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9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2020See Jones, supra. The only federal statute at issue for purposes of this double jeopardy analysis involves the making of false or fictitious oral or written statements or furnishing or exhibiting any false, fictitious, or misrepresented identification to a federal firearms licensee to acquire a firearm, where the aiding and abetting charge was dropped as part of the plea agreement and jeopardy did not attach to that offense. 2020See Jones, supra. The only federal statute at issue for purposes of this double jeopardy analysis involves the making of false or fictitious oral or written statements or furnishing or exhibiting any false, fictitious, or misrepresented identification to a federal firearms licensee to acquire a firearm, where the aiding and abetting charge was dropped as part of the plea agreement and jeopardy did not attach to that offense. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Barndtgreen1 sentence2025See Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185 , 190 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2013)(explaining that, if the claim is cognizable under the PCRA, a post-conviction motion or petition may be treated as a PCRA petition regardless of the title of the document filed). -3- J-S08021-25 on appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. McDonaldgreen1 sentence2010Further, we find that the Commonwealth has met that burden. ¶ 12 As Judge Tucker recognized, Rule 581(D) requires that a motion seeking suppression “state specifically and with particularity the evidence sought to be suppressed, the grounds for suppression, and the facts and events in support thereof.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(D); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 881 A.2d 858, 860 (Pa.Super.2005) (emphasis added). ¶ 13 We agree with Judge Tucker that Dixon’s motion did not comply with the requirements of Rule 581(D). 10 Initially, it did not state “specifically and with particularity” the evidence sought to | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Pander
green
1 sentence2025The trial court sufficiently colloquied Dixon as to his decision not to call any witnesses on his behalf at trial; thus, based on our decisions in Pander and Paddy his claim that trial counsel was ineffective failing to call Smith and Watkins as alibi witnesses lacks arguable merit. 2 See Pander, 100 A.3d at 642 . ____________________________________________ 2 We further note that Smith’s and Watkins’ affidavits do not support Dixon’s claim that their testimony would have changed the outcome at trial. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2019Limiting our analysis to the facts known to Officer Cantanzaro prior to directing Officer Granger to initiate an investigative detention of Dixon, we agree with the suppression court's determination that the evidence was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. -9 J -A14021-19 See Hicks, supra; Martinez, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the suppression court's order granting Dixon's motion to suppress the evidence. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Hicks, M., Aplt.
green
1 sentence2019Limiting our analysis to the facts known to Officer Cantanzaro prior to directing Officer Granger to initiate an investigative detention of Dixon, we agree with the suppression court's determination that the evidence was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. -9 J -A14021-19 See Hicks, supra; Martinez, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the suppression court's order granting Dixon's motion to suppress the evidence. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Dixon
green
1 sentence2018Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(D); cf. Com. v. Dixon, 997 A.2d 368 , 374–75 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc) (holding Commonwealth met its burden of proof in suppression motion where Dixon’s motion alleged that suppression of physical evidence was required due to invalidity of stop, as opposed to manner in which evidence was seized following the stop). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Marcus
green
1 sentence2000In Marcus , this court did state that defendants in civil zoning enforcement proceedings are entitled to “the same protection as ... criminal defendants under the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Marcus, 690 A.2d at 845 n. 5. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Dixon v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp.
green
2 sentences1994We commence with the case of Dixon v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 56 A.D.2d 650 , 391 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1977), wherein the appellate division of the Supreme Court of New York was confronted with an appeal from an order denying the Appellant/Dixon's motion for leave to sue to recover monies claimed due from a governmental agency comparable to Pennsylvania's Assigned Claims Plan, i.e., the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC). 1994We commence with the case of Dixon v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 56 A.D.2d 650 , 391 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1977), wherein the appellate division of the Supreme Court of New York was confronted with an appeal from an order denying the Appellant/Dixon’s motion for leave to sue to recover monies claimed due from a governmental agency comparable to Pennsylvania’s Assigned Claims Plan, i.e., the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVA-IC). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Schiffman v. Hann Auto Trust
green
2 sentences1994We commence with the case of Dixon v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 56 A.D.2d 650 , 391 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1977), wherein the appellate division of the Supreme Court of New York was confronted with an appeal from an order denying the Appellant/Dixon's motion for leave to sue to recover monies claimed due from a governmental agency comparable to Pennsylvania's Assigned Claims Plan, i.e., the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC). 1994We commence with the case of Dixon v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 56 A.D.2d 650 , 391 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1977), wherein the appellate division of the Supreme Court of New York was confronted with an appeal from an order denying the Appellant/Dixon’s motion for leave to sue to recover monies claimed due from a governmental agency comparable to Pennsylvania’s Assigned Claims Plan, i.e., the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVA-IC). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.