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9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1899–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
K.C. and V.C. v. L.A. Appeal of: D.M and L.N.green1 sentence2025Legion Post 153 Home Ass’n, 257 A.3d 751, 755-757 (Pa. Super. 2021) (permitting an insurance company to challenge, as a collateral order pursuant to Rule 313(b), an order denying its petition to intervene for purpose of securing special interrogatories relating to damages); K.C. v. L.A., 128 A.3d 774, 780 (Pa. 2015) (stating, an “order denying intervention is one type of order which must be appealed within thirty days of its entry under Rule of Appellate Procedure 903, or not at all, precisely because the failure to attain intervenor status forecloses a later appeal” (citation, original quotat | 1 | 1 |
Bogdan, D. v. American Legion Post 153green1 sentence2025Legion Post 153 Home Ass’n, 257 A.3d 751, 755-757 (Pa. Super. 2021) (permitting an insurance company to challenge, as a collateral order pursuant to Rule 313(b), an order denying its petition to intervene for purpose of securing special interrogatories relating to damages); K.C. v. L.A., 128 A.3d 774, 780 (Pa. 2015) (stating, an “order denying intervention is one type of order which must be appealed within thirty days of its entry under Rule of Appellate Procedure 903, or not at all, precisely because the failure to attain intervenor status forecloses a later appeal” (citation, original quotat | 1 | 1 |
Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North Americagreen1 sentence2004See Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co., supra, All Pa. at 76-77, 371 A.2d at 198, and its progeny. | 1 | 1 |
Rykill v. Franklin Fire Insurancegreen2 sentences2000In Rykill v. Franklin Fire Insurance Co., 80 Pa. Super. 492, 495 (1923), the court upheld a similar provision, stating that an insurance company has the privilege to decline entering into a contract unless the insured agreed the car would not be used to carry passengers for a fee. 2000In that case, it had been proven that the insured had on prior occasions used his vehicle to carry passengers for a fee. 1 Id. | 1 | 1 |
Greenberg v. Blumberggreen2 sentences1965See, McWilliams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644 , 179 A. 2d 222 (1962), and Greenberg v. Blumberg, 416 Pa. 226 , 206 A. 2d 16 (1965). 1965See, McWilliams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644 , 179 A. 2d 222 (1962), and Greenberg v. Blumberg, 416 Pa. 226 , 206 A. 2d 16 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
McWilliams v. McCabegreen2 sentences1965See, McWilliams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644 , 179 A. 2d 222 (1962), and Greenberg v. Blumberg, 416 Pa. 226 , 206 A. 2d 16 (1965). 1965See, McWilliams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644 , 179 A. 2d 222 (1962), and Greenberg v. Blumberg, 416 Pa. 226 , 206 A. 2d 16 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co.green2 sentences1963Rev. 526 (1941). 4 Although a complaint was not yet filed, appellant had retained counsel who in turn notified the insurance company of her claim. 5 See Hull v. The Curtis Publishing Company, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 86, 90 , 125 A. 2d 644, 650 (1956). 6 We are referring to tlie general policy behind these investigations and not to the validity of appellant’s particular claim. 7 Act of August 21, 1953, P. L. 1273, §2(b) (2) and (10), 22 P.S. §12 (b)(2) and (10). 8 See e.g., Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88 So. 2d 716 (La. 1956). 9 See Restatement, Torts §867, illustrations 4 and 6. 10 Since the 1963Rev. 526 (1941). 4 Although a complaint was not yet filed, appellant had retained counsel who in turn notified the insurance company of her claim. 5 See Hull v. The Curtis Publishing Company, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 86, 90 , 125 A. 2d 644, 650 (1956). 6 We are referring to tlie general policy behind these investigations and not to the validity of appellant’s particular claim. 7 Act of August 21, 1953, P. L. 1273, §2(b) (2) and (10), 22 P.S. §12 (b)(2) and (10). 8 See e.g., Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88 So. 2d 716 (La. 1956). 9 See Restatement, Torts §867, illustrations 4 and 6. 10 Since the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan
green
2 sentences1992The Superior Court in the case of Jackson v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan, 394 Pa. Super. 274 , 575 A.2d 626 (1990), said that: “The purpose of the statute [defining uninsured vehicle] was to prevent fraud and the attempted recovery of benefits in cases where accidents were alleged to have been caused by ‘phantom’ vehicles.” Id. at 276 , 575 A.2d at 628 n.2. (citations omitted) Therefore, it would seem logical that the way in which the notice provision to the carrier prevents fraud is to give the carrier timely notice of a “phantom” vehicle’s participation in the 1992The Superior Court in the case of Jackson v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan, 394 Pa. Super. 274 , 575 A.2d 626 (1990), said that: “The purpose of the statute [defining uninsured vehicle] was to prevent fraud and the attempted recovery of benefits in cases where accidents were alleged to have been caused by ‘phantom’ vehicles.” Id. at 276 , 575 A.2d at 628 n.2. (citations omitted) Therefore, it would seem logical that the way in which the notice provision to the carrier prevents fraud is to give the carrier timely notice of a “phantom” vehicle’s participation in the | 1 | 1992–1992 |
C. H. Pitt Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America
green
1 sentence1973Pitt Corp., supra, and Loftus v. City of Gwbondale, supra. In this case there are other methods, though not as expeditious, by which the insurance company can test its duties under the insurance policy. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Souder v. Pendleton Detectives
neutral
1 sentence1963Rev. 526 (1941). 4 Although a complaint was not yet filed, appellant had retained counsel who in turn notified the insurance company of her claim. 5 See Hull v. The Curtis Publishing Company, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 86, 90 , 125 A. 2d 644, 650 (1956). 6 We are referring to tlie general policy behind these investigations and not to the validity of appellant’s particular claim. 7 Act of August 21, 1953, P. L. 1273, §2(b) (2) and (10), 22 P.S. §12 (b)(2) and (10). 8 See e.g., Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88 So. 2d 716 (La. 1956). 9 See Restatement, Torts §867, illustrations 4 and 6. 10 Since the | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Syme v. Bankers National Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1961Appellant-plaintiff first contends that an answer which is set forth in an application for a policy of life insurance, no matter how false or fraudulent the answer may be, is unavailable to the insurance company as a defense when the application is for a different policy than the policy of insurance to which a copy of it is attached: Syme v. Bankers National Life Insurance Co., 393 Pa. 600 , 144 A. 2d 845 (1958); Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 305 Pa. 296 , 157 A. 614 ; The Insurance De partment Act, May 17, 1921, * §441. 1961Appellant-plaintiff first contends that an answer which is set forth in an application for a policy of life insurance, no matter how false or fraudulent the answer may be, is unavailable to the insurance company as a defense when the application is for a different policy than the policy of insurance to which a copy of it is attached: Syme v. Bankers National Life Insurance Co., 393 Pa. 600 , 144 A. 2d 845 (1958); Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 305 Pa. 296 , 157 A. 614 ; The Insurance De partment Act, May 17, 1921, * §441. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1961Appellant-plaintiff first contends that an answer which is set forth in an application for a policy of life insurance, no matter how false or fraudulent the answer may be, is unavailable to the insurance company as a defense when the application is for a different policy than the policy of insurance to which a copy of it is attached: Syme v. Bankers National Life Insurance Co., 393 Pa. 600 , 144 A. 2d 845 (1958); Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 305 Pa. 296 , 157 A. 614 ; The Insurance De partment Act, May 17, 1921, * §441. 1961Appellant-plaintiff first contends that an answer which is set forth in an application for a policy of life insurance, no matter how false or fraudulent the answer may be, is unavailable to the insurance company as a defense when the application is for a different policy than the policy of insurance to which a copy of it is attached: Syme v. Bankers National Life Insurance Co., 393 Pa. 600 , 144 A. 2d 845 (1958); Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 305 Pa. 296 , 157 A. 614 ; The Insurance De partment Act, May 17, 1921, * §441. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Sterling v. Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co. of Philadelphia
neutral
1 sentence1899Co., 32 Pa. 75 . | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.