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9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1998–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Gaffneygreen2 sentences2005In reaching this conclusion, we employ the Artway/Verniero test as set forth in Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 557 Pa. 327, 733 A.2d 616 (1999). 2 ¶ 10 Under the Artway¡Vemiero test, a statutory provision will be considered punishment where any of the following three criterion are found: “(1) the legislature’s actual purpose is punishment, (2) the objective purpose is punishment, or (3) the effect of the statute is so harsh that ‘as a matter of degree’ it constitutes punishment.” Gaffney, 557 Pa. at 331 , 733 A.2d at 618 (citation omitted). ¶ 11 The Artway ¡Vemiero test requires us first to look at 2005In reaching this conclusion, we employ the Artway/Verniero test as set forth in Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 557 Pa. 327, 733 A.2d 616 (1999). 2 ¶ 10 Under the Artway¡Vemiero test, a statutory provision will be considered punishment where any of the following three criterion are found: “(1) the legislature’s actual purpose is punishment, (2) the objective purpose is punishment, or (3) the effect of the statute is so harsh that ‘as a matter of degree’ it constitutes punishment.” Gaffney, 557 Pa. at 331 , 733 A.2d at 618 (citation omitted). ¶ 11 The Artway ¡Vemiero test requires us first to look at | 3 | 4 |
cluster 716733green2 sentences2005See Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.1996); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir.1997). 1998The Gaffney court analyzed this issue in light of the three-prong test set forth in Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235 (3rd Cir.1996), as modified in E.B. v. Verniero, supra. The Artway /Vemiero test is designed to determine whether a legislative act qualifies as punishment. | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Duffygreen1 sentence2017Nor should we ignore that this Court consistently has relied upon federal precedent when resolving state ex post facto claims, see e.g., Young, 637 A.2d at 1317 (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 , and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-51 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 513 (Pa. 1880) (defining “ex post facto laws” consistent with Justice Chase’s definition in Calder); Kalck, 87 A. at 62 (noting that the rule announced in Calder remains unchanged), occasionally even going so far as to suggest that the resolution of an “appellant’s federal ex post f | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kalckgreen1 sentence2017Nor should we ignore that this Court consistently has relied upon federal precedent when resolving state ex post facto claims, see e.g., Young, 637 A.2d at 1317 (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 , and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-51 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 513 (Pa. 1880) (defining “ex post facto laws” consistent with Justice Chase’s definition in Calder); Kalck, 87 A. at 62 (noting that the rule announced in Calder remains unchanged), occasionally even going so far as to suggest that the resolution of an “appellant’s federal ex post f | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fishergreen2 sentences2017Nor should we ignore that this Court consistently has relied upon federal precedent when resolving state ex post facto claims, see e.g., Young, 637 A.2d at 1317 (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 , and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-51 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 513 (Pa. 1880) (defining “ex post facto laws” consistent with Justice Chase’s definition in Calder); Kalck, 87 A. at 62 (noting that the rule announced in Calder remains unchanged), occasionally even going so far as to suggest that the resolution of an “appellant’s federal ex post f 2017Nor should we ignore that this Court consistently has relied upon federal precedent when resolving state ex post facto claims, see e.g., Young, 637 A.2d at 1317 (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 , and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-51 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 513 (Pa. 1880) (defining “ex post facto laws” consistent with Justice Chase’s definition in Calder); Kalck, 87 A. at 62 (noting that the rule announced in Calder remains unchanged), occasionally even going so far as to suggest that the resolution of an “appellant’s federal ex post f | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gaffneygreen1 sentence2014If question (C) is answered in the affirmative, then a measure will be considered punitive if: (a) the "deterrent purpose is an unnecessary complement to the measure’s salutary operation,” (b) "the measure is operating in an unusual manner inconsistent with its historically mixed purposes," or (c) "the deterrent purpose overwhelms the salutary purpose." Gaffney, 733 A.2d at 619 -20 (quoting Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 702 A.2d 565, 567 (Pa.Super.1997), aff'd, 557 Pa. 327 , 733 A.2d 616 (1999)) (alteration and omission in original). . | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Doegreen2 sentences2003See generally Smith, 538 U.S. at 105 , 123 S.Ct. at 1154 (indicating that the crux of the excessiveness inquiry is not “whether the legislature has made the best choice possible,” but “whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective” sought to be achieved). 2003See generally Smith, 538 U.S. at 105 , 123 S.Ct. at 1154 (indicating that the crux of the excessiveness inquiry is not “whether the legislature has made the best choice possible,” but “whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective” sought to be achieved). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nos. 96-5132, 96-5416
green
2 sentences2006Under the first element, the court looks to whether the adverse effect upon the individual results from a desire by the Legislature “to punish past conduct or is [instead] a by-product of a bona fide legislative effort to remedy a perceived societal problem.” Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1093 . 2005See Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.1996); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir.1997). | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Calder v. Bull
green
1 sentence2017Nor should we ignore that this Court consistently has relied upon federal precedent when resolving state ex post facto claims, see e.g., Young, 637 A.2d at 1317 (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 , and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-51 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 513 (Pa. 1880) (defining “ex post facto laws” consistent with Justice Chase’s definition in Calder); Kalck, 87 A. at 62 (noting that the rule announced in Calder remains unchanged), occasionally even going so far as to suggest that the resolution of an “appellant’s federal ex post f | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police
green
1 sentence2017After the United States Supreme Court adopted the intent-effects test in Smith , however, we did the same— announcing that we would abandon the Artway/Vemiero test “[i]n order to promote consistency.” Lehman, 839 A.2d at 271 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Collins v. Youngblood
green
2 sentences2017Nor should we ignore that this Court consistently has relied upon federal precedent when resolving state ex post facto claims, see e.g., Young, 637 A.2d at 1317 (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 , and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-51 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 513 (Pa. 1880) (defining “ex post facto laws” consistent with Justice Chase’s definition in Calder); Kalck, 87 A. at 62 (noting that the rule announced in Calder remains unchanged), occasionally even going so far as to suggest that the resolution of an “appellant’s federal ex post f 2017Nor should we ignore that this Court consistently has relied upon federal precedent when resolving state ex post facto claims, see e.g., Young, 637 A.2d at 1317 (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 , and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-51 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 513 (Pa. 1880) (defining “ex post facto laws” consistent with Justice Chase’s definition in Calder); Kalck, 87 A. at 62 (noting that the rule announced in Calder remains unchanged), occasionally even going so far as to suggest that the resolution of an “appellant’s federal ex post f | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Young
green
2 sentences2017Nor should we ignore that this Court consistently has relied upon federal precedent when resolving state ex post facto claims, see e.g., Young, 637 A.2d at 1317 (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 , and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-51 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 513 (Pa. 1880) (defining “ex post facto laws” consistent with Justice Chase’s definition in Calder); Kalck, 87 A. at 62 (noting that the rule announced in Calder remains unchanged), occasionally even going so far as to suggest that the resolution of an “appellant’s federal ex post f 2017Nor should we ignore that this Court consistently has relied upon federal precedent when resolving state ex post facto claims, see e.g., Young, 637 A.2d at 1317 (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 , and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-51 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 513 (Pa. 1880) (defining “ex post facto laws” consistent with Justice Chase’s definition in Calder); Kalck, 87 A. at 62 (noting that the rule announced in Calder remains unchanged), occasionally even going so far as to suggest that the resolution of an “appellant’s federal ex post f | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.