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9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 2006–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Estate of Strickergreen2 sentences2018"The [collateral order] doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently." In re Estate of Stricker , 602 Pa. 54 , 977 A.2d 1115 , 1119 (2009), superseded by statute as stated in In re Estate of Plance , 175 A.3d 249 (Pa. 2017). 2018"The [collateral order] doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently." In re Estate of Stricker , 602 Pa. 54 , 977 A.2d 1115 , 1119 (2009), superseded by statute as stated in In re Estate of Plance , 175 A.3d 249 (Pa. 2017). | 5 | 6 |
In Re the Twenty-Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jurygreen2 sentences2025The collateral order “doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently.” In re Twenty-Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 907 A.2d 505, 510 (Pa. 2006). 2010Indeed, Rule 313 is “to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently.” In re Estate of Stricker, 602 Pa. 54, 61 , 977 A.2d 1115, 1119 (2009) (quoting In re Twenty-Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 589, Pa. 89, 98, 907 A.2d 505, 510 (2006)); see Rae, 602 Pa. at 78 , 977 A.2d at 1129 . | 3 | 3 |
Melvin v. Doegreen2 sentences2009“The doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently.” In re Twenty-Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 589 Pa. 89 , 907 A.2d 505, 510 (2006), citing Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264 , 836 A.2d 42, 46-47 (2003). 2009“The doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently.” In re Twenty-Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 589 Pa. 89 , 907 A.2d 505, 510 (2006), citing Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264 , 836 A.2d 42, 46-47 (2003). | 3 | 3 |
Rae v. PA FUNERAL DIRECTORS ASS'Ngreen2 sentences2016Williams, 86 A.3d at 780 ; see also In re Estate of Stricker, 602 Pa. 54 , 977 A.2d 1115, 1119 (2009) (“The [collateral order] doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently.”); Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Ass’n, 602 Pa. 65 , 977 A.2d 1121 , 1126 (2009) (“To buttress the final order rule, we, too, have concluded the collateral order doctrine is to be construed narrowly, and we require every one of its three prongs be clearly pres 2016Williams, 86 A.3d at 780 ; see also In re Estate of Stricker, 977 A.2d 1115, 1119 (Pa. 2009) (“The [collateral order] doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently.”); Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral [J-91-2015] - 9 Directors Ass'n, 977 A.2d 1121 , 1126 (Pa. 2009) (“To buttress the final order rule, we, too, have concluded the collateral order doctrine is to be construed narrowly, and we require every one of its three prongs be clearly presen | 2 | 2 |
Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Ass'ngreen2 sentences2016Williams, 86 A.3d at 780 ; see also In re Estate of Stricker, 602 Pa. 54 , 977 A.2d 1115, 1119 (2009) (“The [collateral order] doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently.”); Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Ass’n, 602 Pa. 65 , 977 A.2d 1121 , 1126 (2009) (“To buttress the final order rule, we, too, have concluded the collateral order doctrine is to be construed narrowly, and we require every one of its three prongs be clearly pres 2010Indeed, Rule 313 is “to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently.” In re Estate of Stricker, 602 Pa. 54, 61 , 977 A.2d 1115, 1119 (2009) (quoting In re Twenty-Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 589, Pa. 89, 98, 907 A.2d 505, 510 (2006)); see Rae, 602 Pa. at 78 , 977 A.2d at 1129 . | 2 | 2 |
Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Authority v. Gladstonegreen1 sentence2014“The collateral order doctrine ‘is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently.’ ” Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth. v. Gladstone, 999 A.2d 1248, 1254 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2010) (quoting In re Estate of Stricker, 602 Pa. 54 , 977 A.2d 1115, 1119 (2009)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re: Estate of Plance Appeal of: Plance, J.
green
1 sentence2018"The [collateral order] doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently." In re Estate of Stricker , 602 Pa. 54 , 977 A.2d 1115 , 1119 (2009), superseded by statute as stated in In re Estate of Plance , 175 A.3d 249 (Pa. 2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Brown v. Pa. Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2016Williams, 86 A.3d at 780 ; see also In re Estate of Stricker, 602 Pa. 54 , 977 A.2d 1115, 1119 (2009) (“The [collateral order] doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently.”); Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Ass’n, 602 Pa. 65 , 977 A.2d 1121 , 1126 (2009) (“To buttress the final order rule, we, too, have concluded the collateral order doctrine is to be construed narrowly, and we require every one of its three prongs be clearly pres 2016Williams, 86 A.3d at 780 ; see also In re Estate of Stricker, 977 A.2d 1115, 1119 (Pa. 2009) (“The [collateral order] doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only final orders may be appealed; thus, the requirements for a collateral order are applied relatively stringently.”); Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral [J-91-2015] - 9 Directors Ass'n, 977 A.2d 1121 , 1126 (Pa. 2009) (“To buttress the final order rule, we, too, have concluded the collateral order doctrine is to be construed narrowly, and we require every one of its three prongs be clearly presen | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Dunn v. Board of Property Assessment
neutral
1 sentence2014In Dunn v. Allegheny County Property Assessment Appeals & Review, 794 A.2d 416, 423 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), ajfd, 594 Pa. 410 , 936 A.2d 487 (2007), this Court specifically held that “an order denying class action certification is a collateral order and, as such, is appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 313.” Although the Dunn Court reached its conclusion having analyzed only the separability requirement of Pa. R.A.P. 313(b), the law makes clear that the Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) criteria — separability, importance and urgency — must be applied, and only those claims that meet all three criteria will be immediately rev | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Dunn v. ALLEGHENY CTY. PROP. ASSESSMENT
green
1 sentence2014In Dunn v. Allegheny County Property Assessment Appeals & Review, 794 A.2d 416, 423 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), ajfd, 594 Pa. 410 , 936 A.2d 487 (2007), this Court specifically held that “an order denying class action certification is a collateral order and, as such, is appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 313.” Although the Dunn Court reached its conclusion having analyzed only the separability requirement of Pa. R.A.P. 313(b), the law makes clear that the Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) criteria — separability, importance and urgency — must be applied, and only those claims that meet all three criteria will be immediately rev | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Dunn v. Board of Property Assessment
green
1 sentence2014In Dunn v. Allegheny County Property Assessment Appeals & Review, 794 A.2d 416, 423 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), ajfd, 594 Pa. 410 , 936 A.2d 487 (2007), this Court specifically held that “an order denying class action certification is a collateral order and, as such, is appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 313.” Although the Dunn Court reached its conclusion having analyzed only the separability requirement of Pa. R.A.P. 313(b), the law makes clear that the Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) criteria — separability, importance and urgency — must be applied, and only those claims that meet all three criteria will be immediately rev | 1 | 2014–2014 |