State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 676 , 147 P.3d 885 (concluding that the three and one-half years delay was “particularly egregious” and weighing the factor heavily in the [defendant's favor), with Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 24 (concluding that a delay of one month beyond the thresh

2017First, it “acts as a triggering 8 mechanism requiring further inquiry into the Barker factors once the delay has 9 reached a specified amount of time, depending on the difficulty of the case.” 10 Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 Second, it is “one of the four Barker factors to be weighed and balanced in the final 12 speedy trial inquiry.” Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 20 .

2017First, it “acts as a triggering 8 mechanism requiring further inquiry into the Barker factors once the delay has 9 reached a specified amount of time, depending on the difficulty of the case.” 10 Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 Second, it is “one of the four Barker factors to be weighed and balanced in the final 12 speedy trial inquiry.” Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 20 .

2010See 13 Garza, 2009-NMSC-038 , ¶¶ 21-23. 14 The right to a speedy trial attaches when a defendant becomes the “accused” 15 through “indictment, or the actual restraints of arrest and holding for charges.” 16 Salandre v. State, 111 N.M. 422, 426 , 806 P.2d 562, 566 (1991) (emphasis omitted). 17 “[A] determination of whether delay is presumptively prejudicial requires 18 consideration of (at least) the length of time between arrest or indictment and 19 prosecution, the complexity of the charges, and the nature of the evidence against the 6 1 accused.” Id.

2010See 13 Garza, 2009-NMSC-038 , ¶¶ 21-23. 14 The right to a speedy trial attaches when a defendant becomes the “accused” 15 through “indictment, or the actual restraints of arrest and holding for charges.” 16 Salandre v. State, 111 N.M. 422, 426 , 806 P.2d 562, 566 (1991) (emphasis omitted). 17 “[A] determination of whether delay is presumptively prejudicial requires 18 consideration of (at least) the length of time between arrest or indictment and 19 prosecution, the complexity of the charges, and the nature of the evidence against the 6 1 accused.” Id.

2014Although this delay is not so extraordinary as to weigh heavily in Defendant’s favor, it nonetheless weighs in his favor; see also id. ¶ 24 (“Considering the length of delay as one of the four Barker factors, the greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [s]tate.”); compare State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 676 , 147 P.3d 885 (concluding that the three and one-half years delay was “particularly egregious” and weighing the factor heavily in the [defendant's favor), with Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 24 (concluding that a delay of one month beyond the thresh

2014Although this delay is not so extraordinary as to weigh heavily in Defendant’s favor, it nonetheless weighs in his favor; see also id. ¶ 24 (“Considering the length of delay as one of the four Barker factors, the greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [s]tate.”); compare State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 676 , 147 P.3d 885 (concluding that the three and one-half years delay was “particularly egregious” and weighing the factor heavily in the [d]efendant’s favor), with Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 24 (concluding that a delay of one month beyond the thres

2008The four Barker factors have no talismanic qualities. “[N]o one factor constitutes either a necessary or sufficient condition to finding a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.” Zurla, 109 N.M. at 642 , 789 P.2d at 590 ; accord Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 .

2008The four Barker factors have no talismanic qualities. “[N]o one factor constitutes either a necessary or sufficient condition to finding a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.” Zurla, 109 N.M. at 642 , 789 P.2d at 590 ; accord Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 .

2014Although this delay is not so extraordinary as to weigh heavily in Defendant’s favor, it nonetheless weighs in his favor; see also id. ¶ 24 (“Considering the length of delay as one of the four Barker factors, the greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [s]tate.”); compare State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 676 , 147 P.3d 885 (concluding that the three and one-half years delay was “particularly egregious” and weighing the factor heavily in the [defendant's favor), with Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 24 (concluding that a delay of one month beyond the thresh

2014Although this delay is not so extraordinary as to weigh heavily in Defendant’s favor, it nonetheless weighs in his favor; see also id. ¶ 24 (“Considering the length of delay as one of the four Barker factors, the greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [s]tate.”); compare State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 676 , 147 P.3d 885 (concluding that the three and one-half years delay was “particularly egregious” and weighing the factor heavily in the [d]efendant’s favor), with Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 24 (concluding that a delay of one month beyond the thres

2007Thus, while the State is correct that we did not weigh the two-month period in Richard Lujan against either party, that aspect of our holding was made in the broader context of our analysis of the four Barker factors; it cannot be viewed as setting forth a general rule that, when the State is unaware of a defendant’s whereabouts, it may shirk its “constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring Defendant to trial.” Marquez, 2001-NMCA-062, ¶15 , 130 N.M. 651 , 29 P.3d 1052 . {17} Second, our holding in Tarango was informed by the fact that the defendant in that case had escap

2007Thus, while the State is correct that we did not weigh the two-month period in Richard Lujan against either party, that aspect of our holding was made in the broader context of our analysis of the four Barker factors; it cannot be viewed as setting forth a general rule that, when the State is unaware of a defendant’s whereabouts, it may shirk its “constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring Defendant to trial.” Marquez, 2001-NMCA-062, ¶15 , 130 N.M. 651 , 29 P.3d 1052 . {17} Second, our holding in Tarango was informed by the fact that the defendant in that case had escap

2007Reasons for the Delay {14} When examining the reasons for the delay, we “alloeatfe] the reasons ... to each side and determine] the weight attributable to each reason.” State v. Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶45 , 133 N.M. 495 , 64 P.3d 522 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]e must bear in mind that (1) the four Barker factors are interrelated and must be evaluated in light of the particular circumstances of the case and (2) we should compare the conduct of the State and Defendant.” Marquez, 2001-NMCA-062, ¶13 , 130 N.M. 651 , 29 P.3d 1052 .

2007Reasons for the Delay {14} When examining the reasons for the delay, we “alloeatfe] the reasons ... to each side and determine] the weight attributable to each reason.” State v. Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶45 , 133 N.M. 495 , 64 P.3d 522 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]e must bear in mind that (1) the four Barker factors are interrelated and must be evaluated in light of the particular circumstances of the case and (2) we should compare the conduct of the State and Defendant.” Marquez, 2001-NMCA-062, ¶13 , 130 N.M. 651 , 29 P.3d 1052 .

2020“In analyzing these factors, we defer to the district court’s factual findings concerning each factor as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, we independently review the record to determine whether a defendant was denied his speedy trial right, and we weigh and balance the Barker factors de novo.” State v. Montoya, 2015-NMCA-056, ¶ 12 , 348 P.3d 1057 . {22} “The first factor, the length of delay, has a dual function: it acts as a triggering mechanism for considering the four Barker factors if the delay crosses the threshold of being presumptively prejudicial, and it is an indepe

2018See State v. Montoya, 2015-NMCA-056, ¶ 33 , 348 P.3d 1057 (holding 9 that where the length of the delay and reasons for the delay weigh moderately to 10 heavily in the defendant’s favor, and the defendant’s assertion of the right and 11 prejudice weigh slightly to moderately in the defendant’s favor, and none of the 12 factors weigh in the state’s favor, the defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated). 13 CONCLUSION 14 {44} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 15 {45} IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 __________________________________ 17 LINDA M.

2023See State v. Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 4 , 406 P.3d 505 (listing the four Barker factors: “the length of delay, the reason for delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice to the defendant”); State v. Garza, 2009- NMSC-038, ¶¶ 25-27, 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (differentiating three reasons for delay: the government’s “intentional delay,” its “negligent or administrative delay,” and its delay for “a valid reason”).

2009See State v. Manes, 112 N.M. 161, 169 , 812 P.2d 1309, 1317 (Ct. App. 11 1991) (upholding the trial court’s determination that no speedy trial violation 12 occurred, even when the first three factors all weighed slightly in the defendant’s 13 favor, as a consequence of the defendant’s failure to make a compelling showing 14 under the fourth factor). 15 In response, Defendant contends that this Court errs by acknowledging that the 16 delay in this case is presumptively prejudicial, yet concluding that Defendant’s right 17 to a speedy trial has not been violated. [MIO 12] Defendant asserts that

2009See State v. Manes, 112 N.M. 161, 169 , 812 P.2d 1309, 1317 (Ct. App. 11 1991) (upholding the trial court’s determination that no speedy trial violation 12 occurred, even when the first three factors all weighed slightly in the defendant’s 13 favor, as a consequence of the defendant’s failure to make a compelling showing 14 under the fourth factor). 15 In response, Defendant contends that this Court errs by acknowledging that the 16 delay in this case is presumptively prejudicial, yet concluding that Defendant’s right 17 to a speedy trial has not been violated. [MIO 12] Defendant asserts that

1999See Work v. State, 111 N.M. 145, 147 , 803 P.2d 234, 236 (1990). {32} We now turn our analysis to the four Barker factors.

1999See Work v. State, 111 N.M. 145, 147 , 803 P.2d 234, 236 (1990). {32} We now turn our analysis to the four Barker factors.